Predicting General Aviation Accidents Using Machine Learning Algorithms by Baugh, Bradley S.
PhD Dissertations and Master's Theses 
10-2020 
Predicting General Aviation Accidents Using Machine Learning 
Algorithms 
Bradley S. Baugh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/edt 
 Part of the Aviation Commons, and the Materials Science and Engineering Commons 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Baugh, Bradley S., "Predicting General Aviation Accidents Using Machine Learning Algorithms" (2020). 
PhD Dissertations and Master's Theses. 545. 
https://commons.erau.edu/edt/545 
This Dissertation - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in PhD Dissertations and Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
Predicting General Aviation Accidents Using Machine Learning Algorithms 
Bradley S. Baugh 
Dissertation Submitted to the College of Aviation in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Daytona Beach, Florida 
October 2020 
ii 
© 2020 Bradley S. Baugh 
All Rights Reserved. 
iii 
Predicting General Aviation Accidents Using Machine Learning Algorithms 
Bradley S. Baugh 
This Dissertation was prepared under the direction of the candidate’s Dissertation 
Committee Chair, Dr. Bruce A. Conway, and has been approved by the members of the 
dissertation committee. It was submitted to the College of Aviation and was accepted in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation 
Bruce A. Conway, Ph.D. 
Committee Chair 
Dothang Truong, Ph.D. Steven Hampton, Ed.D. 
Committee Member Associate Dean, School of Graduate 
Studies, College of Aviation 
David S. Cross, Ph.D. Alan J. Stolzer, Ph.D. 
Committee Member Dean, College of Aviation 
Robert W. Maxson, Ph.D. 
Committee Member (External) 
Lon Moeller, J.D. 
Senior Vice President for Academic 
Affairs & Provost 
10/07/2020 
____________________ 
Date 
iv 
Abstract 
Researcher: Bradley S. Baugh 
Title: Predicting General Aviation Accidents Using Machine Learning 
Algorithms 
 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation 
Year: 2020 
Aviation safety management is implemented through reactive, proactive, and predictive 
methodologies. Unlike reactive and proactive safety, predictive safety can predict the 
next accident and enable prevention before an actual occurrence. The study outlined here 
promotes predictive safety management through machine learning technologies using 
large amounts of data to facilitate predictive modeling.  
The study addresses efforts to reduce General Aviation accidents, an effort that 
was renewed in earnest with the Federal Aviation Administration’s 1998 Safer Skies 
Initiative. Over the past 22 years, the General Aviation fatality rate has decreased. 
However, accidents still happen, and there is some evidence showing the number of 
accidents, representing hazard exposure, is increasing. The accident data suggest that the 
aviation community still has more to learn about the variables involved in an accident 
sequence.  
The purpose of the study was to conduct an exploratory data-driven examination 
of General Aviation accidents in the United States from January 1, 1998, to December 
31, 2018, using machine learning and data mining techniques. The goal was to determine 
what model best predicts fatal and severe injury aviation accidents and further, what 
variables were most important in the prediction model. 
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The study sample comprised 26,387 fixed-wing general aviation accidents 
accessed through the publicly accessible National Transportation Safety Board Aviation 
Accident Database and Synopses archive. Using a mixed-methods approach, the study 
employed both unstructured narrative text and structured tabular data within the 
predictive modeling. First, the accident narratives were culled using text mining 
algorithms to develop text-based quantitative variables. Next, data mining algorithms 
were used to develop models based on both text- and data-based variables derived from 
the accident reports. 
Five types of machine learning models were created using SAS® Enterprise 
Miner™, including the Decision Tree, Gradient Boosting, Logistic Regression, Neural 
Network, and Random Forest. Additionally, three broad sets of variables were used in 
modeling, including text-only, data-only, and a combination of text and data variables. 
Three models, Logistic Regression (text-only variables), Random Forest (text-only 
variables), and Gradient Boosting (text and data variables), emerged with a similar 
prediction capability. The top six variables within the models were all text-based 
covering Medical, Slow-flight and stalls, Flight control, IMC flight, Weather factors, and 
Flight hours topics. The Logistic Regression (Text) model was selected as the champion 
model: Misclassification Rate = 0.098, ROC Index = 0.945, and Cumulative Lift = 3.46. 
The results of the study provide insights to the entire General Aviation 
community, including government, industry, flight training, and the operational pilot. 
Specific recommendations include the following areas: 1) improve the quality and 
usefulness of accident reports for machine learning applications, 2) investigate ways to 
capture and publish more open-source flight data for use in safety modeling, 3) invest in 
vi 
additional medical education and find ways to address impairing medications and high 
risk medical conditions, 4) renew efforts on improving flight skills and combatting 
decision-based errors, 5) emphasize the importance of weather briefings, pre-flight 
planning, and weather-based risk management, and 6) create an aviation-specific corpus 
for text mining to improve text analysis and transformation.  
Keywords: general aviation, machine learning, text mining, data mining, 
predictive safety management  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
The introduction chapter for this study provides a project overview and lays a 
foundation for the follow-on chapters. The foundation begins with a brief background on 
general aviation accidents. Following the background is a discussion of the problem 
statement, the purpose of the study, and study significance. Next, the research questions 
that drive the methodology and research design are presented. Delimitations, limitations, 
and assumptions provide the scope and boundaries of the study. Finally, key definitions 
of significant terms and concepts are provided to facilitate understanding and knowledge 
transfer.  
Background/Overview 
The analysis of modern aviation accidents may be traced to the 1908 Wright Flyer 
crash that killed Thomas Selfridge and injured Orville Wright (Bruno, 1944). While the 
flight environment has become more complex, the core components of accident 
investigation have remained mostly unchanged. The goal of accident analysis is to 
determine what happened to prevent future mishaps. What has changed in the realm of 
accident prevention is a move from reactive analysis--a review of what has happened--to 
methods of proactive prevention. More recent is the effort to move beyond proactive 
accident prevention to predictive methods enabled by machine learning (Shmueli et al., 
2016; Stolzer, Halford et al., 2011). Data mining is a multidisciplinary science concerned 
with extracting information from large quantities of data and draws from different areas 
such as machine learning, artificial intelligence, neural networks, database technology, 
and computer science (Han & Kamber, 2001). Data mining is much more than extracting 
data from a database. It is the machine learning intelligence functionality within data 
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mining that enables the extraction of knowledge that cannot be detected using traditional 
statistical methods or with limited amounts of data (Han & Kamber, 2001). Limitations 
of traditional methods such as assumptions of normality, sensitivity to missing values, 
and multicollinearity are overcome when data mining large amounts of data (Truong et 
al., 2018). As applied to aviation, by using machine learning, it may be possible to predict 
specific types of aviation accidents supporting targeted interventions to prevent adverse 
outcomes (Burnett & Si, 2017; Liu et al., 2013; Stolzer & Halford, 2007). As noted, an 
enabling component of machine learning is access to large blocks of data. One such 
source is the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Aviation Accident Database 
& Synopses (NTSB, 2020b). 
General Aviation Operations   
General Aviation (GA) represents a major portion of flight operations within the 
United States and encompasses a wide array of operations types, aircraft types, pilot 
experience, and operating standards. A standard definition of GA involves a reference to 
what is not included in the category. GA operations are civil aviation flights that do not 
include scheduled or unscheduled air carriers (FAA, 2017). Operations not involving 
scheduled or unscheduled air carriers include such areas as personal use, flight 
instruction, business, agriculture, sight-seeing, and air medical flights (FAA, 2020b), 
though that list is far from exhaustive. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
(2020) conducts annual surveys of aircraft activities by aircraft types in the categories of 
fixed wing-piston, fixed wing-turboprop, fixed wing-turbojet, rotorcraft-piston, 
rotorcraft-turbine, gliders, lighter-than-air, experimental, and special light-sport, giving 
some indication of the variation in aircraft complexities across the GA fleet. According to 
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the FAA (2018), there are over 220,000 GA aircraft in the United States. Focusing on the 
fixed-wing subset of the GA fleet, the FAA (2020) data show that in 2017 there were 
167,560 active aircraft that flew 18,336,203 hours. Overall, both the total number of 
active GA aircraft and total GA flight hours decreased between 1999 and 2017 with the 
lowest numbers in 2013. Since 2013, the total number of active GA aircraft and total GA 
flight hours has been increasing (FAA, 2020b), as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1 
Fixed-wing Active Aircraft and Flight Hours, 1999-2017 
 
Note. Adapted from the FAA General Aviation and Part 135 Activity Surveys (FAA, 2020b). *The active 
aircraft and flight hours data for 2011 are presented as averages of 2010 and 2012 because the FAA has not 
published the data for 2011.  
 
Pilot Certifications. Just as there is a wide variety of GA aircraft and operations, 
there is a wide variety of pilots and certifications. Airmen may earn many different pilot 
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transport pilot (ATP). Each requires varying levels of training and flight hours in order to 
qualify for the different certificates. All but those who obtain a commercial or ATP 
certificate are limited to GA flying. Commercial and ATP pilots are not limited and may 
fly under different flight rules in addition to Part 91. At the end of 2018, there were 
633,316 pilots with active certifications in the US. (FAA, 2019a). Of the total number of 
certificates, 26% are student pilot certificates (FAA, 2019a). Student, sport, recreational, 
and private pilot certificates comprise 48% of the active certificates (FAA, 2019a). 
Pilot medical requirements. In addition to the variety of GA aircraft and possible 
pilot certification levels, each pilot certificate has a different medical requirement that 
varies by age. One difference between the airline community and the general aviation 
community is that that active airline pilots must retire at 65, whereas there are no upper 
age restrictions for GA pilots. Age may have different implications for aviation accidents 
given a GA population of over 92,000 pilots age 65 or higher, with 9,188 pilots age 80 or 
older (FAA, 2019a). A general description of pilot medical requirements can be viewed 
in Table 1.  
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Table 1 
General Pilot Medical Requirements  
Certificate Medical 
Requirement 
Renewal Requirement 
Sport Not Required* *A sport pilot may operate according to their U.S. 
driver’s license restrictions. 
Recreational Third-Class 
Medical 
<40, every 60 months; 40 and over, every 24 
months 
Student Third-Class 
Medical 
<40, every 60 months; 40 and over, every 24 
months 
Private Third-Class 
Medical 
<40, every 60 months; 40 and over, every 24 
months 
Commercial Second-Class 
Medical 
Every 12 months  
ATP First-Class 
Medical 
<40, every 12 months; 40 and over, every six 
months 
Note. The information contained in the table is general and does not capture all of the possible variables. 
The 14 CFR § 61 (Certification: Pilots, 2020) is the source document for all variations of medical 
requirements. 
 
 The primary reason for considering the different aircraft, types of operations, pilot 
certification levels, and medical standards is to frame some of the challenges with 
addressing safety issues in GA. Variations in training, flight experience, aircraft speeds, 
aircraft complexity, and flying operations present very different hazards than that found 
in the airlines and other non-GA commercial operations. Unfortunately, sometimes the 
hazards develop into aviation accidents. 
General Aviation Accidents  
6 
 
A review of accident trends between 1998-2016 reveals mixed conclusions. The 
Joseph T. Nall reports have been an industry source of GA accident statistical roll-ups 
since 1997, with the most recent report covering 2016 (AOPA, 2019). Figure 2 shows the 
fixed-wing GA accident data from 1998-2016. The gold bars indicate the total number of 
accidents per year. Accident rates per 100,000 flight hours are superimposed as line 
graphs. The 2016 data indicate there were 1,036 fixed-wing accidents, of which 159 
involved fatalities. 
 
Figure 2 
Fixed-wing Non-commercial Accidents, 1998-2016 
 
Note. Adapted from the Joseph T. Nall reports AOPA, 2019). *The accident rates from 2011 are estimated 
using the average of the flight hours flown in 2010 and 2012 due to missing data from the FAA. 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
*2
01
1
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
Ac
ci
de
nt
 R
at
es
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
 h
ou
rs
N
um
be
r o
f A
cc
id
en
ts
# of Accidents Fatal Accidents Accident Rate Fatal Rate
7 
 
A review of FAA-provided data, which uses a slightly different accounting 
period, shows there were 347 fatalities from GA accidents in the Fiscal Year 2017 
(October 1, 2016, through September 30, 2017) (FAA, 2018). The fatalities occurred 
from 209 accidents. What the Fiscal Year 2017 numbers do not capture is 961 additional 
GA accidents during the same period that did not result in a fatality (NTSB, 2020b). In 
pure numbers, since 1998, the number of both total accidents and fatal accidents has 
decreased. However, while the number of accidents in 2016 is lower than in 1998, 
accidents increased between 2013-2016 after 14 years of a declining accident trend. 
Many studies have concluded that human error is either causal or contributory to 
the vast majority of GA accidents (Boyd, 2017a; Boyd, 2017b; Houston et al., 2012; 
Shappell et al., 2007; Shappell & Wiegmann, 1996; Van Benthem & Herdman, 2016; 
Wiegmann et al., 2005; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). The 28th Joseph T. Nall Report 
shows that 72.9% of all fixed-wing GA accidents were pilot related. Private pilots were at 
the controls of 45.6% of the accidents, commercial pilots 25.2%, and ATP 19%. There 
was a second pilot in the aircraft in 18.3% of the accidents. Further, in 26% of the 
accidents, there was a certified flight instructor on board, and in 54.2% of the accidents, 
there was an IFR certified pilot on board (AOPA, 2019). 
Of the 1,036 fixed-wing GA accidents, 74.2% involved single-engine fixed-gear 
aircraft. The majority of accidents (73.4%) were listed as personal use, and 17.2% as 
instructional flights. The most dangerous flight condition was day VMC accounting for 
89.1% of fixed-wing GA aircraft accidents and 78.6% of the fatal accidents. The bulk of 
accidents (32%) occurred during the landing phase. The most significant portion of the 
landing accidents (47%) involved loss of control (LOC) with airspeed/stall and hard 
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landings accounting for another 28%. As a group, 48% of all fixed-wing GA accidents 
occurred during landing, takeoff and climb, and descent/approach, in other words, near an 
airport (AOPA, 2019). 
Many studies and reports have touted the safety record of the airline industry 
(Cusick et al., 2017; Ekman & Debacker, 2018; FAA, 2019b; Madsen et al., 2016; 
Shappell et al., 2007). The accolades appear well-founded. In 2016, the scheduled airline 
accident rate was 0.164 (Bureau of Transportation, n.d.), whereas the GA fixed-wing 
accident rate was 5.67 (AOPA, 2019). Interestingly, the difference in total flight hours 
between the two groups was only 3%, with the scheduled airlines flying 18,294,000 hours 
in 2016 (BTS, n.d.b) compared to the GA fixed-wing community flying 17, 691, 000 
flight hours (AOPA, 2019). A comparison of flight hours between GA (Part 91 in blue) 
and scheduled airlines (Part 121 in gold) can be seen in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 
Flight Hours Comparison, 1998-2016  
 
Note. Adapted from the Joseph T. Nall reports (AOPA, 2019) and Bureau of Transportation (n.d.) statistics. 
*The 2011 flight hours for the Part 91 aircraft data are presented as averages of 2010 and 2012 because the 
FAA has not published the data for 2011. 
 
While GA flight hours have decreased since 1998, the accident and fatality rates 
have stayed fairly static, as shown in Figure 4. Over the same period, commercial airline 
accident rates have remained consistently low with the 2016 accident rate at .164 (Bureau 
of Transportation, n.d.).  
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Figure 4 
Accident & Fatality Rate Comparison, 1998-2016  
 
Note. Adapted from the Joseph T. Nall reports (AOPA, 2019) and Bureau of Transportation (n.d.) statistics. 
The rates are calculated as the number of occurrences every 100,000 flight hours. *The Part 91 accident 
rates from 2011 are estimated using the average of the fight hours flown in 2010 and 2012 due to missing 
data from the FAA.  
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First introduced in 1998, the FAA launched the Safer Skies Initiative to reduce all 
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GAJSC partners over the past 20 years, and though there have been incremental 
improvements at times, accidents still occur.  
More recent works on safety theory have outlined three different categories of 
safety efforts. The first is reactive safety, which relies on actual occurrences to develop 
safety interventions. The goal is to learn from the past so that the particular accidents are 
not repeated. The second is proactive safety, which relies on precursor conditions that, if 
identified early, can prevent actual occurrences. Key indicators are determined and 
tracked for trends, and participants voluntarily report near-misses so that mitigations can 
be implemented. The third is predictive safety, where accident occurrences are predicted 
before they occur based on modeling factors that have led to mishaps in the past. By 
determining the combination of factors and the relative weight of a factor contributing to 
an accident, steps can be taken to prevent accidents. 
Unfortunately, published research from governmental and quasi-governmental 
organizations regarding GA accident reduction is sparse. However, what appears to be 
evident is a reliance on reactive safety methodologies. Accident statistics are compiled, 
trends are noted, and initiatives developed to address high-level accident factors. 
Proactive safety methodologies are widely accepted as superior to reactive safety because 
proactive measures seek to prevent accidents by identifying and mitigating accident 
precursors. Proactive programs are robust in the air carrier world. For GA, there appears 
to be only one government-based proactive safety program, the Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS). The ASRS promotes anonymous self-identification of 
deviation without fear of punishment for the purpose of knowledge sharing. Predictive 
safety methodologies strive to provide data-driven knowledge based on past events “to 
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identify current behavior that has the same characteristics” (Dean, 2014, p. 16) with the 
goal of preventing accident precursors, or incidents, and accidents. A search of 
government repositories revealed very little in the way of predictive safety, nor are there 
any evident links between predictive safety methods and the FAA and GAJSC accident 
reduction efforts. 
Research reports from national aviation leaders are sparse providing an 
opportunity to explore new ways of analyzing the problem by leveraging the capabilities 
of machine learning as applied to vast accident archives. The current study seeks to 
augment predictive safety efforts to reduce accidents through data-driven analysis of 
NTSB aviation accident reports. 
Statement of the Problem 
Viable safety systems require continual identification and assessment of its 
components, including identification of hazards, assessments of risks, collection of data, 
and analysis of the data (Stolzer et al., 2018). Since 1998, there has been a targeted 
campaign to reduce GA fatalities, yet fatalities still occur. Data analysis indicates the GA 
fixed-wing accident fatality rate—the proportion of accidents involving a fatality—has 
decreased overall; however, the total number of GA accidents appears to have remained 
at a consistently steady rate (AOPA, 2018b). Further, the fatal accident rate increased 
from .94 in 2017 to 1.029 in 2018 (Gilbert, 2019). What remains unclear is why fatal 
accidents have generally decreased while the overall accident rate remains consistent. 
Perhaps there is undiscovered knowledge to be unlocked in the accident data; 
commonalities or factors that, if better understood, could prevent accidents. Reactive 
safety is expensive and inefficient in terms of both human lives and property. An accident 
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must occur to learn lessons. A better way to approach aviation safety is to predict 
accidents before costs are realized. A machine learning approach with big data could help 
reduce accidents by understanding variables that predict accidents. There is a gap of 
knowledge understanding factors that predict GA accidents (both fatal and non-fatal). 
Further, efforts in closing the gap in understanding are constrained by the limitations of 
traditional statistical modeling. A predictive exploratory data-driven approach to 
analyzing GA accidents through machine learning can potentially advance aviation 
knowledge beyond the limits of proactive safety methodologies and traditional 
correlational analysis. Once the variables are understood in the context of exploratory 
predictive modeling, barriers and mitigations may be instituted to prevent the next 
accident. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this data-driven exploratory study was to determine the model that 
best predicts the target variable—accident injury level—and determine the variables that 
are most important within the model. The variables were derived from quantitative 
tabular and qualitative narrative data found in the NTSB aviation accident report archive. 
Significance of the Study 
Theoretical Significance    
Aircraft incidents and accidents form the basis of reactive safety efforts (Stolzer 
& Goglia, 2015) and efforts to improve aircraft accident prevention have the greatest 
potential impact on operations as safety activities graduate from reactive to predictive 
methods (Baugh & Stolzer, 2018; Friend & Kohn, 2018; Stolzer, Halford et al., 2011). 
Further, the evaluation of accident precursors using new methods is still needed because 
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accidents are still occurring (Erjavac et al., 2018). The study, as envisioned, extends 
efforts to reduce GA accidents by using powerful machine learning techniques 
(predictive methodology) with a large dataset to detect previously undiscovered 
relationships between accident components. 
Practical Significance   
When aggregated, incidents and accidents drive safety campaigns (Aircraft 
Owners and Pilots Association, n.d.; General Aviation Joint Steering Committee, n.d.). 
These campaigns appear to have reduced mishaps; however, mishaps continue to occur. 
The biggest and most well-defined problems are being addressed. The next logical step is 
to investigate areas that are not as easily accessible or under-exploited. The study 
outlined here identifies an algorithm that can predict GA accident outcomes, which can 
more finely guide safety prevention activities. 
The results obtained from this study provide data for use in many academic and 
practical arenas, including developing strategies for improving pilot flight performance. 
Specific benefits are envisioned for general aviation participants, Federal Aviation 
Administration, industry leaders, academic researchers, and flight training institutions. 
Human factors and flight safety researchers will benefit by knowing the relevance of 
particular predictors of accidents to improve further research efforts. Accident 
investigators will benefit from an increased understanding of human error resulting from 
combinations of various human factors. Finally, flight training institutions can use the 
study outcomes to evaluate the curriculum in light of empirical indications of accident 
predictors. 
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Research Questions 
Two research questions guide this exploratory data-driven study: 
RQ1: What model developed with machine learning and data mining techniques best 
predicts fatal and severe injury aviation accidents?  
RQ2: What variables are most important in the selected model for predicting fatal and 
severe injury aviation accidents? 
Delimitations 
The scope of the current study must be defined to ensure feasibility and provide a 
foundation for assessments of generalizability, validity, and reliability. Additionally, the 
broad category of Part 91 GA activities covers a myriad of aircraft types, flight 
operations, and pilot certifications that make it difficult to make meaningful 
generalizations to the entirety of GA. Overall, the research involved Part 91 GA fixed-
wing aircraft accidents in the United States from 1998 to 2018. Because the study is 
interested in the actions of pilots in an accident sequence, crashes involving deliberate, 
willful negligence, or criminal actions were excluded.  
Given the variety of aircraft types within the GA category, the research focused 
only on fixed-wing aircraft. The study excluded the following aircraft: helicopters, 
gliders (powered or unpowered), lighter-than-air, weight-shift, gyrocopters, and powered 
parachutes. Aircraft operating under rules other than Part 91, such as Part 137 
(agriculture aircraft operations) or Part 135 (commuter and on-demand operations), were 
also excluded. 
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Limitations and Assumptions 
Limitations  
The primary limitation relates to the use of archival data. The research project 
relies on secondary historical reports captured by outside individuals for purposes that are 
not necessarily aligned with research designs (Vogt et al., 2012). Some reports are limited 
by the lack of completeness. However, the database is large enough that missing data are 
not anticipated to be a factor in the study results (Bordens & Abbott, 2011; Shmueli et al., 
2016; Truong et al., 2018). In most cases, and unlike aircraft operating as commercial air 
carriers, there are no onboard data capture devices such as cockpit voice recorders and 
flight data recorders. Data is provided based on witness reports, expert judgment, and 
post-crash physical evidence. 
Assumptions   
NTSB reports begin with an investigation outlining the facts surrounding the 
incident or accident. While the NTSB can send investigators to the site, in some cases, 
the facts are determined by other assigned government agencies or by phone interviews 
to individuals at the crash site. Reports submitted by operators are compiled on the NTSB 
Form 6120.1, Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report (NTSB, 2013). It is 
assumed that those individuals providing information to the NTSB answered questions 
honestly.  
Further, it is assumed that the NTSB instrument and methodology are valid and 
reliable. Once the investigation is complete, a report is generated and published in the 
NTSB Aviation Accident Database & Synopses (NTSB, 2020b). Reports are available in 
a standardized format as a PDF or HTML document. Data from the report is mirrored in 
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the downloadable Microsoft Access database. Addressing the NTSB process for 
capturing, storing, and publishing the data, the U.S. Government Accounting Office 
(2010) reported that all required quality assurance measures were in place to help ensure 
accuracy and correct erroneous entries. The quality assurance process includes 
management review, reconciliation of the completeness of the data, a process that 
promotes accuracy when entered into the system, a process that validates data entered 
into the system, and a process to identify and correct data errors (GAO, 2010). Further, 
the NTSB has defined database events to promote replication by third parties, and initial 
and recurrent training is provided to system users (GAO, 2010). 
Summary 
In Chapter I, the subject of the current study was introduced. The nature of the 
problem was stated, and the significance of the problem was outlined. Finally, the first 
chapter outlined research questions that provide direction for the project. 
Chapters II and III complete the setup for the dissertation project. Chapter II 
comprises an extensive review of the literature. Chapter III builds on the literature by 
providing a methodological foundation for addressing the research questions. The 
research design is presented in Chapter III, including details of the population, sample, 
and sampling strategy. Finally, major details on conducting the study and the approaches 
to analyzing the data will be given. Chapters IV and V present the study results and the 
discussion of the results, respectively. 
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Definitions of Terms 
Aviation Accident An aviation occurrence involving substantial 
damage or serious injury that happens on an aircraft 
with intentions to fly. The time period covers 
boarding to disembarking the aircraft (Definitions, 
2020). 
Big Data Describes a magnitude of compiled data typified by 
its volume, complexity, and speed of growth (EMC 
Education Services, 2015). 
Cause A deficiency, which if properly eliminated or 
mitigated, would likely have prevented the accident 
or reduced the accident severity (USAF, 2018; 
Wood, 2003). A cause may be related to a single 
factor or a combination of factors (Wood, 2003), 
and may relate to “actions, omissions, events, [or] 
conditions” (ICAO, 2016, p. 1-2) that led to an 
accident. 
Civil Aircraft An aircraft not categorized as a public aircraft 
(Definitions, 2020). 
Class Variable Used in SAS® EM™, a class variable is 
synonymous with a categorical variable (McCarthy, 
McCarthy, Ceccucci, & Halawi, 2019; SAS 
Institute Inc, 2019a). 
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Confusion Matrix Describes a table used to visualize classifier 
performance. As used in the current study, a 2x2 
matrix shows how many times a model correctly 
and incorrectly categorized the target in terms of 
True Positives (TP), False Positives (FP), True 
Negatives (TN), and False Negatives (FN) (EMC 
Education Services, 2015). 
Data Mining Extracting information from large quantities of data 
using machine learning techniques to detect hidden 
associations (Han & Kamber, 2001; Tufféry, 2011). 
Decision Tree A structure resembling branches of a tree that can 
be used for predicting the target variable using 
“sequences of decisions and consequences” (EMC 
Education Services, 2015, p. 192). Data are 
segmented hierarchically and partitioned into 
disjoint groups where prediction is achieved 
(Sarma, 2013).  
FAR Part 91 Rules governing general aviation flight (General 
Operating and Flight Rules, 2020). 
FAR Part 121 Rules governing air carrier flights (Operating 
Requirements, 2020). 
Fatal Injury An injury resulting in death 30 days or less from the 
accident (49 CFR § 830.2) 
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General Aviation Civil aviation flights not including air carriers 
whether or not the air carrier flights are scheduled 
or unscheduled (FAA, 2017). 
Gradient Boosting Machine An ensemble machine learning technique built in a 
stepwise fashion characterized by combining 
prediction models into a more superior model with 
greater prediction capability than the individual 
models (McCarthy et al., 2019). 
Hazard A condition that creates the “potential for producing 
death, injury, illness, fire, property damage, 
equipment damage or environmental damage” 
(USAF, 2015, p. 143). 
Incident An aviation occurrence that either affects or has the 
potential to affect operations safety and does not 
meet the definition of an accident (Definitions, 
2020). 
Latent Variable Describes a variable not capable of being measured 
directly, and is accessed through observed variables 
(Field, 2018). An aviation example is the concept of 
flight experience which is not directly measured, 
but is a combination of factors. 
Loss of Control “Loss of aircraft control while, or deviation from 
intended flightpath, in flight” (ICAO, 2017, p. 15). 
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Machine Learning “A branch of artificial intelligence [that] uses 
computational algorithms to automatically learn 
insights from the data and make better decisions in 
the future with minimal intervention” (McCarthy et 
al., 2019, p. 12) 
Minor Injury An injury not rising to the level of serious or fatal 
(49 CFR § 830.2). 
Mishap Describes unplanned reportable safety occurrences 
resulting in injury or damage. The terminology is 
primarily used by military services in the United 
States (USAF, 2015; Wood, 2003). 
Near Miss A near miss can be described as “an outcome with a 
subjective potential negative (or more severe) 
consequence” (Thoroman et al., 2019), or more 
specifically, “an incident that could have, but did 
not, result in death, injury, or illness” (OSHA, 2016, 
p. 34).  
Neural Network “A neural network, when used for classification, is 
typically a collection of neuron-like processing 
units with weighted connections between the units” 
(Han & Kamber, 2001, p. 24) 
Overfitting A characteristic where model training becomes 
overly complex and includes too much noise (SAS, 
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2019a) leading to poor operation in subsequent 
samples.  
Parent Term Within the text mining process, words are identified 
and categorized. A parent term is one that includes 
all stemmed versions of the word. The plus (+) 
character indicates the word is a parent term. 
Random Forest An ensemble model for regression and classification 
based on multiple decision trees to arrive at a model 
with greater stability and prediction capability than 
a single decision tree (McCarthy et al., 2019).  
Receiver Operating Characteristic A plot of a model’s sensitivity and specificity using 
true positive and false positive rates at various 
thresholds (McCarthy et al., 2019).  
Safety A risk-based assessment of an operation. Operations 
with acceptable risk are deemed safe, while 
operations with unacceptable risk are deemed 
unsafe (Wood, 2003). 
Serious Injury An injury resulting in more than 48 hours 
hospitalization, bone fractures, severe lacerations, 
internal injuries, or burns (second or third-degree) 
(49 CFR § 830.2). 
Text Mining A form of data mining involving the quantification 
of textual data (Shmueli et al., 2016). 
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List of Acronyms 
ADM Aeronautical Decision Making 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
AGL Above Ground Level 
ANN Artificial Neural Network 
AoA Angle of Attack 
AOPA Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 
ARC Aviation Rulemaking Committee 
ASAP Aviation Safety Action Program 
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System 
ATP Airline Transport Pilot 
CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
CG Center of Gravity 
CRM Crew Resource Management 
EAB Experimental Amateur Built 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAAST Federal Aviation Administration Safety Team 
FAR Federal Aviation Regulation 
FOQA Flight Operational Quality Assurance 
FSF Flight Safety Foundation 
GA General Aviation 
GAJSC General Aviation Joint Steering Committee 
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GAO Government Accountability Office 
HF Human Factors 
HFACS Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
IAF Initial Approach Fix 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IEA International Ergonomics Association 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
INCOSE International Council on Systems Engineering 
LOC Loss of Control 
LODA Letter of Deviation Authority 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
OOB Out-of-Bag 
ROC Receiver Operating Characteristic 
SMS Safety Management System 
SQL Structured Query Language 
SRM Safety Risk Management 
SVD Singular Value Decomposition 
SVM Support Vector Machine 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions  
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Chapter II: Review of the Relevant Literature 
There will develop a technique and a language of aerial navigation, and 
experts will become skilled in contending with the perversity of special 
mechanisms in starting and landing under difficult circumstances, in battling with 
fog and rain and storm, in taking advantage of air currents at different levels, and 
in seeking out the lanes of the atmosphere in which to add to their speed the 
sweep of the trade winds.  
And over all will soar with the ease of the gull or drive with the speed of 
the whirlwind, the myriad of ships of the air, transforming the face of the heavens. 
Of many sizes and at many altitudes, midgets and leviathans, close to the earth 
and up in the clouds—in the days of the shadows of their wings will speed over 
every corner of all the lands and seas, and in the nights of that future time the eye-
like gleams of their search-lights will mingle to the uttermost ends of the earth, 
beacons of science and romance and progress and brotherhood. (Victor Lougheed, 
1909, p. 41)  
Following the study foundation laid in the previous chapter, Chapter II proceeds 
with a discussion of general aviation in the literature, findings on general aviation safety, 
and general aviation safety initiatives. Next, studies researching aspects of aviation 
safety, including studies predicting aviation incidents and accidents, are outlined. Finally, 
gaps in the literature are presented. 
General Aviation in the United States. 
It may be argued that from the beginning of powered flight in the United States, 
aviation was “general.” To be sure, early flyers such as the Wright brothers sought to sell 
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their aircraft to the military (McCullough, 2015). However, in the years following Kitty 
Hawk, many pioneers such as Walter Beech, Clyde Cessna, Glenn Curtiss, Lloyd 
Stearman, and the Wrights developed aircraft and aircraft components for a myriad of 
personal and business purposes (Crehan & Brady, 2000). While discussions of GA may 
evoke images of the ubiquitous Cessna and similar aircraft, GA is defined not by a type 
of aircraft but by a kind of operation. The standard FAA (2017) definition states that GA 
comprises civil aviation flights, not including air carriers, whether or not the air carrier 
flights are scheduled or unscheduled. Rules defining GA flight operations are defined in 
14 CFR § 91 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) (General Operating and 
Flight Rules, 2020). An abbreviated listing of common aviation CFRs are found in Table 
2. 
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Table 2 
Common CFRs for Aircraft Operations 
Part Heading 
61 Certification: Pilots, Flight Instructors, and Ground Instructors 
67 Medical Standards and Certification 
68 Requirements for Operating Certain Small Aircraft Without a Medical 
Certificate 
91 General Operating and Flight Rules [for General Aviation] 
103 Ultralight Vehicles 
121 Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and Supplemental Operations 
135 Operating Requirements: Commuter and On Demand Operations and 
Rules Governing Persons on Board Such Aircraft 
136 Commercial Air Tours and National Parks Air Tour Management 
137 Agriculture Aircraft Operations 
Note. Adapted from the eCFR table of contents (Aeronautics and Space, 2020). 
 
General aviation operations encompass a wide variety of aircraft types and 
activities. Aircraft types include single- and multi-engine piston, single- and multi-engine 
turboprop, turbojet, helicopter, experimental, and light sport (AOPA, 2018a). Balloons, 
blimps, gliders, powered-parachutes, ultralights, and weight shift control aircraft also 
operate under GA rules (NTSB, 2020b). Some of the GA activities that fall under Part 91 
include recreational flying, air ambulance, business, freight, and law enforcement 
(AOPA, 2018a). The BTS (n.d.a) indicates there were 211,749 GA aircraft as of the 2018 
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accounting. In comparison, there were 7,397 aircraft recorded under Parts 121 and 135 air 
carrier operations (BTS, n.d.a).  
Aviation Safety   
The early days of powered flight were fraught with accidents as builders 
innovated with different materials and aircraft shapes. Engines, propellers, and even 
building techniques all needed to be tested. Improvements were made when designs 
failed, and system reliability gradually improved. Learning from accidents in the early 
days of aviation was key to aviation progress, beginning with the first fatal crash. On 
September 17, 1908, Orville Wright and Lieutenant Thomas E. Selfridge were flying a 
final sortie during acceptance trials for a potential aircraft purchase by the U.S. Army. 
Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft crashed, injuring Mr. Wright and fatally injuring Lt. 
Selfridge. The U.S. Army investigated the cause of the accident and found that a new 
propeller contacted rudder guy wires leading to a loss of the aircraft directional control 
(Martin, 1999). Recalling the 1908 crash, Stolzer, Halford et al. (2008) wrote:   
It is fascinating to read this report from the perspective of a century of aviation 
safety evolution, and recognized in the reporter’s work the same painstaking 
attention to detail and objective analysis that we have come to expect from 
present-day NTSB reports. In the description one can see the progenitors of many 
of our present-day accepted practices in forensic analysis—crowd control and the 
principle of preservation evidence, description of ‘witness’ marks in the 
wreckage, identification of probable cause. (p. 43) 
While lacking today’s sophistication, the investigation served its purpose, to prevent 
future accidents. The report helped the Wrights to improve the aircraft design and 
29 
 
“marked the beginning of the flight safety program so familiar to us today” (Martin, 
1999, p. 2). 
James Reason (2000b) wrote, “avoiding [fatalities, injuries and environmental 
damage] as far as possible is the objective of the safety sciences” (p. 4). Implementing 
the safety objective is as varied as there are organizations and methods to promote safety 
and avoid accidents collectively take various forms. One large aviation organization 
stated its policy in part, “The [organization as a whole] shall support hazard identification 
and mitigation. …When mishaps do occur, investigations must identify the causes and 
allow mitigation of hazards to prevent similar occurrences” (USAF, 2019, p.2). Further, 
the policy stated a requirement to provide safety training to the workforce, enabling 
proactive hazard assessments (USAF, 2019). The parent company for several GA aircraft 
manufacturing operations—Beechcraft, Cessna, and Hawker—stated in part their 
commitment to the safety of their employees and other stakeholders, “We will actively 
champion environmentally sound practices and safe behaviors. We will continuously 
improve our processes, require individual accountability and demonstrate leadership to 
strive for zero injuries…” (Textron, 2018, para 5). Textron (2018) also stated their belief 
that safety begins at the top levels of management, all injuries are preventable, and 
employees must be appropriately trained to realize the desired safety state. For a final 
example, a large southeast college flight program in the United States stated their 
approach to safety as proactive in nature, combining the principles of mishap prevention, 
hazard identification, data collection and analysis, and safety education. Moreover, like 
Textron, safety begins with organizational leadership (ERAU, 2020). From large, diverse 
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fleets, to GA manufacturing, to GA training, the goal is the same; identify and mitigate 
hazards to prevent the next accident. 
To be sure, there are hazards associated with flying, and sometimes accidents 
occur. Investigations are conducted, and from a safety practitioner’s standpoint, 
hopefully, they arrive at a root cause. Once root causes are determined, mitigations can 
be instituted. It seems clear from the literature that most GA accidents have a human 
error component. However, focusing on the pilot can be counterproductive in preventing 
the next accident. First, when pilots feel they are going to be blamed, they are less 
inclined to be forthcoming with information. Second, accidents rarely occur in a vacuum. 
Reason (1997; 2016) argued for a broader view. Certainly, sharp-enders, “those in direct 
contact with the system” (Reason, 2016, p. 2) may be causal in an accident sequence. 
However, what may be more valuable to preventing the next accident is understanding 
underlying factors that created an environment for the accident to occur. Preventing 
mishaps requires addressing both active failures, where sharp-enders act unsafely, and 
latent conditions, those conditions without which the accident would not have happened 
(Reason, 2016). Maurino et al. (2016) wrote of their belief that the time is past for a focus 
on the individual. Instead, it is more beneficial to focus on the organization where the 
underlying conditions reside. One way of systematically shifting away from the 
individual focus to the organization is through the implementation of a Safety 
Management System (SMS). 
Safety Management Systems  
If a system is “a combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one or 
more stated purposes” (INCOSE, 2006, p. 1.5), then a safety management system is a 
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mechanism for managing the safety aspects of the defined system. The International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines safety as “the state in which the possibility of 
harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an 
acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk 
management” (ICAO, 2019b, p. 2-1). Due to the complexity and high risks encountered 
in aviation, aviation at large adopted the SMS framework to improve and ensure aviation 
safety. Safety practitioners realized safety problems might not just reside at the operator 
or the equipment, but can have organizational components. Further, as aviation grew to 
be a global system, there was a need to establish international safety standards in the form 
of a State safety program (ICAO, 2019b). The State-level safety program in the United 
States is directed by 14 CFR Part 5 (Safety Management Systems, 2020) and developed 
and managed by the FAA (2016). According to federal law, some types of operations, 
such as Part 121, are mandated to develop a formal SMS, while others are highly 
encouraged to do so (FAA, 2015). The defining characteristic of an SMS, according to 
the FAA, is that it is a system to support safety decision making (FAA, 2015). 
Explaining the premise of a system approach to addressing human error, Reason 
(2000b) wrote, “Humans are fallible and errors are to be expected, even in the best 
organizations. Errors are seen as consequences rather than causes, having their origins not 
so much in the perversity of human nature as in ‘upstream systematic factors’” (p. 768). 
Recognizing the difficulty in changing the human condition, organizations should focus 
their efforts on understanding and changing the operating condition. Further, when 
accidents occur, the focus should move from individual blame to understanding the 
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defense barriers that were breached (Reason, 200b). To Reason (2000a), “Defenses, 
barriers, and safeguards occupy a key position in the system approach” (p. 769). 
Swiss Cheese Model  
The Swiss cheese model is widely used to explain how accidents may occur. If 
one considers aircraft operations, there are any number of hazards that exist that provide 
the conditions for an accident. Barriers (represented by a slice of Swiss cheese) are 
designed to prevent the hazards from becoming an accident factor. However, barriers are 
not perfect (represented by the holes in the Swiss cheese). If the holes in the barriers 
align, then an accident occurs. Reason (2000a) explained the nature of the barriers: 
In an ideal world each defensive layer would be intact. In reality, however, they 
are more like slices of Swiss cheese, having many holes—though unlike in the 
cheese, these holes are continually opening, shutting, and shifting their location. 
The presence of holes in any one “slice” does not normally cause a bad outcome. 
Usually, this can happen only when the holes in many layers momentarily line up 
to permit a trajectory of accident opportunity—bringing hazards into damaging 
contact with victims. (p. 769) 
Active failures, such as a pilot violating a standard operating procedure, and latent 
conditions, such as a lax safety culture represent the holes. “Active failures are like 
mosquitoes. They can be swatted one by one, but they still keep coming. The best 
remedies are to…drain the swamps in which they breed. The swamps, in this case, are the 
ever present latent conditions” (Reason, 2000a, p. 769). 
Active Failures. Active failures most commonly occur with the operator. The 
framework proposed by Maurino et al. (2016) breaks active failures into three areas and 
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provides a method of identifying potential errors. Active failures are categorized as 
knowledge-based, rule-based, and skill-based. Errors within the active failure categories 
can range from skill-based slips and lapses resulting in routine violations to knowledge-
based mistakes resulting in exceptional violations. 
Latent Conditions. Latent conditions represent the operating environment. 
Organizationally, the goal of the SMS is to provide depth in the level of safety barriers; 
the more barriers, the less likely the Swiss cheese holes will align, ending in an accident 
(Reason, 2016). “The key to proactive safety management lies in identifying latent 
failures and remedying them before their consequences are visited upon the organization” 
(Maurino et al., 2016, p. 26). 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). 
Shappell and Wiegmann (1997; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003), developed 
HFACS to provide a tool for identifying the holes theorized in the Swiss cheese model. 
HFACS describes four failure levels: unsafe acts; preconditions for unsafe acts; unsafe 
supervision; and organizational influences.  
Unsafe Acts. HFACS builds on Reason’s (1990) categories of errors and 
violations. Errors can be categorized as skill-based errors, decision errors, and perceptual 
errors. Violations can be categorized as routine and exceptional. Interestingly, Reason 
(2016) has since adopted some of these expansions in his later works. 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts. One level removed from unsafe acts, HFACS 
looks at underlying conditions and begins to look at the operating environment. The 
HFACS preconditions fall under three branches. The first is the condition of the operators 
further divided into adverse mental states, adverse physiological states, and physical or 
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mental limitations. The second condition is environmental factors, which has two 
branches, physical and technological. The final condition is comprised of personnel 
factors divided by crew resource management and personal readiness. 
Unsafe Supervision. Once problems with preconditions for unsafe acts are 
understood, HFACS broadens to look at how the preconditions are allowed to exist, 
leading to unsafe supervision. Again building on Reason (1990), unsafe supervision is 
subdivided into four areas: failure to correct a problem, inadequate supervision, planned 
inappropriate operations, and violations by the supervisor. 
Organizational Influences. At the broadest level, HFACS examines the 
organizational setting from the highest levels of the organization. Organizational 
influences are comprised of organizational climate, organizational processes, and 
resource management. 
SMS Components   
An SMS is developed around four core pillars: safety policy, safety risk 
management, safety assurance, and safety promotion (FAA, 2015; ICAO 2019b). The 
safety policy pillar establishes standards and outlines responsibilities. The safety 
assurance pillar outlines the processes necessary to ensure essential policies are 
implemented and meeting policy goals. The safety promotion pillar helps ensure all 
members of the system know their responsibilities and are trained to implement their role 
in safety. Finally, the fourth pillar, safety risk management, will be explained in greater 
detail in a separate paragraph. 
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Safety Risk Management (SRM)  
There is a myriad of hazards associated with flying. However, that does not mean 
flying is inherently risky; risk can be a subjective term. Because all risks cannot be 
avoided, avoiding unnecessary risk has become a major component of aviation safety 
(USAF, 2013) that implies active involvement from participants (Stolzer, Halford et al., 
2008). Safety risk management involves processes for “identifying hazards and 
mitigating risk based on a thorough understanding of the organizations’ systems and their 
operating environment” (FAA, 2015, pp. 4-5). It is within this component that the 
reactive, proactive, and predictive aspects of accident prevention are carried out.  
Reactive SRM. Reactive SRM is the traditional tool facilitated by accident 
investigation and analysis (Baugh, 2020). Stolzer, Halford et al. (2008) refer to this as the 
“fly-crash-fix-fly” (p. 215) approach to safety management. Accidents are investigated, 
and the lessons learned are used to reevaluate hazards and implement barriers to prevent 
similar events in the future. The primary benefit of reactive SRM is the prevention of 
similar occurrences in the future. The apparent limitation with reactive SRM is that 
incidents and accidents, also known as losses, will have already occurred. 
Proactive SRM. Proactive SRM benefits from analysis of operational trends and 
near-misses to provide a basis for change before incidents develop into accidents 
(Stolzer, Halford et al., 2008). Proactive SRM requires a knowledge of the operating 
environment, data capture, and measurement against operating standards. Proactive SRM 
also relies on voluntary self-identification of deviations and hazards to support inferential 
analysis (Stolzer, Halford et al., 2008). Trends in the deviations provide the basis for 
safety efforts to prevent the precursor activities well before the risks can develop further. 
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The primary benefit of proactive SRM is the possibility of preventing accidents without a 
loss already occurring. The primary shortfall of proactive SRM is that deviations, also 
called near-misses or close-calls, represent risks that, but for some factor, could have 
developed into an accident. 
Predictive SRM. Predictive SRM represents an advancement over both reactive 
and proactive methods. Being able to predict problems enables mitigations prior to 
incidents and accidents even developing. Stolzer, Halford et al. (2008) wrote, “If we wish 
to move to an even higher level [of safety management], the aviation industry must begin 
to embrace methods that allow us to better assess complex systems and predict where the 
failures may be” (p. 216). One challenge for safety program leaders is that accident rates, 
especially for the airline industry, are quite low, making it difficult to analyze and reduce 
the existing risks. However, using predictive tools can provide the information needed to 
improve safety (Stolzer, Halford et al., 2008). Predictive SRM uses historical 
performance data to identify future states with the same attributes (Dean, 2014). Today 
there are vast amounts of data available to fuel prediction modeling. While difficult to 
analyze using traditional statistical and inferential methods, one way to advance 
predictive SRM is through machine learning techniques that have the capability to build 
predictive models from the large amounts of operational and safety data generated. 
GA Safety Initiatives   
A natural outgrowth of safety management efforts is a number of safety initiatives 
designed to better prepare pilots for the hazards of aviation and add barriers to hazards 
developing into accidents.  
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General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC). One organization tasked 
at the national level to address general aviation safety is the GAJSC. The GAJSC began 
with the 1998 Safer Skies Initiative and is comprised of industry and government 
stakeholders. The organization charter has evolved, but their most recent goal was to 
reduce the GA fatal accident rate incrementally to just one fatal accident per 100,000 
hours by 2018 (GAJSC, 2016). To realize their goal, the GAJSC launched several lines of 
work. The products of two lines of work, loss of control and system component failure – 
powerplant, produced several safety enhancements that are viewable on the GAJSC 
website (GAJSC, n.d.). A third group, controlled flight into terrain, has met, and a 
published list of recommendations appears to be forthcoming (Haertlein, 2019). A list of 
the loss of control safety enhancements can be seen in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
GAJSC Loss of Control Safety Enhancements  
Project Title 
1 Angle of Attack (AoA System – New and Current Production 
2 Angle of Attach (AoA) Systems – Existing Fleet 
3 Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) 
4 Over Reliance on Automation 
5 Transition Training 
6 Transition Training Letters of Deviation Authority (LODA) for Experimental 
Amateur Built (EAB) 
7 Utilization of Type Clubs 
8 Flight Training after Period of Inactivity 
9 Part 135 Safety Culture 
38 
 
Project Title 
10 Stabilized Approach and Landing 
12 Weather Technology – Weather Cameras 
R1 Expanded Weather Camera Network 
13 Weather Technology – Use of Available Weather Information 
14 Engine Monitoring Technology 
15 Flight After Use of Medication with Sedating Effects 
16 Flight with Impairing or Incapacitating Medical Conditions – Improve 
Medical Records 
17 Flight with Impairing or Incapacitating Medical Conditions – Barriers to 
Communication 
21 Risk Based Flight Review 
22 Flight Data Monitoring 
23 E-AB/Flight Test 
24 Single-Pilot Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
25 Reduce Regulatory Roadblocks (R3)- Streamline Novel Technology 
26 Reduce Regulatory Roadblocks (R3) – Part 23 Aviation Rulemaking 
Committee (ARC) 
27 Reduce Regulatory Roadblocks (R3) – Review of 14 CFR 21.8 and 21.9 
28 Pilot Response to Unexpected Events 
30 Medication List for Pilots 
31 Test Pilot Utilization and Experimental Amateur Built (EAB) Proficiency 
32 Airman Certification Standards 
33 Safety Culture 
34 Safety Outreach 
Note. Adapted from GAJSC (n.d.). 
 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The NTSB is well known for 
its independent role in investigating transportation accidents, conducting safety studies, 
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and recommending safety improvements (NTSB, n.d.a). In addition to the causal finding 
accident reports, every one to two years, the NTSB publishes a “most wanted list” to 
focus attention on safety trends with many issue areas applying to all modes of 
transportation. Four topics from 2011-2020 deal specifically with GA operations 
including the following areas: preventing LOC in GA (2015-2018); improving GA safety 
(2011-2013), identifying and communicating hazardous weather for GA (2014); 
enhancing safety in public helicopter operations (2015); and addressing the unique 
aspects of helicopter operations (NTSB, 2020a). The full NTSB most wanted lists 
applicable to aviation are compiled in Appendix D. 
FAA Safety Briefing. The FAA Safety Briefing, published as an online magazine 
six times per year, is billed as “the safety policy voice of non-commercial general 
aviation” (FAA, 2020a, para. 1) with topics selected by the safety briefing editorial staff. 
Topics have included unfriendly weather, knowing your aircraft, flight fundamentals, and 
safety culture, among many others. In addition to the safety magazine, the FAA has 
produced a series of GA safety topic fact sheets that cover topics to enhance pilot skills. 
Many of the fact sheets support both the NTSB's most wanted and GAJSC safety efforts. 
A list of the fact sheets can be found in Appendix E. 
Studies of GA Accidents and Correlating Variables   
Malcolm Ritchie (1988) wrote, “the three classes of aviation in the United States 
are military, airlines, and everybody else” (p. 561). The broadness of everybody else 
points to the difficulty in researching generalizable GA accident factors. Despite the 
challenge, many scholarly studies have been undertaken to research aspects of GA 
accidents. With many studies, there are as many ways to categorize them when 
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conducting a review. The following paragraphs will outline the primary predictor or 
outcome variables that have been used as correlates, a review of studies covering 
different categories of GA aircraft, and those studies with a particular Human Factors 
focus. 
Review of GA Safety Studies   
It may be instructive to begin with an overview of GA safety and studies with 
broad implications. Boyd (2017a) provided a 33-year look at non-revenue-generating 
fixed-wing flight with specific attention given to particular areas: new training and 
technology; crashworthiness initiatives; human factors and aviation psychology; and, 
pilot physiology and toxicology. Several risk factors were identified, including weather, 
mountainous flying, flight distance, night flying, and gender. Studies of flight experience 
as a risk factor report mixed results (Boyd 2017a). When considering safety 
improvements, Boyd (2017a) reported training improvements to focus on risk 
management and relevance to real-world situations. Regarding occupant survivability, the 
lack of seatbelt use was implicated as a significant factor for fatalities in survivable 
accidents. Other risk factors included unsafe behavior, in-flight decision making, and 
pilot health (Boyd 2017a). The factors noted by Boyd (2017b) may be viewed as an 
overview of the more recent findings.  
Wiegmann and Taneja (2003) conducted a more focused study researching fatal 
accident injuries. Blunt trauma was the leading cause of fatalities. Improving 
survivability should include further studies into “attenuating the energy of a crash before 
it can be transmitted to an individual…[and] further development in the areas of 
improving restraint systems” (Wiegmann & Taneja, 2003, p. 576). The final 
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recommendation of Wiegmann and Taneja (2003) was for investigators. Reports need to 
include crashworthiness factors and documentation of the sources of injuries to 
understand the mechanisms of the crash environment. 
Perhaps there is no surprise that common categories of variables are used in 
accident studies. The reason for some of the commonalities likely relates to how accident 
data are recorded. Many accident studies rely on data captured by NTSB investigators, 
and, by definition in archival research, one gets what is previously recorded. Differences 
in studies often reduce to periods covered, the target sample, variations on variable 
combinations used for correlation models, and analysis method. What follows is a 
discussion of common variables used in studying GA hazards, risks, and accidents. 
Coverage of common demographic variables. Depending on the counting 
method, there are hundreds of possible variables in the NTSB database. A pilot’s age, 
sex, flight experience, and flight hours are some of the most commonly used variables. 
These four variables are introduced in the next paragraphs. 
Pilot Age. A pilot’s age has been used as both a predictor and a control variable in 
many studies. Age may be a factor in GA accidents since there is a decline in some 
cognitive and performance capabilities and health implications with age (Boyd, 2018; 
Tsang, 1992; Kennedy et al., 2010; Van Benthem & Herdman, 2016). In airline 
operations, a pilot must retire at age 65, and until 2006, the age was 60 (FAA, 2019c), 
while there is no age restriction in GA operations (Certification: Pilots, 2020). Some 
studies use combinations of a pilot’s age and flight experience to explain the findings (Li 
et al., 2003). Older pilots are at a higher risk for accidents (Li & Baker, 2007; McFadden, 
2003; Shao et al., 2014a, 2014b), and pilots over 60 were found to have a greater risk of 
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involvement in a fatal accident (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2011). Contrarily, Boyd (2015) 
found that increased age was not a risk factor for fatal accidents, and Morris (2018) found 
younger pilots have a greater probability of being involved in an accident than older 
pilots. In Groff & Price (2006), age at the time of earning the first pilot certification 
mattered with higher accident risks associated with private pilot certification after age 25. 
In Li et al. (2001), the researchers found no association between age (or gender) and 
increased probabilities of committing a pilot error. 
Tsang (1992) conducted a review of the literature on how age affects key 
cognitive functions used by pilots. The core functions are memory, perceptual processing, 
problem-solving, and psychomotor coordination. Cognitive slowing begins around age 
25, though the degree to which slowing matters in operations is at the heart of the various 
studies.  
The analysis of the literature indicates that different types of memory are affected 
by age. What is not known is if age effects on memory are different in pilots than in the 
general population. Studies show an age-related decline in perceptual processing; 
however, the research is unclear as to any significance to operations. Age does not appear 
to affect problem-solving when considering the person’s area of expertise. Finally, 
psychomotor coordination can decline with age; however, the data suggests that 
experience and practice can mitigate declines. The broad summary indicated experience 
could mitigate aging effects (Tsang, 1992).  
Li et al. (2003) designed a study to analyze the risk of accidents with commuter 
air carrier and air taxi pilots. The study spanned 1987 to 1997 and included pilots age 45-
57. They found that the risk of accidents in the targeted age range remained stable. 
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Nevertheless, flight experience was shown to be a significant protective factor, especially 
for those pilots with 5,000 to 9,999 hours. The research suggested that after 10,000 hours, 
the protective effect plateaued. 
Van Benthem and Herdman (2016) delved into the relationship of age, pilot 
expertise, and cognitive factors through a GA aircraft simulator experiment. Their results 
showed that older pilots with fewer flight hours experienced significantly more flight 
path deviations in the simulator. They were not willing to say that experience mediates 
for cognitive decline because there may be other factors involved such as flying skills. 
What seemed clear was that cognitive flexibility, visual attention, speed, and working 
memory predict pilot performance (Van Benthem & Herdman, 2016). 
Because there is no upper age limit for GA flying, Boyd (2018) developed a study 
to determine if medical standards are adequate to address the needs of octogenarian 
aviators. What he found was that the accident rate for the 80 and older pilot population 
was increasing. Landing accidents, twice the rate of younger pilots, were most prevalent 
with many related to flaring errors or loss of directional control. Given the pilot’s 
experience in both total time and recency, the problems were not likely skill-based 
(Boyd, 2018). 
Pilot Sex. The results of studies comparing males and females have shown 
varying results. To illustrate, females may be safer than males (Vail & Ekman, 1986), 
females may be safer in some phases but not in others (Walton & Politano, 2016), there is 
no real difference between males and females in accident rates (Bazargan & Guzhva, 
2011; Ison, 2015; Li et al., 2001; McFadden, 1996, 1997; Mitchell et al., 2005), or males 
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are at higher risk for fatalities (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2011; Li & Baker, 2007; McKay & 
Groff, 2016). 
Vail and Ekman (1986) analyzed all accidents from 1972 through 1982 to 
determine whether accident rates differ between male and female pilots. They determined 
that males had a higher rate of accidents and a higher rate of severe injuries and fatalities 
when compared to females. Their conclusion was striking and spoke to the potential bias 
of the day (Vail & Eckman, 1986):  
This study has shown that not only are females significantly safer pilots as far as 
accident rates are concerned, in every way in which the data were compared, but 
that they also kill themselves off at a significantly lower rate when they do have 
pilot-error accidents, in this still male-dominated profession. (p. 303) 
Walton and Politano (2016) conducted their study using the NTSB database with 
a sample comprised of GA accidents from 1982 to 2014 to determine differences in 
accident severity by females and males. They found that females of lesser experience had 
significantly higher accident rates than males, whereas females with higher levels of 
experience had significantly fewer accidents (Walton & Politano, 2016). 
Burgess, Walton et al. (2018) delved into the relationship of pilot sex to helicopter 
accidents, specifically if patterns in the fixed-wing community were present in the rotor-
wing community. Reviewing 6,678 accidents from 1982 to 2014, the authors researched 
the relationship between flight hours, sex, aircraft damage, and injuries. They found no 
difference between males and females in terms of aircraft damage and injuries. 
Additionally, there were no significant differences with respect to flight hours and 
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accidents. Finally, the results of the rotor-wing pilots were similar to prior studies with 
fixed-wing pilots. 
Flight Experience. Flight experience is a latent variable that is defined for each 
study. Common observed variables used to assess flight experience include combinations 
of total flight hours (Burgess, Walton et al., 2018), recent flight hours, pilot certification 
level, and advanced certifications (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007; Bazargan & Guzhva, 
2011; Boyd, 2015; Boyd, 2017a; Groff & Price, 2006; Li & Baker, 2007; McFadden, 
2003; Shao et al., 2014a, 2014b). 
Flight Hours. Many measures of flight hours may be used in accident research. 
Standard accounting of hours includes a pilot’s total flight hours, aircraft type, aircraft 
make, pilot-in-command, last 24-hours, and last 30/60/90-days (Bazargan & Guzhva, 
2007; Houston et al., 2012; McFadden, 1997; Salvatore et al., 1986; Uitdewilligen & de 
Voogt, 2009). Flight hours are also used as a component of flight experience and pilot 
proficiency (Fanjoy & Keller, 2013). 
Coverage of Common Situational Variables 
Instructional Flights. A large portion of GA operations involves flight 
instruction. Instructional accidents occur with pilots of varying skills from the newest 
pilots to those upgrading their certificates or graduating to different aircraft types. 
Uitdewilligen and De Voogt (2009) studied accidents of student pilots flying solo 
between 2001 and 2005. They found that injury and fatality rates were lower in student 
solo flights than with other instructional flights, and most accidents were in the landing 
phase with errors in flaring. The results indicated a higher risk of injury when 
instructional flights involved pilots with more than 100 hours of flight time. 
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In a similar study, Boyd and Dittmer (2012) researched solo student accidents 
except with a broader sample covering 1994 through 2013. They found that 90% of the 
accidents had minor or no injuries, though 97% of the aircraft had substantial damage. 
Similar to Uitdewilligen and De Voogt (2009), Boyd and Dittmer (2012) found that more 
than 70% of the accidents were in the landing phase, with a third of those due to excess 
speed. 
Loss of control in GA instructional flights was the subject of a study by Houston 
et al. (2012). The purpose was to discover secondary factors that contributed to LOC 
accidents. The majority of the accidents occurred in the landing phase, with a second 
significant portion occurring during takeoff, a go-around, or a climb after takeoff. 
Through their study of 147 GA instructional accidents, they found a correlation between 
accumulated flight hours and crash location, and analyzing the causal chain is vital in 
determining accident causes. While not a key aim of the study, the researchers found a 
lack of information in many reports where there was no underlying analysis explaining 
the factors leading to the LOC condition (Houston et al., 2012).  
Lee et al. (2017) studied the reports of 293 accidents involving instructional 
flights in the United States. They found that in fatal accidents, it was four times more 
likely to be a flight with both a student and an instructor suggesting instructor 
deficiencies in supervising the student. Most accidents were local (i.e., not cross-
country), most accidents were in the landing phase, most of the landing accidents were 
related to skill-based errors, and most of the landing accidents were nonfatal. Finally, the 
researchers found that accidents involving decision deficiencies involved more fatal 
outcomes (Lee et al., 2017). 
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Flight Distance. Flight distance is often used as a measure of risk exposure and 
may be used in measures of nautical miles from the point of departure or may be 
categorical like local or cross-country (Boyd, 2015; Boyd, 2017; Lee et al., 2017). 
Aircraft Complexity. Complexity is defined by the researchers and is often 
defined by the number and type of engines (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007; Boyd, 2015; 
Boyd & Stolzer, 2016), aircraft size (Boyd, 2015), speeds (Boyd, 2015), and landing gear 
type (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007; Rostykus et al., 1998). 
Post-crash Fire. The presence of a post-crash fire or explosion has been cited in 
several studies and is often associated with off-airport accidents (Ballard et al., 2013; 
Boyd, 2015; Handel & Yackel, 2011; Li & Baker, 1999; Li & Baker, 2007; Rostykus et 
al., 1998). When a post-crash fire occurs, fatality rates increase (Rostykus et al., 1998). 
Air medical flights were shown to have a higher fatality rate than non-medical flights 
when a post-crash fire occurred (Handel & Yackel, 2011). 
Time of Day. Time of day can be significant in many respects, though it is often 
used as an indicator of prevailing visibility (Boyd, 2017; Handel & Yackel, 2011; Li & 
Baker, 1999). Different light conditions can hinder a pilot’s ability to judge distances and 
see other aircraft (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007; Boyd, 2015; Handel & Yackel, 2011). 
Flying during dark hours typically comes with a higher risk than daylight (Handel & 
Yackel, 2011). 
Off-airport. A location variable can take different forms, such as on- or off-
airport or in maneuvering and enroute phases. When it comes to emergency landings, 
there are many considerations, though it has been shown that landings off-airport, 
especially when combined with a post-crash fire are the most deadly (Ballard et al., 2013; 
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Boyd, 2015; Houston et al., 2012; Li & Baker, 1999; Li & Baker, 2007; Rostykus et al., 
1998). While enroute or maneuvering, the terrain feature was shown to be a factor in 
accident outcomes, with mountainous areas being the most dangerous for GA flights 
(Boyd, 2017; Ison, 2014). 
Restraints / Seatbelts. Seatbelts and shoulder harnesses are not typically involved 
in the causal portion of the accident. However, their use can make a difference between a 
survivable outcome or a fatal outcome (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007; Boyd, 2017a, Li & 
Baker, 1999; Li & Baker, 2007; Rostykus et al., 1998; Wiegmann &Taneja, 2003). 
Professional Pilot / Second Pilot. Intuitively it would make sense that 
professional pilots perform better than non-professionals due to experience. Ison (2015) 
determined that while professional pilots certainly had more experience, they tended to 
have more fatalities primarily due to acrobatic mishaps. The presence of a second pilot 
would seem to be helpful to assist with the complexities of flight, though this is not 
always the case (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007). 
Weather-related Accidents. Numerous researchers have studied accidents with a 
weather component (Boyd, 2017a; Handel & Yackel, 2011; Li & Baker, 1999; Liu et al., 
2013). For example, Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) researched weather-related decision-
making. Specific weather factors such as winds, either straight line, crosswinds, tailwind, 
or gusts, may play a factor in an accident (Mclean, 1986; Wiegmann et al., 2005) as well 
as general flight conditions such as IMC or VMC (Ballard et al., 2013; Boyd, 2015; Li & 
Baker, 2007). A pilot’s perception of weather risks can also be a factor in accidents 
(Shappell et al., 2010). Ison (2014) used weather briefings as a variable in studying 
accident outcomes. 
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One of the more commonly cited works is McLean (1986). He noted that 
unfavorable winds on approach and landing accounted for the greatest number of GA 
accidents. However, continued VFR flight into IFR was the most frequent cause of fatal 
accidents. Perhaps the most significant contribution of the McLean (1986) study is a 
discussion of investigation techniques to determine the weather elements vital to the 
understanding of accidents.  
Shappell et al. (2010) sought to understand factors relating to why pilots 
encounter poor weather. The study was somewhat novel in that the research team 
interviewed 27 pilots who had been involved in adverse weather events. The results 
suggested a misunderstanding or lack of appreciation for the hazards of weather. 
Acceptance of unnecessary risks was anecdotally linked to outside influences and 
sometimes mechanical issues (Shappell et al., 2010). 
Weight and Balance Issues. Given that one-third of Americans are affected by 
obesity, and that weight can negatively impact flight characteristics, Boyd (2016) 
researched accidents where weight and balance or center of gravity (CG) issues were 
implicated. He found no correlation between rising body mass and weight and 
balance/CG accident rates. Boyd (2016) did find that 57% of the accidents were fatal, 
with the majority related to aircraft out of weight limits but within CG limits. 
Coverage of Common Skill-related Variables. Borrowing from HFACS 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003), the next set of studies 
relate to GA pilot skill-based errors. The research includes landing accidents (Boyd, 
2019; Rao & Puranik, 2018), midair collisions (De Voogt and Van Doorn, 2006), and 
pilot proficiency (Fanjoy & Keller, 2013; Salvatore et al., 1986). 
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LOC. The LOC accident can occur in many phases of flight with different 
severity risks and different initiates (Lee et al., 2017; Rao & Marais, 2020). Risk of LOC 
can vary by accumulated flight hours (Houston et al., 2012), and may be riskier for 
females in helicopter hovering (Burgess, Walton et al., 2018). Risks of a LOC event may 
be different by pilot qualification, though Shao et al. (2014a) found that LOC risk did not 
vary between IFR and non-IFR qualified pilots in the landing and takeoff phases.  
Landing Accidents. Landing accidents for GA fixed-wing aircraft are the single 
biggest accident category at almost three times the next category. They account for 44% 
of all accidents, yet they account for the smallest number of fatalities (AOPA, 2019). 
Attempting to land while unstabilized is a critical factor in landing risk (Rao & Puranik, 
2018). Further, most instructional flight accidents occurred in the landing phase (Boyd & 
Dittmer, 2012; Lee et al., 2017; Uitdewilligen & De Voogt, 2009) 
Rao and Puranik (2018) conducted a study to analyze the causes of unstabilized 
approaches in GA accidents. Unstabilized approaches are a well-known hazard in both 
airline and GA flying; however, relatively few studies focus attention on GA. “A stable 
approach requires a methodical sequence of changes to an aircraft’s state while satisfying 
pre-defined safety criteria” (Rao & Puranik, 2018, p. 1). The Flight Safety Foundation 
(FSF, 2000) recommended that the criteria for landing are met prior to reaching 500 feet 
AGL in VMC/ 1,000 feet AGL in IMC, and should include the following areas:  
- The flight path is correct; 
- Only small changes are necessary for the aircraft to stay on the flight path; 
- The aircraft speed is not too fast or too slow; 
- The gear and flaps are set correctly; 
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- The sink rate is controlled at 1,000 feet per minute or less; 
- Power settings are appropriate according to the flight manuals; 
- Required briefings have been completed; and 
- Instrument approach tolerances are maintained (FSF, 2000). 
Additionally, Rao and Puranik (2018) found the most frequent cause of landing accidents 
(42.4%) to be airspeed related, and 29% of those accidents involved stalls on the final 
approach due to AoA exceedance. Behind airspeed was a failure to maintain the 
necessary glidepath (28%). 
Boyd (2019) delved further into the research on GA landing accidents by focusing 
on excessive landing speeds and the relation to accident injury severity. Two categories 
of landing accidents were identified from the NTSB reports between 1997 and 2016. Low 
energy (low airspeed) accidents related to aircraft stalls. High energy (high airspeed) 
accidents related to bounces, floating, or porpoising. Boyd (2019) found high energy GA 
landing accidents to be correlated with more severe injuries. 
Midair Accidents. Using the NTSB reports for 2000-2004, De Voogt and Van 
Doorn (2006) looked at midair collisions to determine common situational characteristics 
but with a focus on radio communications and aircraft altitude at the time of the collision. 
The sample included all Part 91 operations, including public use flights, Part 135 
operations, and Part 137 operations. During the study time, there were 48 midair 
collisions. De Voogt and Van Doorn (2006) identified a limitation determining 
communications issues as in 14 of the accidents there were no indications in the report of 
any communications. Interestingly, in 16 of the midair accidents, the aircraft were under 
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ATC control. Additionally, while traffic pattern accidents are more frequent than other 
types, they are often less fatal. 
Pilot Proficiency. A common premise in studies asserts that pilots with an airline 
transport pilot (ATP) certificate are safer than those flying under lesser certificates. 
Salvatore et al. (1986) conducted a study to compare ATP certified pilots in GA accidents 
with private pilots. Overall, the ATPs had fewer accidents than private pilots, and their 
accidents were largely non-skill related. Aerobatic accidents accounted for 14% of ATP 
accidents and 50% of the ATP accidents fatalities. In other phases of flight, ATPs fared 
better overall, likely due to their level of flight proficiency (Salvatore et al., 1986). 
Fanjoy and Keller (2013) studied IFR accidents in GA between 2002 and 2012, 
specifically looking at the pilot's instrument proficiency check currency and possible 
relationships in the approach phase. Within the sample of 31 pilots, the number one cause 
of instrument approach accidents was a failure to control the aircraft, followed by a 
failure to follow instrument procedures, proceeding below weather minimums, airspeed 
issues, spatial disorientation, CFIT, and not initiating a missed approach. 
Human Factors   
Human factors (HF) is concerned with “understanding interactions among 
humans and other elements of a system, and the profession that applies theory, principles, 
data, and other methods to design in order to optimize human well-being and overall 
system performance” (IEA, 2020, para 1). Practitioners of HF “analyze the factors (e.g., 
human information processing, situation awareness, mental models, workload and 
fatigue, human error) that influence decision making and apply this knowledge to identify 
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potential hindrances to successful task performance, at both the individual and team 
level” (Cuevas et al., 2018, p. 1). 
The study of HF in aviation dates back to World War II when increasingly 
complex aircraft systems were introduced, and the need to understand the limits of human 
capabilities interacting with the systems was recognized (Cuevas et al., 2018; Stone et al., 
2018).  
Li (1994) conducted an extensive meta-analysis of the literature concerning pilot-
related factors in an aircraft accident from the 1930s to the late 1990s. More of an 
exposition on how to conduct better aviation research, one conclusion of interest is that 
violations of regulations needed more attention in the literature. The primary outcome 
was that more epidemiologic studies of pilot-related factors are needed, and using state-
of-the-art methodologies can assist in identifying accident risk factors. 
McFadden and Towell (1999) took a similar approach when reviewing previous 
studies on pilot error. They aimed to analyze past methods and propose a framework for 
future studies that research more complex HF interactions. While the study was airline 
focused, the point of their research applies to GA research; pilot error is a complex study 
requiring insight into underlying relationships.  
The team of Wiegmann et al. (2005) applied HFACS to 14,436 GA accidents that 
occurred between 1990 and 2000. They found that skill-based errors were most common 
and accounted for the first HF component in the accident chain in almost half of the 
accidents. Accidents involving violations were the most deadly. Comparing the HFACS 
classifications with the NTSB cause codes, Wiegmann et al. (2005) found that the top 
five skill-based errors were maintaining directional control (on the ground), airspeed, 
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stall/spin, aircraft control (in the air), and wind compensation. The top five decision 
errors related to in-flight planning, pre-flight planning, managing fuel, terrain selection 
(for taxi, takeoff, and landing), and decisions to go-around. Perceptual errors involved 
misjudgments of distance, flare, altitude, clearance, and visual/aural perception. Finally, 
the top five violations were continued VFR flight into IMC, disregarding known 
procedures, operating unsafe aircraft, hazardous maneuvers, and flying into bad weather 
(Wiegmann et al., 2005). 
Erjavac et al. (2018) sought to model the preconditions to human error in air 
carrier and GA operations. Their goal was to determine the relationship between active 
and latent factors in Part 91 and Part 121 multi-engine accidents that occurred between 
2006 and 2015. One finding was a validation that the Part 91 pilots and the Part 121 
pilots came from different populations. Agreeing with Wiegmann et al. (2005), accidents 
involving violations resulted in a higher incidence of severe injuries and fatalities 
(Erjavac et al., 2018). 
Drugs & Alcohol. Just like with motor vehicles, operating an aircraft while under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol increases accident risk (Li & Baker, 2007), and drug use 
in pilots while flying appears to be increasing (McKay & Groff, 2016). Drugs and 
alcohol, along with cardiovascular or cerebrovascular events, are the most probable 
causes of pilot incapacitation (Booze, 1987; Taneja & Wiegmann, 2002). Prior alcohol-
related events on the ground provide a risk marker for pilots (Li, Baker, Qiang et al., 
2005), and alcohol use has been specifically implicated in continued VFR flight into IMC 
accidents (Li, Baker, Lamb et al., 2005). 
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Taneja and Wiegmann (2002) conducted a more narrow HF study to analyze 
incidents of in-flight impairment and incapacitation in GA accidents. Reviewing NTSB 
and FAA crash data from 1990 through 1998, the authors found 216 accidents relating to 
their study. The most common causes of incapacitation were from drugs and alcohol, 
accounting for 72.2% of the accidents. Cardiovascular-related causes of impairment 
accounted for another 12.03% of the accidents. While pilot health is a concern, the 
primary lesson learned is the importance of not flying while under the influence of drugs 
and alcohol (Taneja & Wiegmann, 2002). Taneja and Wiegmann (2002) generally agree 
with Booze (1987), who also found the most likely causes of incapacitation in GA pilots 
to be alcohol, drugs, and cardiovascular/cerebrovascular events. What appears to have 
changed is the number of drug and alcohol accidents, only at 7.7 % (Booze, 1987), 
although this may be due to different reporting and accounting. Booze (1987) did 
determine the risk of incapacitation increased with age, but the risk is less than that in the 
general public. 
Building on risks related to operating vehicles while intoxicated, Li, Baker, Qiang 
et al. (2005) designed a study to assess whether a history of driving while intoxicated 
(DWI) served as a risk indicator for GA pilots. They found that of the pilots with a 
history of DWI, there was a 43% risk increase of involvement in a future aviation 
accident. Less experienced older males were also at an increased risk (Li, Baker, Qiang et 
al., 2005). In a related study led by Li and Baker (Li, Baker, Lamb et al., 2005), 
researchers focused on pilots from fatal accidents in three states. They noted that alcohol 
use was particularly detrimental in its correlation to continued VFR flight into IMC 
fatalities. 
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McKay and Groff (2016) continued research on drug use in aviation in all forms, 
including over-the-counter drugs, prescription medication, and illicit drugs. Using data 
from the NTSB and the FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute toxicology database, the 
researchers analyzed the information of 6,677 pilots from fatal accidents that occurred 
between 1990 and 2012. All pilots in the sample had some form of drugs in their system; 
the researchers wanted to know what kinds and the likelihood of impairment. Most of the 
pilots were flying as GA (96%) and were primarily male (98%). The study noted an 
upward trend in the use of all categories of potentially impairing drugs, with the most 
common being diphenhydramine found in many common over-the-counter medicines. 
And while not significant, there was an increasing amount of accidents where the pilot 
tested positive for marijuana (McKay & Groff, 2016). 
Violations. Violations are defined in HFACS as “a willful departure from those 
practices deemed necessary to safely conduct operations” (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997, 
p. 274). Fatal and non-fatal accidents can frequently be traced back to violations (Boyd & 
Stolzer, 2016; Erjavac et al., 2018; Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997; Wiegmann et al., 2005), 
and pilots with a history of violations are at greater risk for future accidents (Li & Baker, 
2007). Moreover, violations are often the predecessor to continued VFR flight into IMC 
(Detwiler et al., 2008).  
VFR to IMC Accidents. The most deadly accidents by percentage involve 
continued VFR flight into IMC (AOPA, 2019), a condition that has endured for decades 
(McLean, 1986; Wiegmann et al., 2005). These accidents are related to decision errors 
and violations (Detwiler et al., 2008), can be linked to overconfidence (Goh & 
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Wiegmann, 2001), and are generally associated with lesser pilot certification levels (Ison, 
2014).  
Inadvertent flight into IMC weather conditions while flying under VFR rules may 
not account for the most accidents, but they do account for the highest fatality rate of 
weather-related accidents (Detwiler et al., 2008; McLean, 1986). Some of the associated 
variables include overconfidence (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001), visibility miscalculations 
(Detwiler et al., 2008; Goh & Wiegmann, 2001), and violations (Detwiler et al., 2008; 
Ison, 2004). 
Goh and Wiegmann (2001) investigated decision-making for continued flight 
from VFR to IMC. Using a flight simulator, pilots flew a sortie beginning in VFR 
conditions. After about 45 minutes of flying, the weather deteriorated to below VFR 
minimums. Pilots were then given a time window to decide to turn back or press on to 
their destination. The researchers found 68.75% of the pilots erroneously pressed on to 
their destination. Their findings suggest poor diagnoses of the visibility and 
overconfidence in piloting skill correlate with continued VFR flight into IMC (Goh & 
Wiegmann, 2001). 
Detwiler et al. (2008) use HFACS to examine the causal factors behind the GA 
pilot’s VFR flight into IMC. Their study included fixed- and rotor-wing accidents 
between 1990 and 2004. Subject matter experts reviewed the NTSB findings and 
categorized each according to 10 HFACS causal categories. The results indicated that 
decision errors, perception errors, and violations were the most prevalent factors in the 
accidents (Detwiler et al., 2008). 
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Ison (2014) sought to determine the correlates of GA pilot characteristics and 
situational factors with continued VFR flight into IMC. Initial input variables included 
age, contact with ATC, flight plan filed, pilot certificate, pilot flight hours, terrain, time 
of day, and whether the pilot received a weather briefing before the flight. Ison (2014) 
found that terrain (mountainous areas being more troublesome) and the weather briefing 
(perhaps related to violations) were significant predictors. He found a negative 
correlation with pilot certification level and the likelihood of a VFR to IMC accident, and 
younger pilots were more likely to press into IMC. 
Decision Making. Decision making is one of the human factors studied by 
researchers. Topics of research included the decision to fly VFR into IMC (Detwiler et 
al., 2008; Goh & Wiegmann, 2001; Ison, 2014; Shappell et al., 2010), the decision to turn 
back or to continue to the destination in the face of weather (Wiggins & O’Hare, 1995), 
the effects of age on decision making (Kennedy et al., 2010), and the decision to fly in 
too close of a proximity to convective weather (Boyd, 2017a). 
One of the oft-cited experimental studies came from Wiggins and O’Hare (1995), 
where they researched the GA pilot’s weather-related decision making. Using a sample of 
pilots from New Zealand, the authors were presented a general problem-solving test and 
several aeronautical-based decision-making scenarios. Wiggins and O’Hare found that 
experienced pilots were able to make decisions more efficiently, and novices and experts 
view problems differently and access information differently. Given the scenario, novice 
pilots chose the wrong course of action more times than the intermediate and expert 
pilots. Additionally, the time to make the decisions was longer for the novices. 
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Kennedy et al. (2010) developed an experimental study using a flight simulator to 
study aviation decision-making with respect to age and expertise effects. Using a sample 
of 72 GA pilots, all IFR certified, they presented scenarios requiring a land/go-around 
decision and holding. They found that older pilots—those over 41-years old—were more 
likely to attempt landing below the visibility minima. Age-related factors may affect 
certain flying tasks. The hypothesis of better decisions related to more experience was not 
supported. When measures of cognition were entered in the model, processing speed 
became a significant predictor; faster processing and more experience correlated with 
better performance (Kennedy et al., 2010). 
More recently, Boyd (2017b) conducted a decision-making study with GA pilots 
focusing on thunderstorm-related accidents and whether or not pilots had violated the 
FAA-prescribed storm clearance distances. They found that 93% of thunderstorm-related 
landing accidents and 77% of enroute accidents involved a violation of the recommended 
separation distances. The numbers are significant given a 70% fatality rate in 
thunderstorm related accidents (Boyd, 2017b). 
Other GA Aircraft Studies   
Sport Aircraft. While not large in number, at least two studies looked at aircraft 
that were not in the fixed-wing or rotor-wing categories. The first was a descriptive study 
by Skelley et al. (2016), who described pilot injuries from powered parachute accidents. 
While not germane to discussions on pilot performance, Skelley et al. (2016) made 
design recommendations to increase a pilot’s safety in an accident. The second study was 
by Van Doorn and De Voogt (2011), who researched sport aviation accidents comprised 
of balloons, blimps, gliders, gyroplanes, and ultralights. They determined that risks and 
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accident rates vary within the sport aviation category, but that accidents in amateur-built 
aircraft carried a higher chance of fatality by a factor of 1.6 (Van Doorn & De Voogt, 
2011). 
Oceanic Flight. De Voogt and Heijnen (2009) studied aviation accidents over the 
Pacific Ocean. Their research included all GA accidents (fixed- and rotor-wing) that 
occurred between 1964 and 2004. Over the 40 years, there were 67 accidents (39 fixed-
wing; 28 rotor-wing) that fit the search criteria. Ultimately the De Voogt and Heijnen 
(2009) study was descriptive and did not delve into correlations and causal chains. 
Rotor-wing. De Voogt and Van Doorn (2007) conducted a study of 4,863 
helicopter accidents between 1982 and 2006. While the title suggests the study 
methodology was data mining, the authors only reported descriptive information and 
accident counts. Like fixed-wing accidents, helicopter accidents were most lethal in poor 
weather. Additionally, the authors concluded that the primary causes of helicopter 
accidents were not specific to rotor-wing operations (De Voogt & Van Doorn, 2007). 
De Voogt, Uitdewilligen et al. (2009) built on De Voogt and Van Dorn (2007) by 
researching the role of additional crew members in preventing accidents in high-risk 
helicopter operations. Analyzing 142 accidents between 1998 and 2005, the authors 
found that while the pilots, on the whole, were extremely qualified, the nature of the 
operation placed high demands on the pilot. The recommendation was to include 
qualified ground crew and possibly additional flight crew members to mitigate the risks. 
Because additional crew can become victims, ground crew members seem to be the best 
option to reduce accidents (De Voogt et al., 2009). 
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Medical Flights. Handel and Yackel (2011) sought to analyze fixed-wing 
medical flight fatalities compared with helicopter medical flights and overall GA fatality 
rates. The accidents spanned 1984 to 2009. Several input variables were used, such as 
light conditions, time of day, weather conditions, whether or not the accident was in 
flight or on the ground, and the presence of a post-crash fire. There were significantly 
more fatalities in medical flights, and post-crash fires were the greatest predictor of 
fatalities (Handel & Yackel, 2011).  
Boyd and Macchiarella (2016) focused on GA helicopter accidents involving 
emergency medical transport. Their time frame spanned 1983-2014. The purpose of the 
study was to determine accident rates and causes, injury profiles, and adherence to 
crashworthiness standards. The underlying correlations and causes were not explored. 
Aviation Accidents Prediction Studies  
It is well understood that learning from past accidents is essential, but being able 
to predict accidents before they happen protects lives and property. Many studies from 
different angles have sought to determine variables and create models useful for 
predicting accidents. For example, overarching studies looked at GA accident risk factors 
(Li & Baker, 2007; Rostykus et al., 1998) predicting fatalities in GA accidents (Bazargan 
& Guzhva, 2011; Diamoutene et al., 2018; Shao et al., 2014a, 2014b), factors for 
predicting accidents (Ison 2015; Knecht, 2013, 2015; Li & Baker, 1999; Morris, 2018; 
Valdés et al., 2018), and factors for predicting airline accidents (McFadden, 1997, 2003). 
Studies conducted to predict accidents in specific sub-sets of aviation include air tour 
crashes (Ballard et al., 2013), turbine-powered aircraft (Boyd & Stolzer, 2016), business 
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aircraft (Burgess, Boyd et al., 2018), helicopters (Rao, 2016), and weather-related 
accidents (Groff & Price, 2006; Insua et al., 2019; Ison, 2014).  
The purpose of the McFadden (1997) study was to predict aviation accidents in 
male and female airline pilots using logistic regression. Model inputs included age, total 
flight hours, recent flight hours, and the employer, either a major or non-major airline. 
Younger pilots with fewer flight hours flying for a non-major airline were at greatest risk. 
Further, there were no significant differences found between females and males 
(McFadden, 1997). 
Rostykus et al. (1988) studied 8,411 GA landing accidents from 1983 through 
1992. Risk factors associated with GA accident fatalities were investigated, and several 
factors that increased the risk of pilot fatalities were identified. The two with the highest 
risk were aircraft destruction and post-crash fire. Other factors included the use of 
restraints, an off-airport crash site, flying a retractable-gear aircraft, and flying a multi-
engine aircraft. Despite the risks of a fatal landing accident, most accidents in the study 
were survivable (Rostykus et al., 1988). 
Li and Baker (1999) searched for potential correlations of factors predicting GA 
fixed-wing and helicopter fatalities. The regression model indicated that the most 
significant factor predicting fatalities was the presence of a post-crash fire. Other 
significant factors in the model were the crash location (on or off-airport), weather, time 
(daytime or nighttime), and use of restraints (Li & Baker, 1999). Eight years later, Li and 
Baker (2007) revisited risk factors encompassing GA flight risks. A post-crash fire 
remained a significant factor in fatality risks. Other variables included IMC, an off-
airport crash, and the use of restraints. Overall, accident risk factors for increased 
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accident potential were alcohol use, experience, age, being male, and intentional 
violations (Li & Baker, 2007).  
McFadden (2003) developed regression models to predict accidents at United 
States airlines and whether there were airline-specific factors useful to the model. The 
model indicated that airline-specific factors were not useful in predicting accidents. 
However, age, experience, and the interaction between age and experience were 
significant predictors. The results suggest that in the airlines, as pilots increase in age and 
experience, their risk of pilot-related accidents decreases (McFadden, 2003). 
Groff and Price (2006) focused their study on determining risk factors for GA 
accidents in degraded visibility. Input variables included accident histories, 
demographics, experience, length of flight, the purpose of flight, and testing. Significant 
predictors in the regression model were for pilots who earn their initial certification after 
age 25, who are non-instrument rated, who have a history of prior accidents or incidents, 
and who are on a flight 300 nautical miles or greater. Age at certification emerged as a 
novel finding (Groff & Price, 2006). 
Bazargan and Guzhva (2007) use regression modeling to predict fatalities in GA 
accidents from accidents that occurred from 1983 to 2002. Variables of aircraft 
characteristics, complexity, experience, flight plan, gender, light condition, phase of 
flight, and wind condition were entered into the model. Significant factors include light 
condition, IMC, cross-country flying, retractable landing gear, second pilot, restraint use, 
total flight time, recent flight time, wind, and phase of flight. Counterintuitive findings 
include a higher risk of accident in cruise flight and the presence of a second pilot 
(Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007). 
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Bazargan and Guzhva (2011) followed their 2007 study with further research on 
predicting GA accident fatalities, but with respect to gender, age, and experience. Their 
findings suggest that gender is not a factor in predicting pilot-related accidents, though 
males were more likely to have a fatal accident. Again, this study found that as 
experience increases, pilot-related accidents decrease (Bazargan & Guzhva, 2007). 
Ballard et al. (2013) researched a lesser-studied category of GA operations, 
commercial air tours. The study covered 152 air tour crashes with at least one fatality 
spanning 2000 to 2011. Three risk factors accounted for the most variance in the 
regression model: post-crash fire, IMC, and an off-airport crash location (Ballard et al., 
2013). 
Knecht (2013) investigated the proposition that there is a range of accumulated 
flight hours —the killing zone—where GA pilots were at the greatest risk for an accident. 
Working under the supposition that the relationship between flight hours and accident 
rates are nonlinear, the author investigated the usefulness of serial nonlinear modeling in 
predicting the outcome variable. The researcher concluded that serial-nonlinear models 
could be useful in making predictions from flight hours. The major finding is data 
suggesting the killing zone may be larger than once thought, perhaps extending to the 
2,000-hour range (Knecht, 2013). In a second study, Knecht (2015) again looked at flight 
hours and accidents, but this time using a nonlinear gamma-based model. With similar 
results to the previous study, the data suggest the killing zone extends wider than 
conventional wisdom suggests.  
As discussed earlier in the literature review, Ison (2014) investigated correlations 
between GA pilot actions or conditions and fatalities from continued VFR flight into 
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IMC using eight predictor variables. Creating a regression model, the researcher found 
two variables contributed to the model in a significant way; terrain and weather briefing 
(Ison, 2014).  
Shao et al. (2014a; 2014b) conducted two studies related to instrument-rated 
private pilots. The first study to report (Shao et al., 2014b) centered on fatal accident 
rates. They found that fatality rates increased for pilots over 65. Significant factors in 
IMC accidents included instrument approach deficiency, spatial disorientation leading to 
LOC, and lack of obstacle clearance. Significant pilot factors in VMC accidents included 
aerodynamic stalls and lack of obstacle clearance. The second study (Shao et al., 2014a) 
examined causal factors behind fatal accidents in instrument and non-instrument certified 
private pilots. In contrast to popular wisdom, IFR certification did not provide protection 
from accidents, and IFR certified pilots were involved in more accidents than the non-
certified private pilots. Show et al. (2014a) did not determine a reason though they 
speculated there was an increase in exposure because IFR certified pilots tended to fly 
longer distances. 
Ison (2015) researched accident factors using a sample of two pilot groups; one 
group had been involved in accidents, and the other group of pilots had not. Factors that 
were input into the regression model included age, flight time, gender, pilot certification 
level, professional pilot employment, and the status of the pilot flight review. Significant 
factors in the model were age, employment as a professional pilot, and flight time. Lower 
ages and flight times were associated with an increased risk of accidents. Additionally, 
employment as a professional pilot was associated with a higher risk, though this may be 
a factor of increased exposure. 
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Boyd (2015) used regression techniques to determine risk factors and causes of 
fatal accidents in non-commercial twin-engine piston GA aircraft. Accidents from 2002 
to 2012 (n = 376) were extracted from the NTSB aviation accident database. One key 
finding is the risk factors for fatalities included lighting conditions, IMC, off-airport crash 
site, and post-crash fire. Age was not found to be a factor for fatal accidents, nor was 
advanced certification. 
Boyd and Stolzer (2016) analyzed the underlying factors of accident causes in 
turbine-powered GA aircraft. To begin, they created a unique taxonomy to categorize the 
accident factors into 17 areas. Once the data were categorized, the authors continued with 
their aim to discover which factors were associated with a higher risk of serious injuries 
or fatalities. Using backward elimination in logistic regression, they determined 11 of the 
17 categories of the taxonomy contributed to the model. They found that not following 
checklists or flight manuals appeared most frequently as a precipitating factor. Next were 
flight planning errors and violations to Federal regulations. Other factors that increase 
risk were lack of knowledge and experience followed by deficiencies with air traffic 
services (Boyd & Stolzer, 2016).  
Burgess, Boyd et al. (2018) studied GA business flight accidents searching for 
accident rates, risk factors, and causal factors. They found that business flights had a 
higher proportion of fatalities than recreational flights. Their regression modeling 
indicated that a deficiency in pilot skill, pilot experience, and systems knowledge were 
the top causes of accidents followed by regulatory violations (Burgess, Boyd et al., 
2018). 
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Morris (2018) attempted to model private pilot accidents by age and recentness of 
medical certification. The model indicated that younger pilots had a higher probability of 
accidents. 
Rao and Marais (2020) used state-based analysis to predict helicopter accidents 
using a sample of 6,180 accidents between 1982 and 2015. The researchers reduced the 
redundancy within the NTSB database, making it easier to study safe or hazardous states 
and the triggers that activate the states. Focusing on LOC in flight, they identified the 
primary trigger to be pilots clipping objects. The significant benefit of the state-based 
analysis is the ability to identify causal factors not evident in traditional methods. 
Machine Learning Studies   
The regression analysis has been a staple for research projects, especially when 
trying to determine risk factors and build prediction models. Machine learning is 
becoming an increasingly popular method of developing models for aviation studies 
(Maheshwari et al., 2018) and human factors research (Carnahan et al., 2003). Machine 
learning has also shown better prediction results over regression methods (Stolzer & 
Halford, 2007). Machine learning has been used for safety analysis (Čokorilo, De Luca, 
& Dell’Acqua, 2014) and to predict accidents (Hu et al., 2019), unsafe acts (Harris & Li, 
2019), injuries and fatalities (Burnett & Si, 2017), pilot-error (Matthews, Das, Bhaduri, 
Das, Martin, & Oza, 2013) and HFACS factors (Liu et al., 2013). Additionally, machine 
learning has proven useful in understanding accident complexity (Christopher et al., 
2016) and detecting anomalies (Janakiraman & Nielsen, 2016).  
Liu et al. (2013) drew their sample from the NTSB aviation accident analysis 
database. The sample comprised 2,568 accidents that occurred from 1990-2002. Using 
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subject matter experts, all of the errors listed in the reports were coded into the HFACS 
categories of decision-based, perceptual-based, skill-based, and violations. Several non-
HFACS factors were also used, including general demographics, pilot experience, 
information about the aircraft, and weather information. The variables were then used to 
build a series of neural network models to determine factors that best predict fatal or 
nonfatal accidents. Twenty variables were kept in the final model. The top five most 
influential variables were total hours, ceiling height, taxiing, total aircraft seats, and 
female (Liu et al., 2013). 
Matthews et al. (2013) demonstrated the use of data mining in finding anomalous 
safety events using a multivariate time-series algorithm. They used flight operational 
quality assurance data (FOQA), large streams of data produced by aircraft, to explain the 
process. They found two previously undiscovered anomalies, namely airspeed drops and 
mode confusion. While the study outcome is not directly applicable to most GA 
operations, there is a utility in the technique (Matthews et al., 2013). 
Čokorilo et al. (2014) used clustering algorithms to analyze 1,500 accidents 
across the world that occurred between 1985 and 2010. Through the clustering process, 
data were grouped, and a representative accident was chosen. The defining feature of the 
clustering activity is no subjectivity in the assignment of members as the algorithms do 
the assignment. Each cluster was also assigned a hazard score to denote the level of risk 
represented by the cluster. The results were then used to build a predictive model.  
Janakiraman and Nielsen (2016) “develop[ed] fast anomaly detection algorithms 
using extreme learning machines (ELM) to discover significant anomalies in large 
aviation data sets” (p. 1993). Their data source was the radar measurement output from 
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the Denver Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility (TRACON). The researchers 
noted promise in the technique (Janakiraman & Nielsen, 2016). However, the procedure 
is quite complicated and likely not very useful for typical accident analysis. 
Burnett and Si (2017) used neural network modeling to predict aviation injuries 
and fatalities. The data were extracted from FAA accident records for GA crashes that 
occurred from 1975 to 2002. Variables and data were used to create several models: 
support vector machines (SVM), k-nearest neighbor, decision trees, and artificial neural 
networks (ANN). Each model was duplicated four times using four different 
combinations of variables; two of the four were based on odds ratios. The results of the 
modeling indicated that the ANN models performed better than the other model types, 
with all four variable combinations producing similar abilities to predict fatalities at an 
average rate above 91.16%. 
Harris and Li (2019) wanted to predict HFACS unsafe acts from the pre-
conditions of unsafe acts using neural network modeling. Their data source was the 
accident narratives from the Republic of China Air Force from 1978 through 2002. Each 
of the 523 accidents was coded into the HFACS framework by subject matter experts. 
The neural network predicted the unsafe acts with a classification rate of over 74%. 
Hu et al. (2019) employed text mining to analyze and predict accident causes 
based on NTSB aviation accident narratives for airline accidents from 1982 to October 
24, 2017. Their goal was to develop a model that can predict flight states and accident 
causes. Seven flight states were used: taxi, takeoff, climb out cruise, descent, approach, 
and landing. Causes were divided into three categories: aircraft, personnel issues, and 
environmental issues. Keywords were developed to aid in model development. Features 
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were extracted using the TF-IDF method, which is a factor of how many times a word is 
used and how many times it appears in different documents. Because the number of 
words was in the thousands, logistic regression was used to select the top 500 words.  
Five machine learning methods were chosen: deep neural network (DNN), 
gradient boosting decision trees, ImVerde, multinomial naïve Bayes, and support vector 
machines (SVM). The DNN is often used in text classification and speech recognition. 
Gradient boosting decision trees are a combination of decision trees, where variables are 
split into branches and leaves, and boosting, where models are combined to increase 
predictive capabilities. ImVerde models the reports as a network and reports similarities. 
Multinomial naïve Bayes has been shown to be useful in classifying discrete text features. 
Finally, the SVM algorithm works to classify variables according to a “non-probabilistic 
binary linear classifier” (Hu et al., 2019, p. 4). Of the five methods, the DNN was the best 
at predicting aircraft, personnel, and environmental causal factors. 
Theoretical Foundation  
The study outlined here is exploratory and data driven, which means there is no 
theoretical foundation upon which hypotheses are developed. Rather, the theoretical 
foundation relates to the data and text mining methodology for developing predictive 
models. The following paragraphs describe the data mining, text mining, and SEMMA 
foundation. 
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Data Mining   
Data mining is explained in many ways, yet with universal themes. Tufféry 
(2001) explained, “Data mining is the art of extracting information—that is, 
knowledge—from data” (p. 36). Han and Kamber (2001) wrote, “Data mining is a 
multidisciplinary field, drawing work from areas including database technology, artificial 
intelligence, machine learning, neural networks, statistics, pattern recognition, 
knowledge-based systems, knowledge acquisition, information retrieval, high-
performance computing, and data visualization” (p. xix). Truong et al. (2018) explained 
that data mining is a machine learning methodology that goes beyond traditional 
statistical methods by “construct[ing] patterns based not solely on the input data, but also 
on the logical consequences of the data” ( p. 31). One of the significant benefits of data 
mining is the ability to use large data sources to look for patterns and systematic 
relationships among variables while overcoming traditional statistical challenges with the 
volume of data (Stolzer, Halford et al., 2008). 
Data mining was developed to address the challenge of extracting useful 
information from vast amounts of data collected from a myriad of sources. The 
compilation of information is known as Big Data. The characteristics of Big Data include 
the volume, complexity, and growth of the information captured and stored (EMC 
Education Services, 2015). One use of Big Data in aviation is to support a flight 
operational quality assurance (FOQA) program where a flight organization can review 
digital flight data from day-to-day operations. The organization can then identify trends 
and verify the level of compliance with operating procedures (FAA, 2004). One estimate 
of how much data can be captured tops over half a terabyte of data per Boeing 787 flight 
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(Finnegan, 2013). To facilitate aviation data analytics such as that required by a flight 
operational quality assurance (FOQA) program, Airbus launched a data platform called 
Skywise. According to Airbus (2020), their platform currently houses over 10 petabytes 
of data and connects to over 9,000 airplanes from over 100 airlines. One petabyte is 1015 
bytes of data, 1,000 terabytes, or 1 million gigabytes (Smith, 2016). Han and Kamber 
(2001) described this condition as a deluge of data requiring ways to automate 
classification, analysis, and modeling the data to improve decision making. 
Decision Tree. Decision trees are models that begin with a root (target variable) 
that is split into branches at nodes representing the predictor variables using if/then rules. 
Trees are constructed using recursive partitioning with a training sample and limited, or 
cut back, using pruning with a validation sample. Because the project uses a categorical 
target variable, a classification tree algorithm is used to make the splits into two 
successor nodes (Shmueli et al., 2016). Decision trees are said to work best modeling 
variables with non-linear relationships (Wielenga, 2007). They also hold the advantage of 
not being subject to the assumptions required in traditional statistics and are robust to 
noisy data (Truong et al., 2018; Tufféry, 2011). Overfitting is possible, that is why it is 
essential to either stop the tree growth or prune the branches where appropriate. A 
maximum depth of six levels will be imposed (Maxson, 2018; McCarthy et al., 2019; 
SAS Institute, 2019a), and branches will be pruned if necessary. 
 Gradient Boosting Machine. Gradient boosting machine algorithms build 
prediction models based on combining basic regression and decision tree models (Dean, 
2014) “with the goal of minimizing a target loss function” (Bonaccorso, 2018, p. 274). 
The algorithm uses a series of trees that become the foundation for a single prediction 
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model. The gradient boosting machine functions in a stepwise or additive manner where 
data are resampled several times to produce a weighted average of the data just resampled 
with the sum of the individual predictions formulating the final prediction (Bonaccorso, 
2018; Dean, 2014; McCarthy et al., 2019). By building in an additive manner, 
mispredictions from previous trees are corrected. When used on large datasets, “the 
combined techniques may produce results that are superior to each individual technique” 
(McCarthy et al., 2019, p. 176). A benefit of gradient boosting machine models is that 
they are said to be more robust to missing data and outliers than single regression or 
decision tree models (McCarthy et al., 2019). 
 Neural network. The artificial neural network in data mining method mimics 
how the human brain makes connections (Stolzer & Halford, 2007) and learns through 
experience (Shmueli et al., 2016). Similarly, machine learning neural networks are based 
on connecting “simple processing elements” (Liu et al., 2013, p. 155), and, because of its 
structure, can solve complex problems. Further, “although each neuron holds a relatively 
small processing capacity, it is this interconnected, nonlinear, parallel-processing 
architecture that gives this system the computational power to solve complex problems 
similar to those solved by biological systems” (Liu et al., 2013, pp. 155-156). Using a 
supervised process, a model is constructed by building on inputs, outputs, 
backpropagation of error, and weight adjustments improving predictability through each 
cycle (Han & Kamber, 2001; Liu et al., 2013; Shmueli et al., 2016; Stolzer, Halford et al., 
2008). Neural networks may be especially useful for modeling non-linear relationships 
(Wielenga, 2007), and can model complex variable relationships not possible using other 
methods (Shmueli et al., 2016). However, they can be challenging to interpret, and 
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variables should be examined a priori so that only necessary variables are used 
(Wielenga, 2007). Additionally, neural networks are subject to overfitting due to over-
training the data (Shmueli et al., 2016). 
Random Forest. To quote Bonaccorso (2018), “A Random Forest is a bagging 
ensemble method based on a set of Decision Trees” (p. 264), or, in other words, a 
decision tree forest (McCarthy et al., 2019). Bagging, also known as bootstrapping, 
creates a tree ensemble through a series of sampling by replacement and builds new trees 
for each sample (Bonaccorso, 2018). The algorithm builds many trees that are weak 
classifiers that then “vote in some manner to build a stable and strong classifier that is 
better than the average tree created in the forest” (Dean, 2014, pp. 125-126). The benefit 
of the Random Forest algorithm is its ability to work with classification and regression 
trees so it can be used with binary target variables. They are also said to be less prone to 
overfitting compared to a single decision tree (McCarthy et al., 2019). 
 Regression. Regression is a method of discovering relationships between 
variables and may be one of the most popular textbook methods for prediction (Shmueli 
et al., 2016). When a change in one variable correlates with a change in another variable, 
it is said to be a linear relationship. Logistic regression is used when the target variable is 
binary such as in the current study and predicts “the probability of a categorical outcome” 
(Shmueli et al., 2016, p. 231). The regression model output will be used to assess a 
variable’s worth in predicting the target variable. 
Regression in data mining is not restricted to traditional statistical assumptions 
because the models are built with machine learning algorithms, and they are capable of 
handling noisy data (Truong et al., 2018). Shmueli et al. (2016) advise caution with 
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taking an all-in approach with variables. Instead, they suggest using variable subsets as a 
possible method of improving model accuracy. When there are multiple variables, 
multicollinearity can affect the model. Further, there are tradeoffs between too many and 
too few predictors that should be considered; too many uncorrelated predictors can 
increase prediction variance, whereas too few could mean valuable predictors have been 
left out (Shmueli et al., 2016). 
Text Mining   
Text mining is also a machine learning methodology, but it processes text inputs 
rather than numerical inputs by “undercover[ing] the underlying themes or concepts that 
are contained in large document collections” (SAS, 2019b, para 1). Using unstructured 
data rather than structured data, text mining “is a method of extracting unknown and 
valuable information from randomly organized text data” (Hong & Park, 2019, p. 2). 
Text mining is a quantitative methodology employing algorithms to identify parts of 
speech based on context (SAS, 2019b). Using a process of parsing, stemming, stop-word 
removal, search and retrieval, and text mining (EMC Education Services, 2015; Han & 
Kamber, 2001), text is transformed into a “term-by-document frequency matrix” (SAS, 
2019, p. 1385) that can be used for data mining. Similar documents will likely have 
similar words, and frequency tables can be used to count and classify related terms (Han 
& Kamber, 2001), from which text mining algorithms can group similar objects into 
clusters (Stolzer & Halford, 2007). Clusters may then be used as predictors in a data 
mining model. 
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SEMMA Framework   
The SEMMA framework operates in activities suggested by its acronym 
SEMMA—sample, explore, modify, model, and assess. SEMMA represents a way to 
visualize and organize data mining processes. While beginning with sampling, the 
processes described by SEMMA are iterative through all phases as the researcher 
explores the data and evaluates the models. The SAS® Enterprise Miner™ is designed in 
line with SEMMA and was used for the current study. 
Sample. The sample activity comprises actions needed to determine the data 
required to answer the research question and whether or not the data are available in a 
single source or need to be merged from separate sources (Patel & Thompson, 2013). 
Once data are aggregated, a sample is extracted and prepared for follow-on processes 
beginning with selecting a sample statistically representative of the data (SAS, 2006). 
Partitioning the sample facilitates model development and assessment. Depending on the 
research needs, data are partitioned into a training sample for model fitting, a validation 
sample for assessment, and a test sample to reconfirm the model generalizability (Dean, 
2014). 
Explore. The explore activity allows the researcher to search for anticipated 
relationships (Patel & Thompson, 2013) and discover inconsistencies, abnormalities, and 
trends useful for understanding the data (Dean, 2014). Reviewing the quality of the data, 
such as searching for missing data and errors, is also within the explore activity (Patel & 
Thompson, 2013). SAS (2006) explains exploration as a means of discovering. A number 
of methods are available in the process of exploring, including clustering, factor analysis, 
and other statistical techniques (SAS, 2006). 
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Modify. The modify activity describes molding the variables to facilitate 
meaningful modeling. Variables may be grouped or deleted, and outliers may be 
transformed (Dean, 2014). Should the data change, researchers may need to revisit the 
modify activity and account for new conditions (SAS, 2006). 
Model. The model activity uses machine learning algorithms to find combinations 
of variables that predict the target variable (Dean, 2014). The Enterprise Miner™ can 
develop many different types of models, each with their strengths and weaknesses, to 
facilitate the search for the best predicting model for the data. The current study will use 
Decision Tree, Logistic Regression, Neural Network, Gradient Boosting Machine, and 
Random Forest models in the search for a model that performs the best in predicting the 
target variable with the NTSB dataset.  
Assess. The assess activity describes evaluating and comparing models between 
the partitioned samples (Dean, 2014). Models are built with the training sample and 
validated with the validation sample. The models are then assessed for their accuracy 
using new data not previously used in training or validation. Depending on the model 
type, there are a number of methods for assessing the models, including misclassification 
rate, receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, Gini coefficient, cumulative, and 
average squared error (McCarthy et al., 2019). The accuracy will be assessed using the 
test sample partitioned from the dataset in the Sample activity. The outcome of the 
Assess activity is a determination of the champion model (SAS, 2006). 
Gaps in the Literature 
Accident analysis and efforts to predict future accidents are prevalent in the 
literature. Unfortunately, the underlying combination of variables at the heart of GA 
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accidents are still not fully understood; accidents continue and appear to be increasing. 
Considering the stated research problem, and a review of the extant literature, several 
gaps are evident. 
First, aviation is not stagnant. New generations of pilots are trained, the current 
generation of pilots mature, aircraft systems change, and the airspace system evolves. A 
search of aviation studies revealed that there is a gap in analyzing current data. To 
illustrate, GA accident analysis from 2016 to present only appears in four peer-reviewed 
studies, with zero analysis of accidents from 2018 to present. An additional six studies 
include 2015, and, further, seven additional studies cover 2014. 
 Second, there have been very few studies that have taken advantage of the 
increased abilities afforded by data mining in predicting accidents. In practical terms, that 
means that lessons learned through non-parametric model building with large amounts of 
data, and potentially hundreds of variables have not been exploited. 
 Third, text mining has not been fully explored. There is only one known text-
mining study (Hu et al., 2020) using NTSB data with GA accidents, and that study used 
different variables, years, goals, and data mining models from the study reported here. It 
is possible that new information emerging from text mining may unlock some of the 
answers to reducing GA accidents. 
Summary 
Given the century-long history of aviation, and the FAA and NTSB focused 
attention on GA since 1998, it may seem all lessons have been learned, and safety 
improvements are a matter of executing what is already known. However, with GA 
accident rates increasing, it appears there is more to learn. The role of the literature 
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review was to provide a foundation for the current study, define the variables, and 
describe the research gaps. The review covered GA safety, the role of SMS, introduced 
many studies seeking to understand GA accident causes and understand variables that 
may predict the next accident so that barriers can be put in place and risks mitigated. The 
following chapter details the study methodology. 
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Chapter III: Methodology 
Chapter III proceeds with a detailed discussion of the methodology used in the 
current study toward the project’s aim of building a model capable of predicting GA 
accidents. The chapter first outlines the selected research methodology and the sampling 
strategy. The middle portion of the chapter focuses on the research design, including 
procedures used to conduct the study. Finally, the last sections of the chapter introduce 
the approach to data analysis. 
Research Method Selection 
The data-driven exploratory study, as envisioned, employed both text and data 
mining techniques to answer the research questions. Data mining is useful for detecting 
patterns and relationships among quantitative variables contained in large databases (Han 
& Kamber, 2001; Stolzer, Friend et al., 2018; Truong et al., 2018; Tufféry, 2011). Text-
mining, a method of data mining used with unstructured text data such as the narratives 
found in accident reports (Shmueli et al., 2016), was also used. Text mining is a form of 
text-based predictive modeling “to find the patterns that emerge when the values of the 
target variable are analyzed against the text” (SAS Institute, 2019b, para. 1). The study 
first used text mining to analyze and categorize textual components of the dataset and 
create quantitative variables from the qualitative inputs. Text-based variables were then 
added as quantitative variables in the data mining modeling. 
Data Mining   
Researchers are taught that research designs are based on the nature of the 
research problem and research questions (Cresswell, 2009). The study, as suggested, 
seeks to advance the science of aviation accident prevention through exploratory data-
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driven predictive modeling. Further, the dataset is large, and the variables potentially 
complex. Data mining provides the capability to address the research questions while 
handling the potential variable complexity. 
The challenge, as stated by Dean (2014), is that with real data the relationships 
between variables are often nonlinear and do not follow assumptions required of 
traditional statistical methods. Even where a linear relationship appears to exist, it is 
sometimes difficult to describe. However, data mining overcomes obstacles presented by 
nonlinear relationships and violations of traditional statistical assumptions. Further, large 
amounts of data are sometimes required to observe relationships (Dean, 2014). Perhaps 
most importantly, traditional statistical methods are limited in their ability to predict 
target variables such as that envisioned in this study. 
Text Mining   
As stated previously, the overarching goal of the project was to develop predictive 
models from data contained in the NTSB aviation accident reports. Reviewing individual 
reports revealed a vast amount of the information was in a narrative format. Qualitative 
analysis of the report narratives using traditional methods could undoubtedly have led the 
researcher to central themes in the text-based data to describe the dataset. However, the 
knowledge gained from such a purely qualitative analysis could not be used for 
prediction. Conversely, text mining combined qualitative and quantitative aspects and 
employed machine learning algorithms that enabled predictive modeling from the text 
through a combination of data mining and text-based analytics (Dean, 2014). 
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Population/Sample 
The current study intended to develop a model that could predict injury-related 
GA accidents from variables captured in NTSB aviation accident reports. The following 
paragraphs describe the population of interest and the sampling strategy. 
Population and Sampling Frame   
The population of interest comprised the aviation incidents and accidents from 
1998 to present within the GA community. The incidents and accidents were archived in 
the NTSB (2020b) Aviation Accident Database & Synopses and made available to the 
public. The population size was n = 31,967. 
Sample Size   
The sample was n = 27,786 and was comprised of all fixed-wing GA incidents 
and accidents in the United States, 1998-2018. 
Sampling Strategy   
The purposive sample derived from the population of interest was all accidents 
involving only fixed-wing GA aircraft in the United States, 1998-2018. The definition of 
GA adopted for the current study described a type of operation rather than particular 
types of aircraft or pilot certifications. Aircraft flown under GA rules ranged from slow 
and simple to fast and complex, and pilots ranged from the newest student to the most 
accomplished pilots with multiple certifications. The broad range of participants flying 
diverse aircraft involving different speeds, training, complexities, and flight envelopes 
could have made it difficult to draw meaningful conclusions. Therefore, purposive 
sampling was used. As envisioned, all cases within the specific parameters were chosen. 
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Samples are smaller representatives of the population useful for research when 
using the entire population is impractical or infeasible (Field, 2018). The goal was to 
select a sample that represented the whole population of interest to reduce bias in the 
research conclusions and improve the study’s generalizability (Bordens & Abbott, 2011). 
Various methods of sampling were possible to accomplish research goals included under 
the broad categories of random and non-random sampling. Random sampling describes 
methods of selecting participants or cases from a population based on probabilities, 
where each unit has an equal chance to be chosen for the sample. Variations include 
stratified sampling, systematic sampling, and cluster sampling (Bordens & Abbott, 2011). 
Non-random sampling does not rely on probabilities for selection and is used when 
required knowledge of the population is not available or when random sampling is not 
appropriate (Babbie, 2013). Common methods of non-random sampling are convenience 
sampling, snowball sampling, and purposive sampling. Purposive sampling, also called 
judgmental sampling, describes the selection of participants or cases based on “the 
researcher’s judgment about which ones will be the most useful or representative” 
(Babbie, 2013, p. 190). As explained, the current study used purposive sampling to select 
the class of cases to be data mined. 
Data Collection Process 
The study used aviation accident report data collected by the U.S. Government 
and archived for public use. Because the data were not pre-formatted according to the 
scoping requirements of a particular study, pre-processing actions were needed. The 
following paragraphs detail procedures used to prepare the data for analysis. 
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Design and Procedures   
There were several possible ways of obtaining the NTSB aviation accident data. 
The primary way for most users is to use the basic search features of the NTSB Aviation 
Accident Database & Synopses webpage (NTSB, 2020b). Users can search using basic 
event information, aircraft details, operation type, NTSB report status, or geographical 
information. The system searches for reports meeting the requested parameters and 
provides links to the written reports. However, for the current study, tabular data were 
needed. In addition to the written reports, the NTSB made downloadable datasets 
available on the same webpage. The datasets were complex and comprehensive, requiring 
more advanced procedures to extract and pare the required information. A step-by-step 
methodology was used to prepare the data and promote process repeatability, which 
began by downloading the data set. The dataset was downloaded as a Microsoft® Access® 
file using the process explained below. 
Once the files are downloaded, data are commonly extracted using the Access® 
query functions and then exported to Microsoft® Excel® for data analysis. To facilitate 
data extraction and presentation, the NTSB dataset was instead imported into Microsoft® 
SQL Server®, a platform for programming database functions. The NTSB used event 
identification (event ID) numbers as anchors making standard query results and the 
resulting display cumbersome because each event ID returned multiple lines of data. For 
instance, in the case of mid-air or on-ground collisions, a single event ID represented all 
of the aircraft involved. As another example, when extracting flight hours, a single event 
ID was replicated multiple times to cover each of the various flight hour categories. 
Through SQL Server®, the data were extracted and presented using the NTSB report 
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number as the anchor. The result was a structured dataset where each aircraft with the 
associated variables was contained on a single row. All aircraft were placed in rows, one 
aircraft per row, and all variables were placed in single columns. Once the data were 
extracted, they were exported to a Microsoft® Excel® file. 
The Excel® file containing the NTSB incident and accident data was scoped 
according to the planned delimitations. A review of the NTSB product revealed that the 
entire database contained over 84,000 line items. The scoping included the following 
steps: 
Step 1: The study date range—January 1, 1998 – December 31, 2018—was 
selected. 
Step 2: The country—USA—was selected. Reports without a country listed were 
deleted. 
Step 3: The type of operation—FAR Part 91—was selected. Reports without an 
operation designation were deleted. 
Step 4: The aircraft category—AIR—was selected. Reports with an unknown 
category or that were coded as a balloon, blimp, glider, gyrocopter, helicopter, powered-
parachute, ultra-light, or weight-shift were deleted. 
The remaining data included all of the NTSB reports for Part 91 airplane incidents 
and accidents in the United States between 1989 and 2018. The next actions involved 
building the target variable, combining selected variables, and determining features for 
input into the models. 
Target Variable Preparation. The target variable called Accident Injury Level 
was built as a dichotomous variable. Events involving fatal or serious injuries were 
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combined to form the first level of the target variable and labeled as one (1) in the 
dataset. Events with minor or no injuries were combined to form the second level and 
labeled as zero (0). Events without a specified injury level were deleted. 
Text-based Variable Preparation. There were three categories of text-based 
information in the NTSB database considered for the projected study. They were the 
Occurrence Descriptions, the Findings Descriptions, and the Narratives. Each report 
possibly contained several major events, termed occurrences, listed in the report. One 
occurrence in each report was designated the defining event while the others described 
major events in the accident sequence. Using the CONCATENATE function within 
Excel®, all of the occurrences were combined into a single field. Similarly, the reports 
listed findings, which were designated as either causal components or factors in the 
accident sequence. All findings were combined into a single field. At this stage, the 
narratives were not adjusted. 
Variable Selection. There were many variables or features available from the 
NTSB database as potential inputs into the model. As introduced previously, the target 
variable was Accident Injury Level, a two-level dichotomous variable of fatal/serious and 
minor/no-injuries. Variables relating to pilot demographics, including age, sex, 
certificates held, and flight hours are common descriptors in aviation studies and were 
used in the modeling process. Other variables of potential interest related to weather (e.g., 
visual or instrument conditions and precipitation), aircraft details (e.g., homebuilt, 
landing gear complexity, and aircraft complexity), and the operating environment (e.g., 
airspace type, mishap location, second pilot on board, and student solo). The final 
variables related to the text-based variables that described the accident sequence, 
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findings, and occurrences. The a priori study variables are found in Table 4. The 
complete variable library is at Appendix C.  
 
Table 4 
 
A Priori Study Variables  
 
Variable Description Type 
Mid-air Mid air collision Dichotomous 
Ground collision On ground collision Dichotomous 
Airport location to crash Proximity to airport Categorical 
Atmospheric lighting Lighting condition Categorical 
Wind gusts indicated Gusts indicated Dichotomous 
TARGET Accident Injury level Dichotomous 
Basic weather conditions Basic weather condition Dichotomous 
Flight plan type Type of flight plan filed Categorical 
Homebuilt Homebuilt aircraft Dichotomous 
Fixed-retractable gear Gear type Dichotomous 
Flight purpose Flight purpose Categorical 
Second pilot on board Second pilot on board Dichotomous 
Sightseeing flight Sightseeing flight Dichotomous 
Air-medical flight Air medical flight Dichotomous 
Airspace Airspace Categorical 
Crew position code Pilot category Categorical 
Age Pilot age Interval 
Sex Pilot sex Dichotomous 
Med certificate validity Medical certificate validity Categorical 
Professional pilot Professional pilot Dichotomous 
Highest certificate Highest pilot certificate Categorical 
Total flight hours Total flight hours, all a/c Interval 
Total PIC hours PIC hours, all a/cd Interval 
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Variable Description Type 
Hours last 90-days Hours last 90-days, all a/c Interval 
Hours last 30-days Hours last 30-days, all a/c Interval 
Hours last 24-hours Hours last 24-hrs, all a/c Interval 
Total hours make Total hours in a/c make Interval 
Total hours multi-engine Total multi-engine hours Interval 
Total hours single-engine Total single-engine hours Interval 
Total hours at night Total night hours Interval 
Engine type Engine type Categorical 
Multi-engine aircraft Multi-engine a/c Dichotomous 
Defining events Defining event Categorical 
Occurrences Combined occurrence descriptions Text 
Causes Combined cause descriptions Text 
Factors Combined factors descriptions Text 
Report narrative Accident summary/report Text 
Factual narrative Factual narrative Text 
Cause narrative Probable cause narrative Text 
Incident narrative FAA Incident Narrative (8020-5) Text 
 
Apparatus and Materials   
The data used for modeling came from archived aircraft incident and accident 
information downloaded from the NTSB’s public website. Data were extracted using 
Microsoft® Access® and Microsoft® SQL Server® then cleaned and prepared using 
Microsoft® Excel®. Descriptive analysis and modeling were conducted using SAS® 
Enterprise Miner™. 
Sources of the Data   
The data for analysis were drawn from the NTSB aviation accident database, 
which is a publicly available repository of civil aviation accident reports from 1948 to 
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present (NTSB, 2020b). The NTSB database was a relational database; data were stored 
in a collection of tables consisting of various attributes and capable of storing thousands 
of records with each record identified by a unique key (Han & Kamber, 2001). The 
contents comprise both structured and unstructured data (EMC Education Services, 
2015). The database contained all of the written accident reports, and the reports were 
available for download as PDF or HTML documents. Additionally, all of the report 
components were stored as searchable tabular data. As an additional feature, 
downloadable datasets in Microsoft® Access® format provided the researcher the ability 
to customize data extraction according to the research project requirements. The Access® 
database contained all of the information found in the actual accident investigation 
reports. The data used for the study were current as of the NTSB’s February 2020 
Access® product. 
Ethical Consideration 
The use of data about people may have serious implications depending on data 
access, collection purposes, and legitimate conclusions that can be drawn from the data 
(Witten et al., 2017). Considering the data source and purposes, concerns for the ethical 
treatment of human subjects were not a factor in the described study as the data were 
available for public download according to U.S. Government policies and used for 
accident prevention in line with the goals of investigating accidents. Additionally, any 
pieces of personally identifiable information for individuals involved in the events were 
sanitized by the government prior to the report being made public. Given the data source 
and protections provided by the U.S. Government before posting the data, internal review 
board consideration was not required. 
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Data Analysis Approach 
The basic purpose of the study outlined in this chapter was to develop a prediction 
model that best predicted the target variable using text mining and data mining tools. 
Choosing the best predicting model—the champion—required a methodical development 
process and assessments of several candidate models. The study followed the SEMMA 
model as previously introduced (SAS Institute, 2019a). The paragraphs that follow within 
this section outline the data analysis approach used to conduct the study including the 
steps within the SEMMA framework and specific discussions on participant 
demographics, reliability, and validity assessments. 
Participant Demographics 
Descriptive demographics were derived from data captured in the NTSB reports. 
The demographics included descriptive statistics regarding the accident pilots’ age, sex, 
flight hours, and the highest pilot certification. Derived statistics included the minimum, 
maximum, mean, median, and standard deviation values. 
Reliability Assessment Method   
Reliability is commonly defined in relation to how well an instrument provides 
consistent measurements (Field, 2018; Hair et al., 2010). Two components of reliability 
in the current study were connected to the reliability of the data and the reliability of the 
predictive models (Hair et al., 2010; Odisho, 2020). If the data were corrupted, the 
models would not provide consistent predictions with new data. Processes were instituted 
by the NTSB to ensure the data entry personnel were trained and the data were quality-
checked (GAO, 2010). Model reliability was assessed using the validation sample in 
comparison with the training sample results. Details are provided hereafter; however, 
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assessment methods included reviewing ROC curves, lift charts, and miscalculation rates. 
Reliable models were those that showed similar results in each sample. Models with the 
best results were then used with the test sample. Again, the similar results indicated 
reliability. 
Validity Assessment Method   
Validity refers to whether an instrument measures what it intends to measure and 
the level to which results can be inferred (Hair et al., 2010; Vogt, 2005). Validity works 
in partnership with reliability; a model that is reliable lacks usefulness in predicting 
outcomes if it does not predict well. Validity in the study was assessed using the test-
retest methodology in SAS, similar to the reliability assessment. Specifically, the validity 
was evaluated after the models were built with the training portion of the data and 
validated with the second portion of the data. The validation models were then tested 
with the third portion of the data. 
Validity assessment methods included assessments of prediction accuracy and 
predictive power. Miscalculation rate and overall prediction results assisted in assessing 
accuracy. The Lift chart, ROC, specificity, and sensitivity analysis assisted in assessing a 
model’s predictive power.  
Data Analysis Process   
Data analysis was a key component in realizing the goals of the current study. As 
Dean (2014) described, “Model assessment, stated simply, is trying to find the best model 
for your application to the given data” (Dean, 2014, p. 67). While Dean (2014) was 
specifically writing about the model, it follows that in order to find the best model, solid 
analysis needed to occur in all appropriate points in the project.  
93 
 
As previously introduced, the text mining activities were conducted first because 
the text mining process converted qualitative data into a quantitative format for use in 
modeling. The data mining process followed the text mining process and incorporated the 
text-based variables. Three groups of models were built. The first grouping of models 
was based solely on the text variables. The second grouping was based solely on the 
quantitative tabular data. Finally, the third grouping combined both text-based and 
tabular data in the models. The champion model was chosen from the models produced in 
the three groups. The process and analysis decision points are described below. 
Sample Analysis Approach. As the Sample activities appear first in the model, it 
was intuitive that they set the stage for the remaining SEMMA activities. Analysis in the 
Sample activity was simple yet foundational. First, the overall dataset was analyzed to 
determine whether the necessary information existed in the dataset or whether additional 
information was required. Upon review, additional information was not needed. Next, the 
dataset was assessed against the scoping delimitations to ensure the extraneous data were 
removed. 
Explore Analysis Approach. During the Explore activities, the data were 
assessed for completeness and were cleaned according to the assessment. A descriptive 
analysis occurred in order to provide depth and understanding to key pilot demographics 
and other appropriate variables in the dataset. During the Explore activities, the data were 
assessed for extreme values and data entry errors. Further, new variables were created 
from the existing data to facilitate eventual model interpretation. 
Modify Analysis Approach. In connection with the Explore analysis, the Modify 
analysis entailed assessing the potential impact of such issues as missing variables and 
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outliers. Imputation and data transformation were not used. Analysis in the Modify 
activity, in conjunction with the Model activities, included assessments of model 
adjustments to improve model performance. 
Model Analysis Approach. During the Model activity, the various models were 
trained. The analysis involved reviewing the model for any unexpected results or 
anomalies that could be addressed through modifications, either correcting erroneous data 
in the dataset or creating new variables based on findings. Overall, five types of models 
were used, including Decision Trees, Gradient Boosting, Logistic Regression, Neural 
Network, and Random Forest. The project process is explained in the next paragraphs. A 
depiction of the project flow diagram can be viewed in Figure 5. 
 
  
95 
 
Figure 5 
Project Flow Diagram  
 
 
Note. The diagram was built within SAS® Enterprise Miner™. The project flow began with the dataset 
node in the top-left portion and flowed to the Final Models Node on the extreme right of the diagram. The 
three Metadata Nodes were not required, but they facilitated variable selection for all following nodes. 
 
Text Mining. The text mining portion of the project began with Text Parsing 
where a terminology-document frequency matrix was created by the text mining 
algorithm. The stop list was edited by the researcher so that the algorithm returned the 
most useful terms. Analysis of the Text Parsing process provided insight into document 
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terms, how a term was used, how frequently it was used, and whether the term was kept 
for follow-on processes. Terms that appeared to have no use yet figured prominently in 
the analysis became candidates for the stop list. When words were added to the stop list, 
the node was executed again, and the words were dropped from future use. Once the Text 
Parsing output was created, the Text Filter process refined the list of words and terms by 
applying weights. Words that appeared less frequently were assigned higher weightings 
and were potentially more meaningful in the prediction models.  
The next two processes of Text Cluster and Text Topic created the text-based 
variables using singular value decomposition (SVD) to transform the terminology-
document frequency matrix into a form compatible for quantitative modeling. The first of 
the two processes was the Text Cluster, where documents were clustered into disjoint sets 
and described with descriptive terms. In the current study, the documents were the 
individual aircraft accident reports. In text clustering, each document was assigned to a 
specific cluster without crossover between clusters. The second process was the Text 
Topic, which associated terms and documents. Unlike the text clusters, terms and 
documents could be associated with more than one topic or not associated with any topic 
at all. The outcome of the text mining process was a set of new Text Cluster and Text 
Topic variables that were added to the quantitative dataset and available for overall 
modeling. 
Data Mining. Once the text mining process was completed, the data mining 
process was executed, beginning with data partitioning at a ratio of 60:20:20. The largest 
portion of the partition was allocated for model training and the other two for model 
validation and model testing. Three metadata nodes were inserted into the project flow to 
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facilitate the different model group variables. One branch of the process flow included 
only text variables, a second included only tabular data variables, and a third allowed 
both text and tabular data variables as potential model components. In the end, models 
were assessed against each other, and a champion model was selected. 
Assess Analysis Approach. Several types of models were assessed for usefulness 
in predicting GA accidents using SAS® Enterprise Miner™. The models included the 
Decision Tree, Neural Network, Random Forest, Gradient Boosting, and Logistic 
Regression. The ambition was to discover a model that best predicted the outcome 
variable. A checklist of SAS® Enterprise Miner™ settings for each of the nodes can be 
found in Appendix F. The checklist was used to promote standardization and process 
repeatability, adding to the reliability and validity of the findings. 
Decision Trees. The Decision Trees were based on rules that split variables 
hierarchically, creating a branch structure. The results represented rules that were used 
for predicting the target variable. The splitting rule criterion was based on a Chi-square 
test within the algorithm. The algorithm searched for a split “that maximize[d] the 
measure of worth associated with the [specified p-value]” (SAS Institute, 2019a, p. 765). 
Once a variable node was split, the algorithm considered the new nodes for further 
splitting. Splitting ended when further splits failed to meet the Chi-square significance 
threshold (SAS Institute, 2019a). 
The current study built three Decision Tree models for each of the three groups of 
variables based on how many branches the algorithm was allowed to use, either 2-, 3-, or 
5-branches. The 3- or 5-branch specification did not force the model to create a certain 
number of branches. Rather, it provided a measure of freedom to the algorithm. The 
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Decision Tree models were built using the Decision Tree Node in SAS® Enterprise 
Miner™.  
Gradient Boosting. The Gradient Boosting was another partitioning algorithm 
“that searche[d] for an optimal partition of the data defined in terms of the values of a 
single variable” (SAS Institute, 2019a, p. 799). Target values were partitioned into 
segments in a recursive process. Partition worth was based on partition similarities. When 
the optimality criterion was met, the partitions were combined to form a model that 
predicted the target variable. The boosting mechanism involved several iterations of data 
resampling. The results of the resampling were a weighted average of the original data 
set. The algorithm accounted for inaccuracies in each resample iteration to improve 
accuracy. Many decision trees were developed and combined in a single model (SAS 
Institute, 2019a). The Gradient Boosting models were built using the Gradient Boosting 
Node in SAS® Enterprise Miner™.  
Logistic Regression. As the target variable used in the current study was binary, 
Logistic Regression was appropriate to model the probability that a variable predicted the 
target. Four different effect selection methods were possible, including None, Backward, 
Forward, and Stepwise. The current study used the Stepwise selection method. The 
Stepwise method in SAS® Enterprise Miner™ began with no variables and incrementally 
added variables until the algorithm met the stop criterion. The Stepwise method had the 
ability to remove variables already in the model if a better variable was encountered 
(SAS Institute, 2019a). The Logistic Regression models were built using the Regression 
Node in SAS® Enterprise Miner™.  
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Neural Network. The Neural Network models operated by searching for 
nonlinear linkages between the input variables and the target variable. The network was 
based on the neuron units and connections between the neurons. Input neurons were 
connected to a hidden layer of neurons where the algorithm made the nonlinear 
connections that predicted the target variable. Weights were assigned to connections in an 
attempt to minimize prediction error (SAS Institute, 2019a). The Neural Network models 
used a supervised algorithm and were built using the AutoNeural Node in SAS® 
Enterprise Miner™.  
Random Forest. The Random Forest, like Gradient Boosting, involved many 
Decision Trees. However, the Random Forest algorithm built the training trees using 
sampling without replacement of all the observations, and the input variables were 
randomly selected from all variables. The algorithm calculated posterior probabilities 
from several trees. Then, using a voting mechanism, “the forest predict[ed] the target 
category that the individual trees predict[ed] most often” (SAS Institute, 2019a, p. 1289). 
Individual trees used an out-of-bag sample, data the algorithm excluded from the training 
sample, to form predictions that are said to have greater reliability than predictions from 
the training sample (SAS Institute, 2019a). The Random Forest models were built using 
the HP Forest Node in SAS® Enterprise Miner™.  
Models were evaluated using the software’s Model Comparison node. Similar 
across all of the model results, fit statistics were produced by the Model Comparison 
Node. The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve charts and misclassification rate 
values were used for model evaluation (SAS Institute, 2019a). The misclassification rate 
was based on the formula of one minus the validation accuracy, with better rates having a 
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lower number (Truong et al., 2018). The ROC was based on the model’s true and false 
positive rate at a given threshold. When the plots were joined with a line, they formed the 
ROC curve. The ROC curve, as a measure of model sensitivity and specificity, provided 
an indication of model usefulness (Truong et al., 2018). Area under the curve in a ROC 
chart offered another basis for assessment. In general, the model with the highest area 
was interpreted as the best performing model (Shmueli et al., 2016). Another output, 
cumulative lift, was also used. A baseline was projected on a graph, and the results of the 
models were overlaid. The model with the highest lift above the baseline was interpreted 
to have the best model fit. Finally, variables were examined for their importance in 
predicting the target variable of accident injury severity. 
Summary 
The purpose of Chapter III is to outline the proposed methodology for the study, 
which involved text and data mining. The aim of the project, to create a model that 
predicted GA accident severity, is discussed. Procedures for conducting the study are 
detailed, including explanations of the tools and techniques to be used. Five families of 
models were created, including Decision Tree, Gradient Boosting, Random Forest, 
Neural Network, and Logistic Regression. Finally, the data analysis approach is outlined 
as a framework for choosing the model that best predicted the target variable. 
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Chapter IV: Results 
The study was conducted according to the methodology outlined in Chapter III 
following the SEMMA framework. Using publicly available NTSB aviation accident data 
from 1998-2018, prediction models were developed, validated, and tested through a 
series of machine learning techniques. The chapter begins with the demographic findings 
within the scoped sample of GA accidents and incidents. Next, the actual text mining 
process and results are described. The last portion of the chapter addresses the data 
mining process and findings. The different prediction models included Decision Tree, 
Gradient Boosting, Logistic Regression, Neural Network, and Random Forest. Further, 
the models were built using three combinations of variables: 1) text only, 2) data only, 
and 3) text and data. The results of the modeling process are presented here. 
Demographic Results 
At the beginning of the study, general demographic data were tallied once the 
dataset was uploaded into the SAS® library. The final sample size included in the 
modeling was n = 26,387. While there may have been more than one pilot on board the 
aircraft, the following numbers reflect the pilot at the controls of the aircraft. Further, the 
pilot at the controls was not always the designated Pilot-in-Command. Pilot ages ranged 
from 16 to 98 years old (mean = 51.7; med = 53; SD = 15.3) as seen in Figure 6.  
 
  
102 
 
Figure 6 
Accident Pilot Age Distribution  
 
Note. Age was not captured in 257 reports. 
 
While age is a typical demographic reported in research, the aviation literature 
indicates that correlations between age and a target variable, such as fatal/serious injury 
accidents, are complicated because of the relationship of age with associated variables 
that comprise experience and situational factors. Of note, Figure 6 captures all of the 
accident pilots in the sample, not just those involved in fatal/serious injury accidents. 
Additionally, it is notable that age did not appear as a variable in the top three prediction 
models and only appeared as a minor contributing variable in three of the 21 prediction 
models. The Random Forest (All) model, the fourth-best model, ranked age as #28 in 
variable importance. Age did not appear again until the 13th-best Gradient Boosting 
(Data) and the 14th-best Random Forest (Data) where age appeared at #15 and #18 in 
importance, respectively.  
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Pilot sex was not captured in every NTSB report; however, the accident reports 
indicated the involvement of 23,071 male pilots and 725 female pilots. An exact 
comparison with the demographics of the current GA population is not possible given the 
21-year span of the study and the availability of pertinent statistics. However, the average 
number of female pilots between 2000 and 2018 was approximately 6% of the pilot 
population and ranged from 5.6% in 2000 to 6.9% in 2018 (FAA, 2019a; Goyer, n.d.). A 
crosstabs comparison between the accident pilot female-male ratio and the pilot 
population female-male ratio indicates a statistically significant difference between the 
two groups but, there is not sufficient data to determine if there is a practical significance 
between the two groups. A visualization is provided in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 
Accident Pilot by Sex  
 
Note. Sex was not captured in 2,591 reports. 
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The accident reports contained details regarding the pilot’s certification, and a 
pilot may hold several certificates. For consistency, only the highest certificate was used 
in the demographic analysis. A graph of the number of pilots by highest certificate is 
included for ease in visualizing the data (see Figure 8). The numbers can be viewed as a 
table in Appendix A, Table A1. 
 
Figure 8 
Graph of Pilots by Highest Certificate Held  
 
Note. The numbers here represent the certificate held by the pilot at the controls of the mishap aircraft. 
Information on additional pilots in the aircraft is not included. The category of “none” is assigned by the 
investigator to indicate that the individual held no FAA pilot certificate. The pilot data are missing in 138 
reports. 
 
Several other demographic markers provide greater insight into the accident pilot 
profile. The reports indicated that 1,632 of the accident pilots were employed 
professionally as pilots. There were 5,409 pilots with instructor certifications, of which, 
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3,926 were certified as instructors in more than one aircraft type. Finally, the reports 
indicated that there were 1,894 solo students involved in accidents.  
One hallmark of GA is the number of different types of operations. The types of 
operations and aircraft involved in GA activities can vary greatly. All of the operations 
types were binned into five categories to facilitate modeling. The categories and accident 
totals are shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 
Accident Totals by Operation Type  
 
Note. The categories of Business and Special Purpose differ slightly from the NTSB categories. The 
categories were simplified to facilitate modeling, as explained below. 
 
The Personal category is the largest by far and is perhaps the most generic 
category assigned in the reports. Instructional flights are those that involve either new 
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students or upgrading pilots and may or may not include an instructor pilot. Business 
operations can include any flight in the furtherance of business including executive 
travel, banner tows, aerial application (non-Part 137), flight test, and aerial observation. 
Special purpose flights in the current study are skydiving, airshow, and glider tow 
operations. The final category is for flights categorized as Public which could include 
local government flights, law enforcement, and firefighting. 
There are hundreds of aircraft makes and models involved in the GA aircraft 
accident sample. However, there are accessible indicators from which to build an 
accident aircraft profile. There are different challenges flying diverse types of aircraft 
with varying complexity and associated hazards. Interestingly, the vast majority of 
mishap aircraft were factory manufactured single-engine aircraft with a reciprocating 
engine configured with tricycle landing gear. Unfortunately, there were too many missing 
data points to determine whether or not retractable landing gear figured prominently in 
accidents. Charts depicting the aircraft data are included in Appendix B, Figures B1-B4.  
The accident reports contain several flight hour categories. Most reports captured a 
pilot’s total overall flight hours. Other categories captured flight hours in differing levels 
of detail. The flight hours for the accident pilots are found in Table 5, and each category 
is also displayed graphically in Appendix B, Figures B5-B11. Broadly speaking, the 
demographics provide a profile of an accident pilot who likely will have accrued less than 
500 hours overall, less than 100 hours in the particular aircraft make, less than 20 hours 
in the previous 90 days, and less than 10 hours in the previous 30 days.  
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Table 5 
Flight Hours of Accident Pilots 
Flight Hours Mean Min Max Med 
Hours last 30-days 19.5 0 238 11 
Hours last 90-days 49 0 624 26 
Total PIC hours 2,632 0 48,800 848 
Total flight hours 3,187 1 55,000 1,000 
Total hours make 461 0 31,603 122 
Total hours night 450 0 20,000 57 
Total hours single-engine 1,607 1 48,500 728 
 
Note: Hours last 24-hours and Total hours multi-engine were not included because of the number of 
missing data points. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics were compiled by interval variables, shown in Table 6, and 
class variables, shown in Table 7. Contained within the two tables are 31 class variables 
(categorical variables) and eight interval variables, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Interval Variable Summary Statistics  
Variable N Missing Min Max SD Skew Kurtosis 
Age 26,130 257 16 98 15.30 -0.2217 -0.5753 
Hours last 30-
days 
16,861 9,526 0 238 22.79 2.4499 8.1326 
Hours last 90-
days 
18,178 8,209 0 624 60.85 2.5209 8.0842 
Total PIC 
hours 
15,787 10,600 0 48,800 4553.93 3.1976 12.5337 
Total flight 
hours 
25,463 924 1 55,000 5524.38 3.0458 10.6106 
Total hours 
make 
22,304 4,083 0 31,603 1101.11 7.6958 100.8248 
Total hours 
night 
14,914 11,473 0 20,000 1323.70 5.9493 46.5419 
Total hours 
single-engine 
19,350 7,037 1 48,500 2666.44 4.9633 39.4198 
Note. Aside from age, the remaining interval variables are the different types of flight hours logged by the 
pilots: time in the past 30- and 90-days, time as pilot-in-command, and total time in all aircraft, the accident 
aircraft make, night flying, and single-engine aircraft time. 
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Table 7 
Class Variable Summary Statistics  
Variable Number of 
Levels 
Missing Mode Mode 
Percentage 
Airspace 8 11749  44.53 
Flight Plan Type 5 969 NONE 78.61 
Gear 12 515 TRI 66.53 
Highest Certificate 9 138 PRI 49.65 
Highest Instructor Cert. 13 1357 NONE 73.34 
Multi-platform instructor 4 1369 N 79.93 
Instructor 4 1228 N 74.84 
Atmospheric lighting 5 149 DAY 88.49 
Loss of Control 3 222 0 84.53 
Med Certificate Validity 9 3131 WWL 31.55 
Multi-engine aircraft 3 117 N 93.62 
Seat occupied by pilot 8 2441 LEFT 65.07 
Crew position code 8 67 PLT 87.14 
Professional pilot 3 7607 N 55.61 
Runway condition 19 9868 DRY 51.72 
Solo student pilot 4 8 N 92.79 
Sex 3 2591 N 87.43 
Systems failure 3 222 N 91.25 
Type aircraft 6 226 3 73.76 
Air-medical flight 4 51 N 99.71 
Airport location to crash 3 5 ONAP 53.18 
Engine type 7 188 REC 94.78 
Ground collision 3 400 N 96.37 
Wind gusts indicated 3 4665 N 65.86 
Homebuilt 3 7 N 84.94 
Mid-air 4 395 N 97.41 
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Variable Number of 
Levels 
Missing Mode Mode 
Percentage 
Number of engines 6 331 1 89.06 
Second pilot on board 3 1619 N 79.65 
Sightseeing flight 4 79 N 99.47 
Weather not a factor 3 222 0 64.3 
Basic weather conditions 4 122 VMC 93.86 
Note. The sample size was n = 26,387.  
 
Text Mining Execution  
As introduced, the predictive modeling was preceded by the text mining process. 
The dataset contained a major text field comprised of the written report narratives. Using 
the text mining process, the qualitative data were transformed into a quantitative form 
suitable for modeling. The output of the text mining sequence was a series of new 
quantitative variables that were used in the predictive models. Two types of text-based 
variables are described below including Text Cluster and Text Topic variables. However, 
before the variables were created, the narratives needed to be cataloged and filtered using 
the Text Parsing and Text Filter functions in SAS® EM™. 
The first process, Text Parsing, cataloged all of the words by term, role, attribute, 
frequency, and the number of documents in which the terms appeared. Words were 
analyzed for their potential usefulness in modeling with the goal of reducing noise and 
improving interpretability. Words that did not appear to add value were excluded. The 
decision to exclude words was subjective and iterative based on reviewing the Text 
Parsing output, running the processes through the Text Topic creation (explained in 
greater detail below), and reviewing the output for the topic descriptors. Words were 
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added to the stop list, and the cycle of Text Parsing-Text Filter-Text Cluster-Text Topic 
was run again. Examples of excluded words included the following: directions (north, 
northeast, south, southwest), medical measures (hg, mg), descriptors (agl, msl, c), and 
terms referring to accident severity (death, fatal, severe injury, and fatal injury). As an 
illustration of the output, a catalog of the top 250 words detected by the Text Parsing 
algorithms can be found in Appendix A, Table A2. Figure 10 provides an indication of 
the number of words, documents, and frequencies detected in the dataset. While the 
figure is a macro-level view, it provides a picture of the magnitude of the parsing process. 
 
Figure 10 
Number of Documents by Frequency  
 
Note. During the Text Parsing process, all words are counted and cataloged. For example, the term 
+airplane appears 205,085 times within 25,056 documents. The term +landing has a frequency of 50,455 
and appears in 19,392 documents. Finally, the term +teach has a frequency of 98 within 88 documents. 
Terms with a plus (+) are parent terms.  
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The second text mining process, Text Filter, built upon the first process by adding 
weights to words. Words with potentially greater usefulness according to the text mining 
algorithm were assigned higher scores based on frequency and usage. Similar to the Text 
Parsing results, a catalog of the top 250 terms with the newly assigned weights is located 
in Appendix A, Table A3. Figure 11 provides an indication of the number of words, 
documents, and weights assigned in the dataset.  
 
Figure 11 
Number of Documents by Weight  
 
Note. During the Text Filter process, the words were assigned weights by the algorithm. Terms with a 
weight of zero were dropped from further use. In some cases, the words were automatically dropped by 
rule. In other cases, words were dropped via the stop list by the researcher like the word +airplane. The 
term +landing was assigned a weight of 1.444. The term +teach was assigned a weight of 9.228. Terms 
with a plus (+) are parent terms. 
 
+airplane 
+teach 
+landing 
113 
 
The third process, Text Cluster, arranged the documents into mutually exclusive 
clusters based on the words cataloged and weighted during parsing and filtering. The 
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) algorithm transformed the high dimensional 
document-term frequency matrix into a lower dimensional form that enabled the creation 
of variables that can be used in modeling (SAS Institute Inc., 2015). The SVD is an 
approximation of the weighted frequency matrix and “is the best least squared fit to that 
matrix” (SAS Institute Inc., 2018, p. 78). The SVD solution created 24 dimensions and 
derived four clusters for a total of 28 possible new variables including 24 Text Cluster-
SVD variables and four Text Cluster variables. In practice, SVD variables and cluster 
variables were not used together in modeling because of the potential overlap or 
confounding effects in data representation. Rather, models were developed using each 
type, either SVD or cluster, and then compared for their usefulness in the models. 
There is an important distinction between the 24 SVD variables and the four text clusters 
that factor into their usefulness in model interpretation. The SVD variables numerically 
represent the likeness or separateness of one document to another in the algorithm-
created matrix. While the SVD variables may prove extremely useful in a prediction 
model’s accuracy, in the SVD form there is no practical way to interpret and explain the 
composition of the variable potentially hampering the model’s usefulness for some 
applications and end-users. Of potentially greater use to the end-user is the clustering of 
the documents. The algorithm determines clusters of documents in the matrix and 
extracts words that are key within the clusters. The key words for the current study are 
shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8 
 
Text Cluster Descriptive Terms  
Cluster ID Descriptive Terms Frequency Percentage 
1.0 +landing  +report  +runway  +gear  left  
+land  +condition  visual  +damage  +plan  
+student  +nose  +prevail  +state  +time 
3875.0 15% 
2.0 +power  +engine  +fuel  +tank  +hour  
+position  +reveal  medical  last  +record  
+issue  +hold  +wing  +damage  
+instrument 
9731.0 37% 
3.0 +record  weather  last  medical  +locate  
+hold  +issue  +instrument  +mile  +hour  
+impact  +knot  +turn  +instructor  +wind 
2655.0 10% 
4.0 +report  +runway  left  +landing  
+condition  visual  +plan  +land  +damage  
+state  +prevail  +sustain  +time  +nose  
+operate 
10126.0 38% 
Note. The plus (+) character indicates the word is a parent term and includes all stemmed versions of the 
word. 
 
The final text processing step, Text Topic, also relied on SVD with a different 
outcome. Scores were assigned by the algorithm to words and documents. Topics were 
created when scoring thresholds indicated strong associations among the words and 
documents, allowing the formation of topical groups. Unlike the mutually exclusive Text 
Cluster variables, Text Topic words and documents may appear in more than one topic 
(SAS Institute Inc., 2018). As text mining is an iterative process, the first iteration 
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specified an output of 15 topics as a baseline. A second iteration specified an output of 25 
topics and produced more intuitive results, the output of which is shown in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 
Text Topic Output  
Topic 
ID 
Variable Label Topic Terms Description 
1.0 Wind Factors +knot, +wind, +degree, 
+runway, +gust 
Landing accidents where 
wind was noted. 
2.0 Fuel Issues +fuel, +tank, +gallon, +fuel 
tank, +selector 
Fuel related accidents 
including human factors. 
3.0 IMC Flight +controller, +radar, 
+advise, +acknowledge, 
+tower 
Flight in instrument 
conditions or under ATC. 
4.0 LOC-Stalls +propeller, +nose, aft, 
+blade, +approximately 
Stalls and LOC, often 
related to abrupt 
maneuvers 
5.0 Student Pilots +student,  +student pilot, 
solo, +solo flight, 
instructional 
Student flying, especially 
as on solo instructional 
flights. 
6.0 Forced Landings +engine, +power, forced, 
+forced landing, +loss 
Forced landings often in 
conjunction with engine 
issues. 
7.0 Landing Gear +gear, gear, +landing gear, 
+landing, +extend 
Landings noting gear 
issues, including failure to 
extend or hard landings. 
8.0 Flight Envelope 
Exceedance 
aircraft, +approximately, 
+refer, +find, accident 
aircraft 
Pilots exceeded the aircraft 
capabilities. 
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Topic 
ID 
Variable Label Topic Terms Description 
9.0 Weather Factors +foot, +cloud, +mile, 
+visibility, +ceiling 
Reports where weather 
factors were prominent. 
10.0 Flight Hours +hour, total, +time, 
+engine, +logbook 
Both pilot and maintenance 
times figure prominently 
11.0 Engine Oil Loss +oil, +rod, +connect, 
+cylinder, +number 
Engine related issues due 
to oil loss and related 
component failure. 
12.0 Directional LOC +normal operation, 
+preclude, +malfunction, 
+failure, +operation 
Loss of directional control 
on takeoff or landing; no 
aircraft problems noted. 
13.0 Braking issues +brake, +brake, +apply, 
+rudder, +wheel 
Issues with aircraft brakes 
and braking. 
14.0 Water-Remote 
Airstrips 
+airstrip, +passenger, 
+water, +lake, +seat 
Accidents by amphibious 
or float equipped aircraft. 
Also, includes remote 
airstrips. 
15.0 Excess Weight +takeoff, +weight, +foot, 
+pound, +end 
Excess weight and takeoff 
errors. 
16.0 Instructional +instructor, +instruction, 
+instructional flight, 
instructional, +student 
Variation of instructional 
flights involved in 
accident. 
17.0 Unstable 
Approach 
+approach, +runway, final, 
+airport, +end 
Errors on approach; 
includes mid-air collisions 
on approach. 
18.0 Carburetor Icing +carburetor, +heat, icing, 
carburetor heat, ice 
Accidents where actual or 
suspected carburetor icing 
played a major role. 
19.0 Loss of Power +pump, +magneto, +valve, 
+cylinder, +spark 
Engine related events, 
often with fuel issues. 
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Topic 
ID 
Variable Label Topic Terms Description 
20.0 Slow Flight-Stalls +witness, left, +hear, 
+state, +turn 
Reports often developed 
with witness testimony; 
includes slow flight and 
stalls 
21.0 Flight Control +attach, +aileron, +control, 
+cable, +remain 
Focused on flight control 
surfaces, often recounting 
the aircraft had no 
problems. 
22.0 Surface Accidents +taxiway, +taxi, +runway, 
+park, +fire 
Airport surface incidents. 
23.0 Engine 
Component 
Failure 
+fracture, +bolt, +rod, 
fatigue, +surface 
Mechanical-related 
incidents. 
24.0 Medical +detect, +witness, medical, 
+test, +brake 
Accidents involving 
medical issues. 
25.0 Obstructions +tree, +runway, main, 
+landing gear, +tank 
Landing and takeoff issues, 
on or near a runway, with 
obstructions playing a role. 
Note. The short variable label was developed by the researcher to assist readers in recognizing the topics 
throughout the study. Because the algorithm-assigned topic words did not always capture themes, a 
description of the documents assigned to a particular topic has been provided. Details regarding the number 
of terms assigned to each topic and the number of documents in which the topics appear can be found in 
Appendix A, Table A4. The plus (+) character indicates the word is a parent term and includes all stemmed 
versions of the word. The top-25 associated accident reports for each topic are referenced in Appendix A, 
Table A9. 
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At the end of the text mining process, four Text Clusters, 24 Text Cluster-SVD 
variables, and 25 Text Topic variables, were created. All of the new variables were made 
available for modeling. 
Data Mining Execution  
The data mining portion of the study followed the SEMMA framework of sample, 
explore, modify, model, and assess. As SEMMA is iterative in nature, there are natural 
overlaps in activities. Where possible, the activities are presented within their respective 
categories to facilitate understanding. 
Sample Execution   
The sample activity began prior to both text and data mining. A general review of 
the NTSB database indicated a large amount of data was available across multiple 
variables. The researcher determined no additional sources of data were necessary given 
the study aims and the available report data. The data were extracted from the NTSB 
Access® product using SQL Server® and saved into an Excel® format. In the spreadsheet 
format, the data were pared according to the stated delimitations: 1) United States only, 
(2) accidents and incidents between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2018, 3) Part 91 
operations, and 4) fixed-wing aircraft.  
Another sample activity included the partitioning of the dataset to facilitate model 
training, validation, and testing. The data were partitioned 60:20:20 respectively. 
Partitioning occurred immediately following the text mining activities.  
While not necessarily anticipated, several reports were deleted after the initial 
sample selection based on findings while exploring the data. Specifically, 17 accidents 
involved stolen aircraft, 20 suicides, 79 parked aircraft, 7 ATC/airfield management-
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caused mishaps, and 17 maintenance accidents (where there was no intent to fly). By 
their nature, these events could not provide value in predicting the target.  
Exploration Execution   
Data exploration built upon the sample activity to help ensure maximum usability 
to the modeling algorithms. During the Sample activities, the data were pared using the 
information entered into the various data field. However, there were occasions where data 
were incorrectly entered or mislabeled. Observations that did not meet the delimitations 
were removed. Additionally, variables were reviewed for missing values and extreme 
high or low numbers. Where possible, the seemingly extreme values were compared to 
the actual NTSB reports. Any detected errors were corrected. For instance, data contained 
in the field L24H_ALL indicated impossibilities; the reports indicated that some pilots 
flew more than 24 hours in a 24-hour day. All values greater than 18 were verified 
against the reports and the original documentation, where available. Ultimately 12 data 
points with hours ranging from 24 to 124.6 were deleted. Missing values were also 
addressed against the NTSB reports, where possible. Any values found in the written 
documents were entered into the study dataset. Once suitable for the study, the dataset 
was uploaded into SAS® EM™ for use in modeling.  
The dataset included multiple variables containing structured quantitative data. 
The StatExplore node was used to conduct an examination of the importance of 
individual variables based on their Chi-Square values when set against the target variable. 
The results are depicted in Figure 12. The table of results can be viewed in Appendix A, 
Table A3.  
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Figure 12 
Chi-Square Variable Importance 
 
 
Another way to view variable importance is to assess their worth according to 
statistical calculation, as seen in Figure 13. As before, the table of results can be viewed 
in Appendix A, Table A4. 
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Figure 13 
Input Variable Worth 
 
 
Examination of the figures and accompanying statistics indicated Air-medical 
flight and Sightseeing flight might be candidates for exclusion. Further analysis of the 
Sex variable indicated possible exclusion due to the small number of female pilots 
included in the sample. The bottom seven variables, according to worth, were considered 
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for exclusion. Each was individually eliminated from models to view the effects on the 
model. The decision was made to globally exclude Air-medical flight, Sightseeing flight, 
and Sex from the list available for the models. All other variables were made available 
for modeling. 
Modify Execution   
A potential outgrowth of the sample and explore activities is the need to modify 
variables. Variables may be modified to address outliers, missing data, or to group 
variables. Several a priori proposed variables were deleted by rule in the import process 
due to the number of missing data points (greater than 50%). The deleted variables were 
Fixed-retractable gear, Hours last 24-hours, Total hours multi-engine, Defining events, 
Occurrences, Causes, Factors, Factual narrative, Cause narrative, and Incident narrative. 
Several quantitative variables were created upon closer inspection of the NTSB database 
to make better use of the data for model building and improve usability of model 
findings. The new variables were compiled and are shown in Table 10. A comprehensive 
list of variables used in the modeling steps is in Appendix C, Table C1. 
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Table 10 
 
New Quantitative Variables 
Variable Description Type 
Gear Type Gear type Nominal 
Highest instructor cert. Highest instructor rating Nominal 
Multi-platform instructor Instructor rated in multiple a/c Dichotomous 
Instructor Pilot possessed instructor rating Dichotomous 
Loss of Control  Loss of control (air or ground) Dichotomous 
Number of engines Number of engines Interval 
Seat occupied by pilot Seat position of accident pilot Nominal 
Runway condition Runway condition Nominal 
Solo student pilot Solo student pilot Dichotomous 
Systems failure System failure cited Dichotomous 
Weather not a factor Weather not a factor Dichotomous 
 
Model Execution   
The prediction models were built in three groupings based on the types of 
variables in the dataset; text-only, data-only, and both text and data variables. Ultimately, 
21 models were built and then ranked by misclassification rate. The final model process 
used to build the models is shown in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14  
Final Model Process  
 
 
Text-only Models. The possible text-only variables included the four Text 
Cluster, 24 Text Cluster-SVD, and 25 Text Topic variables. The first task was to 
determine which text-based variables produced the best predicting models. The variables 
were iteratively introduced into the seven basic model types and then assessed according 
to their misclassification rates. The possible variable combinations were Text Cluster-
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only, Text Cluster-SVD-only, Text Topic-only, Text Cluster/Text Topic, and Text 
Cluster-SVD/Text Topic, noting that the two cluster variable types were not used 
together in the same models. The results in Table 11 indicate that three of the five 
combinations produced models with a misclassification rate less than 0.10. As explained 
previously, the internal workings of the Text Cluster and Text Cluster-SVD variables are 
not readily translatable to the general audiences intended to use the models. Given the 
similarity of the misclassification rates and the usability factors, the researcher opted to 
use only the Text Topic variables in the final models. 
 
Table 11 
Text-based Model Comparison Summary  
Model Text-
Cluster 
Text 
Cluster-
SVD 
Text Topic Text Topic/ 
Text 
Cluster 
Text Topic/ 
Text 
Cluster-
SVD 
Random Forest 0.20750 0.10063 0.09873 0.09627 0.09987 
Neural Network 0.20750 0.11162 0.12583 0.09665 0.09077 
Logistic Regression 0.20750 0.10707 0.09816 0.09911 0.09816 
Gradient Boosting 0.20750 0.11256 0.10290 0.10309 0.10006 
DT (5-branch) 0.20750 0.11256 0.10498 0.10498 0.10555 
DT (3-branch) 0.20750 0.11294 0.10726 0.10669 0.10574 
DT (2-branch) 0.20750 0.11768 0.10707 0.10839 0.10460 
Note. The bolded numbers in each column represent the best predicting model by variable combination 
based on the validation misclassification rate. DT = Decision Tree. 
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Data-only Models. Seven models were developed using only structured data. 
Unlike the text-based variables, no additional work was necessary to determine the best 
predicting model by data type. The findings are shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12 
Data-based Model Comparison Summary   
Model Misclassification Rate 
Gradient Boosting 0.16771 
Random Forest 0.17908 
Decision Tree (2-branch) 0.18287 
Decision Tree (3-branch) 0.18571 
Decision Tree (5-branch) 0.18666 
Logistic Regression 0.26492 
Neural Network 0.28918 
Note. The models within the table presented here only used data variables. 
 
Combined Text and Data Models. The final set of seven models used both text 
and data variables. As with the final text-only models presented earlier, the Text Topic 
variables were used in the combined models. The results of the combined text and data 
models are shown in Table 13. 
 
  
127 
 
Table 13 
Combined-data Model Comparison Summary   
Model Misclassification Rate 
Gradient Boosting 0.09930 
Random Forest 0.10063 
Decision Tree (5-branch) 0.10479 
Decision Tree (3-branch) 0.10707 
Decision Tree (2-branch) 0.10821 
Logistic Regression 0.22873 
Neural Network 0.28482 
Note. The models within the table presented here used both text and data variables. 
 
Assess Execution   
The final process in the SEMMA framework involved assessing the 21 models 
and selecting the champion model. All 21 models, their rankings, and the associated 
misclassification rates are contained in Table 14. A full accounting of the model 
prediction and accuracy numbers are shown in Appendix A, Table A7. 
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Table 14 
Model Comparison Summary 
Model Variables 
Used 
Valid: MR Test: MR ROC 
Index 
Ranking 
Logistic Regression Text 0.09816 0.09850 0.945 1 
Random Forest Text 0.09873 0.09358 0.938 2 
Gradient Boosting All 0.09930 0.09528 0.937 3 
Random Forest All 0.10063 0.09225 0.937 4 
Gradient Boosting Text 0.10290 0.10059 0.933 5 
Decision Tree (5-br.) All 0.10479 0.10684 0.902 6 
Decision Tree (5-br.) Text 0.10498 0.10722 0.901 7 
Decision Tree (3-br.) All 0.10707 0.11082 0.907 8 
Decision Tree (2-br.) Text 0.10707 0.10513 0.875 9 
Decision Tree (3-br.) Text 0.10726 0.10968 0.908 10 
Decision Tree (2-br.) All 0.10821 0.10551 0.875 11 
Neural Network Text 0.12583 0.12616 0.915 12 
Gradient Boosting Data 0.16771 0.17181 0.863 13 
Random Forest Data 0.17908 0.18072 0.854 14 
Decision Tree (2-br.) Data 0.18287 0.18716 0.807 15 
Decision Tree (3-br.) Data 0.18571 0.18810 0.810 16 
Decision Tree (5-br.) Data 0.18666 0.18886 0.809 17 
Logistic Regression All 0.22873 0.21993 0.814 18 
Logistic Regression Data 0.26492 0.26596 0.715 19 
Neural Network All 0.28482 0.28396 0.551 20 
Neural Network Data 0.28918 0.28888 0.529 21 
Note. For MR, lower numbers indicate better performing models. For ROC Index, also known as Area 
Under the Curve, a higher number generally indicates better performance. The column listing variables 
used refers to the type of variables introduced in the model. For instance, “text” indicates only text-based 
variables were used. Models using both text- and data-based variables have the notation “all.” 
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As shown, three models achieved misclassification rates less than 0.10: Logistic 
Regression (Text), Random Forest (Text), and Gradient Boosting (All). Because of the 
similarity, details of the top three models are presented in the next paragraphs. The 
combined results are introduced first followed by a discussion of the top three models 
individually. 
One way to visualize the performance of the models is with the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) graphs. A ROC curve within the graph depicts the 
misclassification rates according to Sensitivity on the y-axis and Specificity on the x-axis. 
Sensitivity and specificity are measures of how well a model performs in predicting the 
target events (SAS Institute Inc., 2018). Better performing models have higher sensitivity 
and specificity for a given threshold. Another way to describe the ROC curve is with the 
accompanying ROC Index or Area Under the Curve. The previous table showed the top 
three models had a ROC Index of 0.95 for the Logistic Regression (Text) and 0.94 for 
both the Random Forest (Text) and the Gradient Boosting (All). The Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) graphs for the top three models (see Figure 15) illustrate pictorially 
what the misclassification numbers indicate. 
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Figure 15 
ROC Diagrams—Top Three Models  
 
Note. The graphs depict model performance from training to validation and from validation to test. The 
expectation is that the validation models perform as well or better than the train models. Additionally, the 
test models should be consistent with the validate models. 
 
The Cumulative Lift graph is another tool to visualize model performance. Better 
predicting models again have a higher area under the curve, also described as lift. Similar 
to the ROC, the models should be consistent across the three samples. The similarity of 
the top three models is indicated by the proximity of the lift lines to each other. The 
Cumulative Lift graphs for the top three models are shown in Figures 16-18. 
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Figure 16 
Cumulative Lift (Train)—Top Three Models  
Note. The figure depicts each model’s cumulative lift from the model training activity. There is no expected 
performance as the training step builds the models and provides the baseline for validation and testing. 
 
  
132 
 
Figure 17 
Cumulative Lift (Validate)—Top Three Models  
Note. The figure depicts each model’s cumulative lift from the model validation activity. In general, the 
models should perform in a similar manner to the training sample. Additionally, the graph indicates the 
closeness of the three models in their prediction capability. 
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Figure 18 
Cumulative Lift (Test)—Top Three Models  
Note. The figure depicts each model’s cumulative lift from the model test activity. The validation and test 
lift charts should be similar if the models perform well. 
 
Logistic Regression (Text). The model ranked highest by misclassification rate 
was the Logistic Regression only using the text variables. Inspection of the Cumulative 
Lift chart (see Figure 19) provides an indication of the model performance between Train 
and Validate samples. The lines in close proximity indicate model consistency. The 
Cumulative Lift value is 3.46. Additionally, the chart indicates that at the cumulative lift 
of 2.0 (where the model predicts 2x better than random), 45% of the fatal/severe injury 
accidents are predicted. At the 1.5 level, the prediction is 65%, and at the at the 1.25 
level, 80%.  
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Figure 19 
Cumulative Lift—Logistic Regression (Text)  
 
Note. The model has a Cumulative Lift of 3.46. 
 
Plots showing the misclassification rates are not produced for regression models. 
Instead, an Effects Plot is produced, as shown in Figure 20. The bars represent the 
individual variables used in the model with blue indicating variables with a positive 
impact. The height of the bars indicates the absolute values of the variable coefficients, 
and in the figure provide an indication of relative importance. 
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Figure 20 
Effects Plot—Logistic Regression (Text)  
 
Note. The variables are shown here according to their absolute coefficient values. Of most interest to the 
current study are the variables in blue that have a positive relationship to the target variable. The variable 
identification numbers were inserted into the chart to aid in identification. The variables are explained in 
greater detail in subsequent paragraphs and tables (see Table 19).  
 
The fit statistics for the Logistic Regression (Text) model are shown in Table 15. 
The statistics most commonly referenced in the table are the Misclassification Rate and 
the Average Squared Error. The better predicting models will show consistent values 
across the three samples. 
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Table 15 
Fit Statistics—Logistic Regression (Text)   
Fit Statistic Train Validation Test 
Akaike's Information Criterion 7931.96   
Average Squared Error 0.07 0.08 0.07 
Average Error Function 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Degrees of Freedom for Error 15812   
Model Degrees of Freedom 19   
Total Degrees of Freedom 15831   
Divisor for ASE 31662 10554 10558 
Error Function 7893.96 2632.63 2536.52 
Final Prediction Error 0.07   
Maximum Absolute Error 1.00 0.99 0.9 
Mean Square Error 0.07 0.08 0.07 
Sum of Frequencies 15831 5277 5279 
Number of Estimate Weights 19   
Root Average Sum of Squares 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Root Final Prediction Error 0.27   
Root Mean Squared Error 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Schwarz's Bayesian Criterion 8077.69   
Sum of Squared Errors 2314.03 791.82 762.33 
Sum of Case Weights Times Freq 31662 10554 10558 
Misclassification Rate 0.09513 0.09816 0.09850 
 
Random Forest (Text). The model ranked second by misclassification rate was 
the Random Forest using only text variables. The Random Forest model behaves 
differently than other models in that the Cumulative Lift lines (see Figure 21) between 
the Train and Validate samples are somewhat separated at the beginning and then 
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converge as the depth increases. The expectation of a good model is the validate lift will 
be less than the train lift given a tendency to overfit a solution. The Random Forest (Text) 
model has a Cumulative Lift score of 3.45. The graph indicates that at the 2.0 lift level, 
the depth is 45, at 1.5, the depth is 65, and at 1.25, the depth is almost 80 which is very 
similar to the Logistic Regression (Text) model. 
 
Figure 21 
Cumulative Lift—Random Forest (Text) 
 
Note. The validate model has a Cumulative Lift of 3.45. 
 
The iteration plot depicting the misclassification rate is shown in Figure 22. The 
expectation is that as the Out of Bag and Validate rates improve, the lines will converge, 
and then the lines will flow in close proximity, as the number of trees increase. 
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Figure 22 
Iteration Plot—Random Forest (Text) 
 
 
The fit statistics for the Random Forest (Text) model are shown in Table 16. As 
with the previous model, the statistics most commonly referenced in the table are the 
Misclassification Rate and the Average Squared Error. Again, the better predicting 
models will show consistent values across the three samples. However, with the Random 
Forest model, the Train values may be significantly less than the Validation values. The 
Text sample values are especially important here to provide an indication that the model 
is well trained and not overfit. 
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Table 16 
Fit Statistics—Random Forest (Text)  
Fit Statistic Train Validation Test 
Average Squared Error 0.01243 0.07552 0.07368 
Divisor for ASE 31662 10554 10558 
Maximum Absolute Error 0.53 1 1 
Sum of Frequencies 15831 5277 5279 
Root Average Squared Error 0.11151 0.27482 0.27143 
Sum of Squared Errors 393.663 797.0808 777.872 
Frequency of Classified Cases 15831 5277 5279 
Misclassification Rate .00006 0.09873 0.09358 
Number of Wrong Classifications 1 521 494 
 
Gradient Boosting (All). The third ranked model according to misclassification 
rate was the Gradient Boosting using both text and data variables. Similar to the previous 
two models, the Cumulative Lift chart (see Figure 23) gives an indication of model 
performance between samples. The model has a Cumulative Lift of 3.46, and the lift lines 
between the samples are in close proximity. At the 2.0 lift, the depth is 45, at 1.5, the 
depth is 65, and at 1.25, the depth is just over 80. 
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Figure 23 
Cumulative Lift—Gradient Boosting (All)  
Note. The validate model has a Cumulative Lift of 3.46. 
 
The Gradient Boosting model produces a Subseries Plot (see Figure 24) depicting 
misclassification rate changes across the iterations. Based on how the models are built, 
the graph shows the rate dropping steeply in the first several iterations and then steadily 
decreases until the algorithm reaches the prescribed stopping point. The better predicting 
models will behave similarly throughout the iterations and run in close proximity to one 
another. 
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Figure 24 
Iteration Plot—Gradient Boosting (All)  
 
 
The fit statistics for the Gradient Boosting (All) model are shown next in Table 
17. Once more, the statistics most commonly referenced in the table are the 
Misclassification Rate and the Average Squared Error. Model performance is indicated 
by consistency between the Train, Validation, and Text sample values. 
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Table 17 
Fit Statistics—Gradient Boosting (All)  
Fit Statistic Train Validation Test 
Sum of Frequencies 15831 5277 5279 
Sum of Case Weights Times Freq 31662 10554 10558 
Misclassification Rate 0.09380 0.09930 0.09528 
Maximum Absolute Error 0.96186 0.96374 0.96143 
Sum of Squared Errors 2,349.152 823.933 792.230 
Average Squared Error 0.07419 0.07807 0.07504 
Root Average Squared Error 0.27239 0.27941 0.27393 
Divisor for ASE 31662 10554 10558 
Total Degrees of Freedom 15831   
 
Variable Importance  
Assessing variable importance is an Assess activity within SEMMA and is related 
to at least two general research aims: 1) improving the model performance, and 2) 
providing practical information for model implementation. While the model output 
formats vary by model, the variable importance of the top three models is presented in 
this section. 
Logistic Regression (Text) Variables. Text variables important to the Logistic 
Regression (Text) model are shown in Table 18. 
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Table 18 
Logistic Regression (Text) Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates  
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Chi-Sq 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
Standardized 
Estimate 
Exp 
(Est) 
Intercept -2.6566 0.0741 1283.66 <.0001  0.071 
Medical  
(TT 24) 
24.2622 0.8373 839.64 <.0001 0.7473 999.000 
Slow Flight-
Stalls  
(TT 20) 
15.3506 0.6828 505.36 <.0001 0.4481 999.000 
Flight Control 
(TT 21) 
10.8613 0.6283 298.82 <.0001 0.4402 999.000 
IMC Flight  
(TT 3) 
4.6725 0.4880 91.68 <.0001 0.1803 106.966 
Weather Factors 
(TT 9) 
4.2627 0.5194 67.34 <.0001 0.1711 71.001 
Flight Hours  
(TT 10) 
4.1343 0.4984 68.80 <.0001 0.1643 62.449 
Excess Weight 
(TT 15) 
3.5586 0.5057 49.53 <.0001 0.1105 35.112 
Unstable 
Approach  
(TT 17) 
3.4771 0.5802 35.91 <.0001 0.1075 32.365 
Engine Oil Loss 
(TT 11) 
2.7163 0.5192 27.37 <.0001 0.0931 15.124 
LOC-Stalls 
(TT 4) 
2.4448 0.6130 15.91 <.0003 0.0872 11.529 
Loss of Power 
(TT 19) 
2.0081 0.4452 20.34 <.0001 0.0788 7.449 
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Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Chi-Sq 
Pr > 
ChiSq 
Standardized 
Estimate 
Exp 
(Est) 
Flight Envelope 
Exceedance 
(TT 8) 
1.9797 0.5185 14.58 .0001 0.0615 7.241 
Carburetor Icing 
(TT 18) 
-2.5487 0.5037 25.61 <.0001 -0.0801 0.078 
Landing Gear 
(TT 7) 
-4.0391 0.7609 28.18 <.0001 -0.1431 0.018 
Wind Factors 
(TT 1) 
-5.5085 0.6321 75.95 <.0001 -0.1823 0.004 
Braking Issues 
(TT 13) 
-7.0504 0.9049 60.71 <.0001 -0.2135 0.001 
Directional LOC 
(TT 12) 
-7.1902 0.7602 89.47 <.0001 -0.2205 0.001 
Engine 
Component 
Failure  
(TT 23) 
-7.7403 0.6550 139.65 <.0001 -0.2212 0.000 
Note. The Degrees of Freedom = 1 for all variables. TT = Text Topic. The full variable descriptions were 
presented in Table 10. 
 
Random Forest (Text) Variables. Variable importance in a Random Forest 
model is assessed using the Out-of-Bounds (OOB) Gini Reduction scores, as shown in 
Table 19. 
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Table 19 
Random Forest (Text) Variable Importance  
Variable Name Number of 
Splitting 
Rules 
OOB: Gini 
Reduction 
OOB: 
Margin 
Reduction 
Label 
Medical 
(TT 24) 
5597 0.06433 0.14439 +detect, +witness, medical, 
+test, +brake 
Flight Hours 
(TT 10) 
3285 0.03871 0.08899 +hour, total, +time, 
+engine, +logbook 
Flight Control 
(TT 21) 
4655 0.02511 0.06543 +attach, +aileron, +control, 
+cable, +remain 
Slow Flight-
Stalls 
(TT 20) 
5182 0.01361 0.04251 
+witness, left, +hear, 
+state, +turn 
LOC-Stalls 
(TT 4) 
4813 0.00388 0.02421 +propeller, +nose, aft, 
+blade, +approximately 
Weather Factors 
(TT 9) 
6682 0.00269 0.02782 +foot, +cloud, +mile, 
+visibility, +ceiling 
IMC Flight 
(TT 3) 
 
4314 
0.00222 0.0189 +controller, +radar, 
+advise, +acknowledge, 
+tower 
Engine Oil Loss 
(TT 11) 
2731 0.0022 0.01427 +oil, +rod, +connect, 
+cylinder, +number 
Excess Weight 
(TT 15) 
3346 -0.0007 0.01049 +takeoff, +weight, +foot, 
+pound, +end 
Fuel Issues 
(TT 2) 
3373 -0.0019 0.0074 +fuel, +tank, +gallon, +fuel 
tank, +selector 
Directional LOC 
(TT 12) 
3257 -0.0025 0.00652 +normal operation, 
+preclude, +malfunction, 
+failure, +operation 
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Variable Name Number of 
Splitting 
Rules 
OOB: Gini 
Reduction 
OOB: 
Margin 
Reduction 
Label 
Instructional 
(TT 16) 
2836 -0.0028 0.00436 +instructor, +instruction, 
+instructional flight, 
instructional, +student 
Braking Issues 
(TT 13) 
3163 -0.0029 0.00478 +brake, +brake, +apply, 
+rudder, +wheel 
Wind Factors 
(TT 1) 
2623 -0.0041 0.00134 +knot, +wind, +degree, 
+runway, +gust 
Carburetor Icing 
(TT 18) 
3060 -0.0042 0.00186 +carburetor, +heat, icing, 
carburetor heat, ice 
Engine 
Component 
Failure 
(TT 23) 
4112 -0.0045 0.00446 
+fracture, +bolt, +rod, 
fatigue, +surface 
Forced Landings 
(TT 6) 
5229 -0.0046 0.00788 +engine, +power, forced, 
+forced landing, +loss 
Loss of Power 
(TT 19) 
3398 -0.0046 0.00277 +pump, +magneto, +valve, 
+cylinder, +spark 
Unstable 
Approach 
(TT 17) 
3534 -0.0049 0.00206 +approach, +runway, final, 
+airport, +end 
Water/ Remote 
Airstrips 
(TT 14) 
2951 -0.0051 0.00062 +airstrip, +passenger, 
+water, +lake, +seat 
Obstructions 
(TT 25) 
4076 -0.0058 0.00185 +tree, +runway, main, 
+landing gear, +tank 
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Variable Name Number of 
Splitting 
Rules 
OOB: Gini 
Reduction 
OOB: 
Margin 
Reduction 
Label 
Student Pilots 
(TT 5) 
4007 -0.0059 0.00125 +student, +student pilot, 
solo, +solo flight, 
instructional 
Surface 
Accidents 
(TT 22) 
3851 -0.0063 0.00048 +taxiway, +taxi, +runway, 
+park, +fire 
Flight Envelope 
Exceedance 
(TT 8) 
5643 -0.0075 0.00261 aircraft, +approximately, 
+refer, +find, accident 
aircraft 
Landing Gear 
(TT 7) 
4993 -0.0079 0.00078 +gear, gear, +landing gear, 
+landing, +extend 
Note. The plus (+) character indicates the word is a parent term. 
 
Gradient Boosting (All) Variables. Variable importance for the Gradient 
Boosting (All) model is shown in Table 20. 
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Table 20 
Gradient Boosting (All) Variable Importance  
Variable Name Description Number of 
Splitting 
Rules 
Validation 
Importance 
Medical 
(TT 24) 
+detect, +witness, medical, +test, 
+brake 
26 1 
Flight Control 
(TT 21) 
+attach, +aileron, +control, +cable, 
+remain 
16 0.41985 
Slow Flight-
Stalls 
(TT 20) 
+witness, left, +hear, +state, +turn 28 0.44596 
Flight Hours 
(TT 10) 
+hour, total, +time, +engine, 
+logbook 
7 0.34715 
IMC Flight 
(TT 3) 
+controller, +radar, +advise, 
+acknowledge, +tower 
11 0.29600 
Total hours 
make 
Total flight time in the accident 
aircraft make. 
7 0.22847 
Weather Factors 
(TT 9) 
+foot, +cloud, +mile, +visibility, 
+ceiling 
8 0.25234 
Airport location 
to crash 
Accident proximity to an airport. 6 0.19135 
LOC-Stalls 
(TT 4) 
+propeller, +nose, aft, +blade, 
+approximately 
3 0.15849 
Excess Weight 
(TT 15) 
+takeoff, +weight, +foot, +pound, 
+end 
9 0.10808 
Hours last 30-
days 
Total flight time in the past 30-days. 3 0.10676 
Directional LOC 
(TT 12) 
+normal operation, +preclude, 
+malfunction, +failure, +operation 
4 0.10312 
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Variable Name Description Number of 
Splitting 
Rules 
Validation 
Importance 
Braking Issues 
(TT 13) 
+brake, +brake, +apply, +rudder, 
+wheel 
3 0.09127 
Total hours 
single-engine 
Total flight time in single-engine 
aircraft. 
2 0.07900 
Total PIC hours Total flight time as pilot-in-
command. 
1 0.07031 
Forced Landings 
(TT 6)   
+engine, +power, forced, +forced 
landing, +loss 
2 0.06963 
    
Engine 
Component 
Failure 
(TT 23) 
+fracture, +bolt, +rod, fatigue, 
+surface 
2 0.04653 
Total hours night Total flight time at night. 2 0.05453 
Obstructions 
(TT 25) 
+tree, +runway, main, +landing gear, 
+tank 
3 0.03915 
Fuel Issues 
(TT 2) 
+fuel, +tank, +gallon, +fuel tank, 
+selector 
1 0.04269 
Engine Oil Loss 
(TT 11) 
+oil, +rod, +connect, +cylinder, 
+number 
1 0.04227 
Homebuilt Aircraft homebuilt or factory 
manufactured. 
1 0.04612 
Carburetor Icing 
(TT 18) 
+carburetor, +heat, icing, carburetor 
heat, ice 
1 0.01352 
Note. TT = Text Topic. The plus (+) character indicates the word is a parent term. 
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Reliability and Validity Testing Results 
The final area under Assess in SEMMA is an analysis of the model’s reliability 
and validity. To summarize, reliability is the level to which an instrument provides 
consistent performance, and validity is the level to which an instrument measures what is 
intended. Reliability and validity begin with the input data. The quality of the data 
sourced from the NTSB was generally acceptable overall, providing consistent model 
outputs. However, during the initial data exploration, errors were noted between the 
Access® data, the written reports, and the public dockets containing the source 
documents for many of the accidents. Many errors were detected and addressed using a 
hi/lo search of the variables. For instance, there were several pilots with ages less than 16 
years and more than 98 years. Each case was cross-checked with the reports to either 
correct the age or delete the entry. In many cases, zero was used for missing data rather 
than leaving the field blank. Total flight hours provide a second example where several 
entries indicated 999,999 flight hours. Closer examination in the reports revealed the 
entry indicated missing data. Many variables contained missing data. Where possible, the 
variables were checked against the reports and corrected in the study dataset. Where 
reference to the original was not possible, no attempt to impute variables was made given 
the general robustness of data mining to missing variables. 
Each model was assessed for reliability and validity using the techniques outlined 
in Chapter III. Overall, models were trained, validated, and tested using different portions 
of the sample, enabling assessments of model performance. The results from the top three 
models are presented in the following sections.  
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Reliability Assessment  
Model reliability was assessed using ROC, Cumulative Lift, and Miscalculation 
Rate scores. The ROC graphs represent sensitivity and specificity scores at various 
threshold levels. When plotted, the plots are joined in a “curve” that depicts model 
performance. Reliable models show consistency across measurement, as seen in the ROC 
graphs in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25 
ROC Graphs—Top Three Models  
 
Note. The Logistic Regression (Text) ROC curve is depicted by the bold blue line. 
 
Cumulative Lift provides a visual representation of model strength. A model that 
is no better than random guessing will have a lift approaching 1 or no lift. Higher lift 
scores indicate better predicting models (McCarthy et al., 2019). The Cumulative Lift 
graph for the top three models shows model reliability in the closeness of the lines from 
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different samples. Upon inspection, the graph shows strong predictability over a random 
guess. To illustrate, at the 2.0 level—the point where a model predicts two-times better 
than no model—approximately 45% of the Fatal/Severe Injury cases are predicted with 
all three models. At the 1.5% level, the prediction is approximately 65%, and at the 1.25 
level, the number is almost 80%. The Cumulative Lift graph is shown in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26 
Cumulative Lift (Validation Sample)—Top Three Models  
 
 
Further examination of the misclassification rates also provided an indication of 
reliability, as found in Table 21. With misclassification rates, a lower score is better. 
Average Squared Error, which is related to model bias, should also be low, indicating less 
bias (McCarthy et al., 2019). Model reliability is indicated by the similarities between the 
Valid and Test scores.  
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Table 21 
Misclassification Rate Comparison—Top Three Models  
Model & Measure Train Validate Test 
Logistic Regression (Text)    
Misclassification Rate 0.09513 0.09816 0.09850 
Average Squared Error 0.07267 0.07461 0.07250 
Random Forest (Text)    
Misclassification Rate 0.00006 0.09873 0.09358 
Average Squared Error 0.01243 0.07552 0.07368 
Gradient Boosting (All)    
Misclassification Rate 0.09380 0.09930 0.09528 
Average Squared Error 0.07419 0.07807 0.07504 
 
Validity Assessment   
Validity indicators include test-retest performance and measures of accuracy and 
predictability. The ROC diagram shown previously (see Figure 25) charts 
misclassification rates by measuring sensitivity and specificity. Sensitivity is a measure 
of a model’s capability to detect targets of interest or events (Shmueli et al., 2016). 
Specificity is a measure of a model’s ability to correctly rule out false targets or non-
events (Shmueli et al., 2016). In other words, the ROC displays the model’s true and false 
positive scores at a given threshold. When the plots are joined with a line, they form the 
ROC curve. Recalling the current study specifics, the target of interest is the Fatal/Severe 
Injury aviation accident. The best predicting model, as represented by the ROC curve 
where all targets were classified correctly without any error would have data points at 1,0 
on the graph or in the top left corner. A ROC Index, or Area Under the Curve (AUC) 
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measures the space created by the curve, the higher number the better with a ROC Index 
of 1 representing a perfect predicting model. 
Test-Retest performance is shown in the Cumulative Lift Graphs across all three 
samples; train, validation, and test. The expectation is that all of the graphs will display 
similar results. The stacked graphs are shown in Figure 27 and provide a visual indication 
of model validity. 
 
Figure 27 
Cumulative Lift Graphs—Top Three Models  
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Several formulas were used to calculate model performance. To begin, actual and 
predicted classification scores were entered into a 2x2 confusion matrix (EMC Education 
Services, 2015). The classification scores were True Positives (TP), False Positives (FP), 
False Negatives (FN), and True Negatives (TN). The confusion matrix with associated 
scores is shown in Tables 22-24. 
 
Table 22 
Logistic Regression (Text) Confusion Matrix  
  Actual 
 
 Fatal/Serious Injury (1) Minor/None Injury (0) 
Pr
ed
ic
te
d Fatal/Serious Injury (1)  1,145 [TP]  138 [FP] 
Minor/None Injury (0)  380 [FN]  3,614 [TN] 
Note. TP = True Positive; FP = False Positive; FN = False Negative; TN = True Negative. 
 
Table 23 
Random Forest (Text) Confusion Matrix  
  Actual 
 
 Fatal/Serious Injury (1) Minor/None Injury (0) 
Pr
ed
ic
te
d Fatal/Serious Injury (1)  1,130 [TP]  126 [FP] 
Minor/None Injury (0)  395 [FN]  3,626 [TN] 
Note. TP = True Positive; FP = False Positive; FN = False Negative; TN = True Negative. 
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Table 24 
Gradient Boosting (All) Confusion Matrix  
  Actual 
 
 Fatal/Serious Injury (1) Minor/None Injury (0) 
Pr
ed
ic
te
d Fatal/Serious Injury (1)  1,114[TP]  113 [FP] 
Minor/None Injury (0)  411 [FN]  3,639 [TN] 
Note. TP = True Positive; FP = False Positive; FN = False Negative; TN = True Negative. 
 
The formulas that build on the confusion matrix are shown in Table 25, including 
the scores derived from the formulas. While assessed separately, better Accuracy, True 
Positive Rate (TPR), Specificity, and Precision scores are closer to 1.0. Better False 
Positive Rate and False Negative Rate scores are closer to 0.0. 
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Table 25 
Model Precision and Accuracy Formulas  
Measure Formula 
Score 
LR (Text) RF (Text) GB (All) 
Accuracy 
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 
0.902 0.901 0.901 
True Positive Rate 
(TPR), Sensitivity 
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 0.75 0.74 0.73 
Specificity 
𝑇𝑁
𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 
0.96 0.97 0.97 
False Positive 
Rate (FPR) 
𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 0.036 0.034 0.030 
False Negative 
Rate (FNR) 
𝐹𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 0.25 0.26 0.27 
Precision 
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 
0.894 0.900 0.908 
Note. TP = True Positive; FP = False Positive; FN = False Negative; TN = True Negative; LR = Logistic 
Regression; RF = Random Forest; GB = Gradient Boosting. 
 
When all of the indicators were combined, the results suggested that the top three 
models are all good predictors of Fatal/Severe Injury aviation accidents. First, the ROC 
index shows a 95%, 94%, and 94% probability that the models can distinguish between 
classes. Second, accuracy for all models is greater than 90%. Third, precision is just 
under 90% for the first model and at or slightly above 90% for the second and third. 
Fourth, the False Positive Rate (FPR) or Type I error is 3.6%, 3.4%, and 3%, 
respectively. Fifth, the False Negative Rate or Type II error is 25%, 26%, and 27%, 
respectively. Sixth, the True Positive Rate (TPR) or Sensitivity is 75%, 74%, and 73% 
(acceptable). And seventh, the Specificity is 96%, 97%, and 97% (good). All of the 
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numbers for the top three models suggest they are acceptable prediction models (Truong 
et al., 2018).  
Summary 
The hallmark of data mining is the ability to work with large amounts of data. 
One source of aviation accident data is the NTSB Aviation Accident and Synopses 
publicly available for download in both structured and unstructured data formats. Text 
and data mining tools were used to make use of the NTSB data to develop models that 
predict Aviation Accident Severity. In total, the results of 21 prediction models were 
presented across five model types and three variable groupings (text-only, data-only, and 
both text and data). The models included Decision Tree, Gradient Boosting, Logistic 
Regression, Neural Network, and Random Forest. Three models emerged as potential 
champions based upon their prediction performance; Logistic Regression (Text), Random 
Forest (Text), and Gradient Boosting (All). 
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Chapter V: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this study was to conduct data-driven exploratory research into 
creating models that predict aviation accident injury levels using machine learning 
techniques. Aviation safety is underpinned by reactive, proactive, and predictive 
methodologies. Both reactive and proactive approaches rely on various levels of actual 
safety occurrences. While it is essential to learn from past accidents and near-misses and 
then prevent them from happening again, prediction methodologies provide a way to 
prevent accidents before they happen in the first place, protecting lives and property. 
The current study successfully employed machine learning tools to build, validate, 
and test several prediction models based on 21 years of data from fixed-wing GA 
accidents and incidents in the United States. Unique to the study was the introduction of 
text-based quantitative variables derived through text mining the accident report 
narratives. Using the text mining process produced a different insight into variables that 
contribute to fatal and severe injury accidents. The lessons gleaned from this research 
could provide new directions in the efforts to reduce aircraft accidents and improve flight 
safety. 
Discussion 
Wiegmann and Shappell (2017) wrote, “Simply focusing on unsafe acts is like 
focusing on a fever without understanding the underlying illness that is causing it” (p. 
56). Standard measures of safety include different counts of occurrences from which 
safety mitigations are developed; the type of accidents with the highest occurrences 
become the target of safety efforts. Traditional statistical methods have been used in an 
attempt to understand variables in an accident sequence. However, these methods are 
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limited by their ability to address complexity and data non-normality. Data mining 
overcomes these limitations, and machine learning enables researchers to delve into the 
underlying factors and patterns undetectable using traditional statistical tools. 
Research Question 1   
RQ 1 asked, what model developed with machine learning and data mining 
techniques best predicts fatal and severe aviation accidents? Analysis of 21 prediction 
models revealed that the Logistic Regression (Text) model had a misclassification rate 
(MR) of 0.098 or a 9.8% MR in the validation data. In practicality, the Logistic 
Regression (Text) model showed a 90.2% capability to correctly predict the target of 
accident injury severity level. 
The practical usefulness of a prediction model is based on the application and 
operating environment, and sometimes the best predicting model is not the most useful to 
those who rely on the model’s interpretability (Truong et al., 2018). For this reason, it is 
beneficial to look at models with similar performance. In the current study, the second- 
and third-best models by MR had similar scores to the Logistic Regression (Text) model. 
The second-best model by MR was the Random Forest (Text). It is similar to the 
Logistic Regression (Text) model using only text-based variables. The MR = 0.9873 or 
9.9%, which equated to a 90.1% capability to correctly predict the target. The third-best 
model by MR was the Gradient Boosting (All), which was also the first model that 
integrated data-based variables. The MR = 0.0993 or 9.9%, which also equated to a 
90.1% capability to correctly predict the target. 
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Research Question 2   
RQ2 asked, what variables are most important in the selected model for predicting 
fatal and severe injury aviation accidents? A comparison of variable importance across 
the top three models revealed commonality between the models with Medical (TT 24), 
Slow flight-stalls (TT 20), and Flight control (TT 21) playing prominent roles. IMC flight 
(TT 3), Weather factors (TT 9), and Flight hours (TT 10) also figured prominently in all 
three models. The most important variables are discussed here according to their 
importance in the model output. A review of the NTSB written accident reports linked to 
the particular Text Topic provided context to the topic assignment. Only the top topics 
are discussed here. However, a listing of the top 50 accident reports by topic weight for 
each of the 25 topics can be viewed in Appendix A, Table A9. 
Text Topic 24 (Medical). Text Topic 24 was the most important variable in all of 
the top three models. Keywords for the variable included +detect, +witness, medical, 
+test, and +brake, noting the plus (+) indicates a parent term. According to the accident 
reports corresponding to the topic variable, many pilots had medical problems that were 
or could have been factors in the accident. Some medical problems noted during the 
forensic analysis were unreported to the FAA and could have had medical certificate 
implications. A common problem noted by investigators was the use of potentially 
impairing over-the-counter drugs, prescription medication, and illegal substances. 
Alcohol impairment was also implicated in many accidents. One challenge with GA 
accidents is that there are often no data or voice recorders on board making witness 
statements important in determining the accident sequence. 
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Text Topic 20 (Slow Flight-Stalls). Text Topic 20 was the second most 
important variable in the Logistic Regression (Text) model, fourth in the Random Forest 
(Text) model, and third in the Gradient Boosting (All) model. The keywords assigned by 
the algorithm included +witness, left, +hear, +state, and +turn. As with the previous text 
topic, witnesses were important to the accident analysis, though some reports point to the 
limitation of the non-aviation bystander witnesses. The use of the term “left” had two 
common uses in the reports. The first use references left turns, often indicating standard 
traffic pattern turns either on landing or takeoff. The second use references the yawing 
action or P-factor associated with the clockwise propeller rotation and the need for right-
rudder to counteract the force. Many times the yawing action appeared to occur just 
before a loss of control. 
Text Topic 21 (Flight Control). Text Topic 21 ranked third in the Logistic 
Regression (Text) and Random Forest (Text) models and second in the Gradient Boosting 
(All) model. The terms +attach, +aileron, +control, +cable, and +remain are the 
descriptors for the topic. In some cases, the accidents referred to aircraft hitting power 
wires or radio tower cables. In other cases, the terms directly related to the analysis of the 
aircraft wreckage, sometimes in connection with pilot control issues. The term control 
was used in several ways, including references to aircraft control surfaces, aircraft 
controls, and loss of control or failure to maintain directional control. 
Text Topic 3 (IMC Flight). Text Topic 3 ranked fourth in the Logistic 
Regression (Text) model, seventh in the Random Forest (Text) model, and fifth in the 
Gradient Boosting (All) model. Key terms for the variable included +controller, +radar, 
+advise, +acknowledge, and +tower. Interactions with air traffic control figured 
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prominently within the topic. In some of the incidents, the controllers were contributing 
factors in the accident. However, a more widespread factor was the environment 
surrounding the accident sequences. Common components included inadequate flight 
planning and unexpected flight from VMC into IMC, where the controllers were doing 
their jobs providing assistance to the pilots. 
Text Topic 9 (Weather Factors). Text Topic 9 ranked fifth in the Logistic 
Regression (Text) model, sixth in the Random Forest (Text) model, and seventh in the 
Gradient Boosting (All) model. Key terms for Text Topic 9 included +foot, +cloud, 
+mile, +visibility, and +ceiling. The accident reports linked to Text Topic 9 all have a 
weather component contributing to mishaps. Many of the accidents involved continued 
VFR flight into IMC. Often the pilot did not receive a weather briefing or disregarded a 
weather briefing that outlined IMC conditions or stated, “VFR flight is not 
recommended.” Lastly, many of the pilots were not instrument rated or had little recent 
experience flying IFR. 
Text Topic 10 (Flight Hours). Text Topic 10 ranked sixth in the Logistic 
Regression (Text) model, fifth in the Random Forest (Text) model, and fourth in the 
Gradient Boosting (All) model. The variable here included the terms +hour, total, +time, 
+engine, +logbook. A common attribute of the reports assigned to Text Topic 10 was a 
detailed accounting of pilot flight times and engine operating times facilitated by the 
investigator’s access to logbooks. The finding may be notable because, while required, 
logbooks were not available for all accident investigations. Unfortunately for 
interpretation purposes, the term engine was not always definitive with a positive or 
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negative outcome, as many reports stated that engine problems were not a factor in the 
accident. 
The Gradient Boosting (All) was the only model in the top three to include data-
based variables. The variable of Total Hours Make (total flight time in the accident 
aircraft make) appeared sixth in variable importance. The variable Airport location to 
crash (accident location in reference to an airport) appeared eighth. The variable Hours 
last 30-days (total flight time in the past 30-days) appeared eleventh. Other data variables 
in the model with somewhat lesser importance scores (< 0.10) were Total hours single-
engine (total flight time in single-engine aircraft), Total hours night (total flight time at 
night), and Homebuilt (whether or not an aircraft was manufactured in a factory). 
Surprisingly, none of the data-only models could perform at a level better than the 
0.16771 misclassification rate. One possible reason relates to how the data mining 
algorithms calculate and account for error, whereas in traditional statistics such as logistic 
regression, models assume no error in the model. Another possible reason could relate to 
the broadness of the GA sample, including a wide variety of pilots, operations, and 
aircraft capabilities. A third possibility is the quality of the data; missing data likely 
hampered the predictive capability of the models. As an example, studies cited by Boyd 
(2017a) showed that flight hours could be a risk factor, yet they did not appear in the top 
two models. The total hours in aircraft make, hours in the previous 30-days, single-engine 
time, and flight time at night did appear in the third-best model, with impact lower than 
text-based variables. 
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Conclusions 
According to James Reason (200b), “There are no final victories in the struggle 
for safety” (p. 4). The meaning seems to be that one must always be looking for new 
safety challenges; the work is never done. Experience has shown that as systems evolve, 
new problems can arise where problems previously did not exist. The research reported 
here does not discount previous efforts. On the contrary, the research adds to the body of 
knowledge in several theoretical and practical ways. 
Theoretical Contributions   
The greatest contribution to the science of aviation safety management and 
machine learning theory relates to the text mining findings. The novel results add to the 
body of literature that addresses predictive safety using machine learning and discusses 
the capabilities of data mining in building predictive models within an aviation paradigm. 
The findings agree with Malaszek (2017), who wrote, “Models with a properly conducted 
text-mining process have better classification quality than models without text variables” 
(p. 1). Interestingly, in the current study, models with only text variables outshone those 
that included both text and data or only data. Further, in the third best performing model, 
which was the first model that incorporated both types of variables, the data variables 
featured lower in importance. The results suggest that while not often used in aviation 
studies, the accident report narratives contain valuable information that can be used in 
predictive accident prevention efforts. Indeed, the current project was the first known 
study to use unstructured-text narratives as they appeared in the accident reports to 
predict accident outcomes, and provides a baseline for future text mining-based 
prediction efforts in aviation. 
166 
 
Other contributions include a new understanding of variables that predict GA 
accidents and provide a basis for future studies. The study answers the call for continual 
reassessment of safety system components to ensure the viability of the system (Stolzer, 
Friend et al., 2018). Further, the findings build on previous literature such as Baugh and 
Stolzer (2018), Friend and Kohn (2018), and Stolzer, Halford et al. (2011), extolling the 
benefits of predictive safety methodologies and advance the research in predictive safety 
risk management.  
Practical Contributions    
Prior to this point in the manuscript, the results of the top three prediction models 
were presented for consideration, and it was shown that all three performed within 0.1% 
of each other, according to their ability to correctly classify the target. However, what 
remains is the selection of the champion model based on all modeling factors and 
usability for the intended population. Using a holistic view, the Logistic Regression (text) 
model is selected as the champion model. It has a slightly better misclassification rate, 
and it performed more consistently than the other models between the validation and test 
samples indicating a higher degree of validity. While it has a slightly higher False 
Positive Rate, it has a lower False Negative Rate, which is seen as a good factor. In other 
words, the model errs on adding cases to the fatal/severe injury side. This helps ensure 
the right variables are represented and not left out when making safety management 
decisions. Of greater importance, logistic regression models are reputed for their 
understandability to larger audiences. 
As suggested, the research here discovered new areas of concentration and 
variables that have value in more finely guiding safety prevention activities. The research 
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extends knowledge of machine learning in aviation human factors from such efforts as 
Liu et al. (2013) and Burnett and Si (2017). Both teams respectively showed the value of 
machine learning in predicting HFACS components using NTSB reports and aviation 
fatalities and injuries with FAA accident records. Additionally, the results provide insight 
into complex and undetected links between accident components, combinations of 
factors, and accident outcomes. Further, the results suggest the need for continued 
research into the underlying and compounding interaction of variables that led to the 
defining events. 
A question arises regarding the top variables in the models and whether anything 
new was discovered. Indeed, the broad areas are well-known in the GA community. The 
primary lesson-learned here is that text mining detected some important nuances that add 
value to accident reduction efforts. The nuances emerged by going beyond the typical 
defining event (e.g., loss of control in flight, controlled flight into terrain, and low 
altitude operation) and primary accident causes (e.g., decision making/judgement, aircraft 
control, and incorrect action selection), which are commonly charted and reviewed in the 
literature.  
The first new area of discovery is the prominence of the Medical topic (TT 24) in 
the prediction models, suggesting an area where additional focus is needed, specifically 
with unreported medical conditions and the use or abuse of all forms of medication. 
Hidden within this topic is the limitation of determining accident factors in a fleet of 
aircraft largely not equipped with cockpit voice and data recorders. Slow flight and stalls 
(TT 20) encompasses a known-hazard, but points to a need to look deeper into 
combinations of factors including speed control, remedial actions, basic pilot skills, 
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situational awareness, task management, and distractions. Flight control (TT 21) covers 
LOC accidents; however, a new contribution is a suggestion to research deeper into why 
pilots fail to maintain directional control. IMC Flight (TT 3) points to a need to 
reexamine inadequate flight planning. Weather factors (TT 9) is a well-known area for 
aviation hazards. However, a new suggestion by the topic is to focus on pilots who do not 
obtain weather briefings, do not obtain adequate briefings, or disregard the briefing, 
especially when the briefer states, “VFR flight is not recommended.” While many pilots 
are not instrument certified, the topic suggests a need to address the importance of recent 
IFR experience for those pilots who are instrument certified. Finally, the topic Flight 
hours (TT 10) is not new, as the literature is replete with examples of research 
surrounding flight hours. However, the topic suggests a new area for research: logbooks. 
Many accidents reports do not contain flight hours because logbooks were unavailable for 
a myriad of reasons. 
The current study was made possible by the data captured in the accident reports 
by teams of expert aviation investigators. The findings of the study provide a treatise for 
current and future accident investigators. Prediction modeling is only as accurate as the 
input data, and the current study shows the strengths and weaknesses of the accident 
reports. The primary strength is the report narrative itself. The study results indicate 
words matter; they can help researchers move beyond data and provide crucial context. 
The richness of the descriptions provided data capable of producing models with a 
prediction capability greater than 90%. The primary weakness of the reports is the 
amount of missing quantitative data. The literature indicates data mining models should 
improve by adding text variables. Strikingly, the current models were not able to 
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capitalize on the tabular data, and the missing data is likely the greatest reason why the 
data-only prediction models did not have a prediction capability greater than 83%. 
Regarding future text mining research, the study provides a basis for building an aviation-
specific corpus for a more accurate analysis of accident reports.  
Finally, the findings provide new areas to target aviation safety efforts. Indeed, 
the major components identified in the accident reports remain valid such as speed errors, 
task saturation, loss of control, and continued VFR flight into IMC. What these results 
provide is additional awareness into some potential precursors such as poor decision 
making, marginal flight planning, and unresolved or pilot-induced medical issues. 
Limitations of the Findings 
Archival-based research is inherently subject to limitations because the data are 
out of the control of the researcher; the data have already been captured, often without the 
possibility of clarifying points of interest or adding new reference points. While the 
prediction models performed well, they were limited by missing data, omissions, and 
errors between the source documents, the written reports, and the database. Additionally, 
source documents were not available online for accidents prior to 2009, limiting the 
ability to check discrepancies. Where a potential discrepancy was discovered, the only 
option was to remove the data from consideration. Unfortunately, several variables of 
potential value (e.g., defining events, factors, and occurrences) were deleted because of 
missing data. 
The study was purposely broad to match the variety of GA participants and 
capture as many reports as possible to improve the amount of data available for 
modeling. Even with the “global” GA breadth, several models were still able to predict at 
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a 90% level. While generalizability across the board is good, the results may not 
generalize at the same level using different subgroupings of the data. 
Finally, conclusions related to flight hours beyond basic demographics are 
problematic. One factor relates to the first limitation above. The amount of missing data 
limited the conclusions in some instances and caused others to be eliminated because of 
the amount of missing data. In some cases, the aircraft was destroyed, and the pilots 
killed, making it impossible to recreate flight hours. In other cases, the reports are silent, 
even when the pilot survived. Another limitation is the number of accident reports that 
used different accounting (i.e., last six months) instead of the standard of last 24-hours, 
last 30-days, and last 90-days. 
Recommendations 
In reactive aviation safety, understanding complex aviation accident factors is 
vital for preventing future occurrences. Proactive safety goes further by adding the near-
miss occurrences into safety equations. By adding predictive methodologies, enabled by 
machine learning and vast amounts of data, the paradigm can change. No longer will an 
accident be the basis for future safety; the prediction models can provide the necessary 
information that enables stakeholders to prevent that first accident from happening.  
Recommendations for the Target Population   
The results of the study lead to several recommendations that will address both 
the quality of the data, and by extension, the prediction models, and address areas where 
safety enhancements might be made. 
Recommendation 1. The first recommendation addresses the accident report. 
Specifically, the quality of the accident reports should be improved with a focus on the 
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needs of predictive modeling. Quality checks should be instituted to ensure continuity 
between the source documents, the written reports, and the database. Additionally, there 
needs to be an emphasis on consistency in reporting missing data (e.g., leaving the data 
field blank instead of reporting a zero for age or a series of nines for flight hours). An 
easy target would be for improvements at the NTSB level. However, the issue is not just 
for one government agency subject to competing priorities and resource constraints. 
Pilots also bear responsibility for report quality. Many of the reports begin with the 
mishap pilot submitting the NTSB Form 6120.1, Pilot Operator Aircraft 
Accident/Incident Report (NTSB, 2013). Cross-checking NTSB accident reports with the 
original NTSB Form 6120.1 revealed that many forms are incomplete or completed in 
error.  
The investigators should also strive for consistency in terminology and word use 
to facilitate text mining and predictive modeling. For example, the word “solo” is often 
used to describe a student pilot conducting a flight without an instructor on board the 
aircraft. However, in many cases, the word was used to describe the sole occupant of the 
aircraft. 
Another part of this recommendation is for investigators to capture variables 
consistently. A prime example is reporting flight hours in non-standard measures such as 
hours in the previous six months, rendering many reports unusable for modeling. The 
flight hours should conform to the categories found in the NTSB Form 6120.1 and the 
standard categories of the NTSB database. 
Recommendation 2. The second recommendation addresses the data. The FAA 
and aviation organization partners should investigate ways to capture and publish more 
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flight data for use in safety modeling. Lack of diverse data will be the greatest hindrance 
to incorporating more predictive methods in GA safety management. One reactive 
starting point could be the implementation of online pilot logbook records. A pilot’s 
flight times can be crucial points in the accident root-cause analysis. With a digital 
platform, the data could be made available to investigators following an accident. 
Recommendation 3. Moving to the model results, a third recommendation is 
based on medical findings. The results of the current study complement the previous 
research by McKay and Groff (2016), who noted an increase in pilot drug use (over-the-
counter, prescription, and illegal substances) while flying, and studies by Booze (1987) 
and Taneja & Wiegmann (2002) on medical conditions likely to cause pilot 
incapacitation. The recommendation here is to continue to invest in medical education 
and build on FAA and GAJSC efforts addressing impairing medication and high risk 
medical conditions. 
Recommendation 4. The fourth recommendation involves focusing efforts to 
improve flight skills and combat decision-based errors. The FAA, partners, and flight 
training organizations should refocus efforts on improving a pilot’s ability to control the 
aircraft when faced with unexpected events in time-critical situations. As an example, an 
additional focus should be placed on countering the effects of carburetor icing, 
identifying conditions conducive to carburetor icing, and training pilots on strategies to 
overcome the effects of suspected carburetor icing. Additional efforts should focus on the 
areas of stabilized approaches, forced landings, power management, and slow flight. 
Recommendation 5. Weather components are common in accidents, as seen by 
their inclusion in different text-based variables. Agreeing with many studies, continued 
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VFR flight into IMC was an important factor in accidents and efforts to combat the 
practice should continue. A surprising theme is the number of times pilots either did not 
receive a weather brief prior to the flight or did not follow the recommendation to avoid 
VFR flight given the observed or forecast conditions. The FAA, partners, and flight 
training organizations should refocus efforts on weather briefings, pre-flight planning, 
and weather-based risk management.  
Recommendations for Future Research    
A novel component of the current study was the inclusion of aviation accident 
report narratives transformed from their qualitative format into quantitative variables 
through a text mining process. The outcome showed great promise for future work given 
the importance of text-based variables in the top 12 of 21 models created in the project. 
Future research should focus on how to make the text mining process produce tighter 
topic and cluster variables. One way to do this could be researching and creating an 
improved aviation corpus used within the algorithm to ensure important concepts specific 
to aviation are captured to produce more precise (and by extension, more interpretable) 
Text Topics and Text Clusters. Qualitative studies of the report narratives could provide 
greater insight into word use and issues with interrater reliability between the writing 
styles and report quality of different investigators and under what circumstances. 
Another avenue of future research is an investigation into the performance of the 
data variables in the prediction models. Having this understanding would improve the 
prediction models and enhance the usability of the models toward other focus areas 
unavailable in the current models. 
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Flight safety efforts often focus on preventing the worst outcomes like those in 
the current study. However, focusing on just fatal and severe injury accidents misses the 
vulnerability represented by accidents with less extreme outcomes. Future data mining 
research should focus on predicting accidents with either minor or no injuries. By 
addressing the important variables in non-injury accidents, other major accidents might 
be prevented. 
The cornerstone of data mining is access to large blocks of data and where 
appropriate, including data from many sources. The prediction models here relied solely 
on archived data from a single source. Future efforts should focus on integrating 
additional data sources like the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), Aviation 
Safety Action Program (ASAP), and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
(ADS-B) data. 
Finally, the discussion on the limits of global generalizability offers an avenue of 
research into the different sub-groups contained in the current study. Different types of 
operations (e.g., business, personal, and instructional) or aircraft attributes (e.g., tail-
wheel or multi-engines) may yield models with more specific applicability to that 
community. Additionally, other GA communities excluded from the current study like 
helicopters and gliders could benefit from prediction modeling with machine learning 
methodologies.  
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Table A1 
Pilots by Highest Certificate Held   
Certificate Type Count Percentage 
Airline Transport Pilot 3,508 13.4% 
Certified Flight Instructor 2,778 10.6% 
Commercial 4,377 16.7% 
Private 13,100 49.9% 
Recreational 19 0.1% 
Sport 263 1.0% 
Student 1,903 7.2% 
None 301 1.1% 
Note. The certificates represent the certificate held by the pilot at the controls of the mishap aircraft. 
Information on additional pilots in the aircraft is not included. The category of “None” is assigned by the 
investigator to indicate the individual held no FAA pilot certificate. The pilot data are missing in 138 
reports. 
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Table A2 
 
Text Parsing Top 250 Terms 
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Table A3 
 
Text Filter Top 250 Words  
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Table A4 
Text Topic Output—Terms and Docs  
Topic 
ID 
Topic Terms Description Number of 
Terms 
# Docs 
1.0 +knot, +wind, +degree, 
+runway, +gust 
Landing accidents where wind 
was noted. 
778.0 3972.0 
2.0 +fuel, +tank, +gallon, +fuel tank, 
+selector 
Fuel related accidents including 
human factors. 
454.0 2978.0 
3.0 +controller, +radar, +advise, 
+acknowledge, +tower 
Flight in instrument conditions 
or under ATC. 
602.0 1780.0 
4.0 +propeller, +nose, aft, +blade, 
+approximately 
Mechanical issues often noted 
with the propeller. 
1157.0 3383.0 
5.0 +student,  +student pilot, solo, 
+solo flight, instructional 
Student flying, especially as on 
solo instructional flights. 
332.0 2457.0 
6.0 +engine, +power, forced, 
+forced landing, +loss 
Forced landings often in 
conjunction with engine issues. 
910.0 4515.0 
7.0 +gear, gear, +landing gear, 
+landing, +extend 
Landings noting gear issues, 
including failure to extend or 
hard landings. 
813.0 1915.0 
8.0 aircraft, +approximately, +refer, 
+find, accident aircraft 
Pilots exceeded the aircraft 
capabilities. 
558.0 2523.0 
9.0 +foot, +cloud, +mile, +visibility, 
+ceiling 
Reports where weather factors 
were prominent. 
1180.0 2494.0 
10.0 +hour, total, +time, +engine, 
+logbook 
Both pilot and maintenance 
times figure prominently. 
981.0 4006.0 
11.0 +oil, +rod, +connect, +cylinder, 
+number 
Engine related issues. 916.0 1729.0 
12.0 +normal operation, +preclude, 
+malfunction, +failure, 
+operation 
Accidents where there were no 
malfunctions noted. 
534.0 3176.0 
13.0 +brake, +brake, +apply, +rudder, 
+wheel 
Largely landing accidents. 688.0 2193.0 
14.0 +airstrip, +passenger, +water, 
+lake, +seat 
Accidents by amphibious or 
float equipped aircraft. Also, 
includes remote airstrips. 
1206.0 3446.0 
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Topic 
ID 
Topic Terms Description Number of 
Terms 
# Docs 
15.0 +takeoff, +weight, +foot, 
+pound, +end 
Takeoff accidents. 936.0 3045.0 
16.0 +instructor, +instruction, 
+instructional flight, 
instructional, +student 
Variation of instructional flights 
involved in accident. 
543.0 2267.0 
17.0 +approach, +runway, final, 
+airport, +end 
Landing accidents. 958.0 3581.0 
18.0 +carburetor, +heat, icing, 
carburetor heat, ice 
Accidents where actual or 
suspected carburetor icing 
played a major role. 
757.0 2074.0 
19.0 +pump, +magneto, +valve, 
+cylinder, +spark 
Engine related events. 1131.0 3262.0 
20.0 +witness, left, +hear, +state, 
+turn 
Reports often developed with 
witness testimony; includes slow 
flight and stalls. 
1072.0 3635.0 
21.0 +attach, +aileron, +control, 
+cable, +remain 
Focused on flight control 
surfaces, often recounting the 
aircraft had no problems. 
1092.0 2986.0 
22.0 +taxiway, +taxi, +runway, 
+park, +fire 
Airport incidents. 1130.0 2163.0 
23.0 +fracture, +bolt, +rod, fatigue, 
+surface 
Mechanical-related incidents. 1095.0 2067.0 
24.0 +detect, +witness, medical, 
+test, +brake 
Accidents involving medical 
issues. 
1344.0 3033.0 
25.0 +tree, +runway, main, +landing 
gear, +tank 
Landing and takeoff issues, on 
or near a runway, with 
obstructions playing a role. 
1303.0 3134.0 
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Table A5 
StatExplore Variable Importance 
Input Chi-Square Df Prob 
Airport location to crash 3417.7967 2 <.0001 
Basic weather conditions 1471.1524 2 <.0001 
Runway condition 1230.9093 18 <.0001 
Atmospheric lighting 462.6179 4 <.0001 
Highest certificate 376.5766 8 <.0001 
Professional pilot 362.0299 2 <.0001 
Homebuilt 356.4551 2 <.0001 
Flight purpose 336.2555 5 <.0001 
Flight plan type 323.6753 4 <.0001 
Second pilot on board 306.5209 2 <.0001 
Crew position code 298.7658  7 <.0001 
Solo student pilot 263.6320 3 <.0001 
Highest instructor cert. 256.1608 12 <.0001 
Multi-platform instructor 248.7324 3 <.0001 
Instructor 205.7463 3 <.0001 
Airspace 195.7200 7 <.0001 
Gear 191.8177 11 <.0001 
Med certificate validity 180.9837 8 <.0001 
Mid-air 145.9344 2 <.0001 
Number of engines 142.0536 5 <.0001 
Wind gusts indicated 108.3157 2 <.0001 
Multi-engine aircraft 100.2272 2 <.0001 
Loss of control 99.2032 2 <.0001 
Seat occupied by pilot 94.8832 7 <.0001 
Engine type 71.1847 6 <.0001 
Ground collision 46.2084 2 <.0001 
Sex 35.3855 2  <.0001 
System failure 21.8658 2 <.0001 
Weather not a factor 19.5206 2 <.0001 
Air-medical flight 3.7046 3 0.2952 
Sightseeing flight 3.5618 3 0.3128 
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Table A6 
 
StatExplore Variable Worth 
 
Variable Importance Worth Variable Importance Worth 
Total hours make 1 0.069741 Wind gusts indicated 28 0.001732 
Airport location to 
crash 
2 0.051725 Seat occupied by pilot 29 0.001724 
Total hours single-
engine 
3 0.047146 Loss of control 30 0.001687 
Hours last 90-days 4 0.044737 Mid-air 31 0.001528 
Hours last 30-days 5 0.042283 Multi-engine aircraft 32 0.00125 
Total hours at night 6 0.033061 Ground collision 33 0.00066 
Total PIC hours 7 0.030906 Engine type 34 0.00063 
Basic weather condition 8 0.022074 Weather not a factor 35 0.00037 
Runway condition 9 0.018009 Systems failure 36 0.00030 
Total flight hours 10 0.00682 Air medical flight 37 0.00017 
Atmospheric lighting 11 0.006807 Sex 38 0.00017 
Highest certificate 12 0.006323 Sightseeing flight 39 0.00009 
Flight purpose 13 0.005632    
Professional pilot 14 0.005431    
Homebuilt 15 0.004903    
Crew position code 16 0.004722    
Solo student pilot 17 0.004435    
Second pilot on board 18 0.004331    
Flight plan type 19 0.004135    
Highest instructor cert 20 0.003478    
Age 21 0.003212    
Multi-platform 
instructor 
22 0.003127    
Airspace 23 0.002724    
Med certificate validity 24 0.002708    
Instructor 25 0.002368    
Number of engines 26 0.002045    
Gear 27 0.00202    
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Table A8 
 
Model Statistics Comparison Chart—Top Three Models 
 
Fit Statistics Statistics Label Logistic 
Regression 
(Text) 
Random 
Forest (Text) 
Gradient 
Boosting (All) 
BINNED_KS_
PROB_CUTO
FF 
Train: Bin-Based Two-Way 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Probability Cutoff 
0.382 0.475 0.352 
KS Train: Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Statistic 
0.745 1 0.748 
_AIC_ Train: Akaike's Information 
Criterion 
7896.171   
_ASE_ Train: Average Squared Error 0.07267 0.012433 0.07420 
_AUR_ Train: Roc Index 0.944 1 0.939 
_AVERR_ Train: Average Error Function 0.248   
_CAPC_ Train: Cumulative Percent 
Captured Response 
34.45488 34.60782 34.45488 
_CAP_ Train: Percent Captured 
Response 
17.23837 17.30391 17.17282 
_CRITERION
_ 
Selection Criterion: Valid: 
Misclassification Rate 
0.09816 0.09873 0.09930 
_DFE_ Train: Degrees of Freedom for 
Error 
15809   
_DFM_ Train: Model Degrees of 
Freedom 
22   
_DFT_ Train: Total Degrees of Freedom 15831  15831 
_DISF_ Train: Frequency of Classified 
Cases 
 15831  
_DIV_ Train: Divisor for ASE 31662 31662 31662 
_ERR_ Train: Error Function 7852.171   
_FPE_ Train: Final Prediction Error 0.07287   
_GAIN_ Train: Gain 244.3531 245.8816 244.3531 
_GINI_ Train: Gini Coefficient 0.887 1 0.877 
_KS_BIN_ Train: Bin-Based Two-Way 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic 
0.743 0.985 0.746 
210 
 
Fit Statistics Statistics Label Logistic 
Regression 
(Text) 
Random 
Forest (Text) 
Gradient 
Boosting (All) 
_KS_PROB_C
UTOFF 
Train: Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Probability Cutoff 
0.273 0.451 0.252 
_LIFTC_ Train: Cumulative Lift 3.44353 3.45882 3.44353 
_LIFT_ Train: Lift 3.44571 3.45882 3.43261 
_MAX_ Train: Maximum Absolute Error 0.99980 0.53 0.96186 
_MISC_ Train: Misclassification Rate 0.09513 0.00006 0.09380 
_MSE_ Train: Mean Square Error 0.07277   
_NOBS_ Train: Sum of Frequencies 15831 15831 15831 
_NW_ Train: Number of Estimate 
Weights 
22   
_RASE_ Train: Root Average Sum of 
Squares 
0.26958 0.11151 0.27239 
_RESP_ Train: Percent Response 99.62121 100 99.24242 
_RESPC_ Train: Cumulative Percent 
Response 
99.55808 100 99.55808 
_RFPE_ Train: Root Final Prediction 
Error 
0.26995   
_RMSE_ Train: Root Mean Squared Error 0.26976   
_SBC_ Train: Schwarz's Bayesian 
Criterion 
8064.905   
_SSE_ Train: Sum of Squared Errors 2300.903 393.663 2349.152 
_SUMW_ Train: Sum of Case Weights 
Times Freq 
31662  31662 
_WRONG_ Train: Number of Wrong 
Classifications 
 1  
VKS Valid: Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Statistic 
0.74 0.735 0.725 
_VASE_ Valid: Average Squared Error 0.074610 0.07552 0.07807 
_VAUR_ Valid: Roc Index 0.945 0.938 0.937 
_VAVERR_ Valid: Average Error Function 0.24832   
_VBINNED_
KS_PROB_C
UTOFF_ 
Valid: Bin-Based Two-Way 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Probability Cutoff 
0.376 0.38 0.337 
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Fit Statistics Statistics Label Logistic 
Regression 
(Text) 
Random 
Forest (Text) 
Gradient 
Boosting (All) 
_VCAPC_ Valid: Cumulative Percent 
Captured Response 
34.62295 34.55738 34.62295 
_VCAP_ Valid: Percent Captured 
Response 
17.31148 17.2459 17.31148 
_VDISF_ Valid: Frequency of Classified 
Cases 
 5277  
_VDIV_ Valid: Divisor for VASE 10554 10554 10554 
_VERR_ Valid: Error Function 2620.719   
_VGAIN_ Valid: Gain 246.0328 245.3774 246.0328 
_VGINI_ Valid: Gini Coefficient 0.889 0.875 0.875 
_VKS_BIN_ Valid: Bin-Based Two-Way 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic 
0.734 0.734 0.721 
_VKS_PROB_
CUTOFF_ 
Valid: Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Probability Cutoff 
0.259 0.301 0.296 
_VLIFTC_ Valid: Cumulative Lift 3.46033 3.45377 3.46033 
_VLIFT_ Valid: Lift 3.46033 3.44722 3.46033 
_VMAX_ Valid: Maximum Absolute Error 0.98891 1 0.96374 
_VMISC_ Valid: Misclassification Rate 0.09816 0.09873 0.09930 
_VMSE_ Valid: Mean Square Error 0.07461   
_VNOBS_ Valid: Sum of Frequencies 5277 5277 5277 
_VRASE_ Valid: Root Average Squared 
Error 
0.27315 0.27482 0.27941 
_VRESPC_ Valid: Cumulative Percent 
Response 
100 99.81061 100 
_VRESP_ Valid: Percent Response 100 99.62121 100 
_VRMSE_ Valid: Root Mean Square Error 0.27315   
_VSSE_ Valid: Sum of Square Errors 787.4203 797.0808 823.9326 
_VSUMW_ Valid: Sum of Case Weights 
Times Freq 
10554  10554 
_VWRONG_ Valid: Number of Wrong 
Classifications 
 521  
TKS Test:  Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Statistic 
0.743 0.74 0.735 
_TASE_ Test: Average Squared Error 0.07250 0.07368 0.07504 
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Fit Statistics Statistics Label Logistic 
Regression 
(Text) 
Random 
Forest (Text) 
Gradient 
Boosting (All) 
_TAUR_ Test:  Roc Index 0.947 0.94 0.937 
_TAVERR_ Test: Average Error Function 0.24101   
_TBINNED_K
S_PROB_CU
TOFF_ 
Test:  Bin-Based Two-Way 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Probability Cutoff 
0.389 0.385 0.339 
_TCAPC_ Test: Cumulative Percent 
Captured Response 
34.53473 34.4692 34.53473 
_TCAP_ Test: Percent Captured Response 17.2346 17.19991 17.2346 
_TDISF_ Test: Frequency of Classified 
Cases 
 5279  
_TDIV_ Test: Divisor for TASE 10558 10558 10558 
_TERR_ Test: Error Function 2544.571   
_TGAIN_ Test: Gain 245.2819 244.6267 245.2819 
_TGINI_ Test:  Gini Coefficient 0.894 0.88 0.874 
_TKS_BIN_ Test:  Bin-Based Two-Way 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic 
0.739 0.74 0.73 
_TKS_PROB_
CUTOFF_ 
Test:  Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Probability Cutoff 
0.258 0.321 0.288 
_TLIFTC_ Test: Cumulative Lift 3.45282 3.44627 3.45282 
_TLIFT_ Test: Lift 3.44627 3.43933 3.44627 
_TMAX_ Test: Maximum Absolute Error 0.99366 1 0.96143 
_TMISC_ Test: Misclassification Rate 0.09850 0.09358 0.09528 
_TMISL_ Test: Lower 95% Conf. Limit 
for TMISC 
0.09059   
_TMISU_ Test: Upper 95% Conf. Limit for 
TMISC 
0.10686   
_TMSE_ Test: Mean Square Error 0.07250   
_TNOBS_ Test: Sum of Frequencies 5279 5279 5279 
_TRASE_ Test: Root Average Squared 
Error 
0.26927 0.27143 0.27393 
_TRESPC_ Test: Cumulative Percent 
Response 
99.81061 99.62121 99.81061 
_TRESP_ Test: Percent Response 99.62121 99.42068 99.62121 
_TRMSE_ Test: Root Mean Square Error 0.26927   
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Fit Statistics Statistics Label Logistic 
Regression 
(Text) 
Random 
Forest (Text) 
Gradient 
Boosting (All) 
_TSSE_ Test: Sum of Square Errors 765.5014 777.872 792.2298 
_TSUMW_ Test: Sum of Case Weights 
Times Freq 
10558  10558 
_TWRONG_ Test: Number of Wrong 
Classifications 
 494  
TKS Test:  Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Statistic 
0.743 0.74 0.735 
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Table A9 
 
Text Topic Associated Accident Reports 
 
Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_1 0.477 DEN01LA054 TT_1 0.372 LAX03LA028 
TT_1 0.466 CHI04FA043 TT_1 0.366 LAX99LA194 
TT_1 0.445 SEA01LA174 TT_1 0.366 SEA02LA052 
TT_1 0.441 WPR16FA007 TT_1 0.363 CHI05LA012 
TT_1 0.430 CHI99LA133 TT_1 0.363 CEN12LA345 
TT_1 0.429 CHI99LA124 TT_1 0.362 IAD01LA085 
TT_1 0.425 CEN15LA149 TT_1 0.361 CHI06CA277 
TT_1 0.423 LAX05CA127 TT_1 0.360 WPR16FA144 
TT_1 0.413 LAX06CA279 TT_1 0.359 CHI06LA061 
TT_1 0.477 DEN01LA054 TT_1 0.359 CHI06CA209 
TT_1 0.466 CHI04FA043 TT_1 0.359 SEA02LA004 
TT_1 0.406 LAX01LA135 TT_1 0.355 ERA09CA219 
TT_1 0.395 CEN14LA086 TT_1 0.353 WPR11FA155 
TT_1 0.394 LAX02LA222 TT_1 0.352 DEN03LA080 
TT_1 0.391 LAX08LA179 TT_1 0.352 CHI04LA036 
TT_1 0.387 CHI04LA097 TT_1 0.352 DEN01FA028 
TT_1 0.385 IAD99LA037 TT_1 0.351 IAC02LA006 
TT_1 0.383 IAD98LA040 TT_1 0.351 FTW01LA080 
TT_1 0.382 SEA04LA056 TT_1 0.350 SEA01LA081 
TT_1 0.378 LAX99LA142 TT_1 0.349 DEN05LA069 
TT_1 0.377 DEN99LA069 TT_1 0.349 CEN14FA102 
TT_1 0.376 LAX02LA068 TT_1 0.348 DFW05CA173 
TT_1 0.375 CEN18LA172 TT_1 0.348 DEN05LA109 
TT_1 0.373 WPR09LA221 TT_1 0.347 FTW02LA066 
TT_1 0.372 LAX03LA195 TT_1 0.347 CHI07CA223 
Note. The topic label is Wind Factors. The topic terms include +knot, +wind, +degree, +runway, +gust. The 
plus (+) indicates a parent term.
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_2 0.893 ERA12FA023 TT_2 0.729 WPR11FA403 
TT_2 0.809 CEN13LA283 TT_2 0.728 ANC06LA078 
TT_2 0.809 NYC00LA157 TT_2 0.727 IAD00LA045 
TT_2 0.796 WPR16LA128 TT_2 0.724 CHI01LA088 
TT_2 0.792 CEN16LA380 TT_2 0.722 WPR10LA001 
TT_2 0.790 ERA12LA001 TT_2 0.721 ERA13LA117 
TT_2 0.784 MIA07LA152 TT_2 0.719 ERA10LA454 
TT_2 0.783 IAD03LA064 TT_2 0.717 WPR18LA040 
TT_2 0.782 CEN13LA330 TT_2 0.713 ERA16LA062 
TT_2 0.776 ERA19LA024 TT_2 0.710 LAX05LA033 
TT_2 0.775 ERA14LA183 TT_2 0.709 ANC14LA038 
TT_2 0.775 ERA16FA289 TT_2 0.709 ATL07LA014 
TT_2 0.769 NYC01LA153 TT_2 0.708 WPR12LA246 
TT_2 0.767 MIA03LA184 TT_2 0.707 ERA09LA004 
TT_2 0.767 CEN16LA115 TT_2 0.704 MIA03LA131 
TT_2 0.765 ERA12LA480 TT_2 0.703 CEN17LA242 
TT_2 0.765 NYC03LA116 TT_2 0.701 SEA06LA057 
TT_2 0.755 ERA13LA179 TT_2 0.701 LAX01LA247 
TT_2 0.753 ERA14LA378 TT_2 0.699 DEN03LA051 
TT_2 0.746 ANC18FA022 TT_2 0.699 CEN13LA381 
TT_2 0.735 CHI03LA288 TT_2 0.698 ATL04LA024 
TT_2 0.733 NYC04LA151 TT_2 0.697 MIA01LA185 
TT_2 0.731 GAA17CA472 TT_2 0.696 ERA16LA090 
TT_2 0.730 CHI01LA038 TT_2 0.691 CHI04LA101 
TT_2 0.729 NYC01LA026 TT_2 0.690 ANC99LA097 
Note. The topic label is Fuel Issues. The topic terms include +fuel, +tank, +gallon, +fuel tank, +selector. 
The plus (+) indicates a parent term.
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_3 0.959 ERA15FA340 TT_3 0.697 CEN14FA032 
TT_3 0.879 NYC01FA040 TT_3 0.695 CEN13LA088 
TT_3 0.877 ERA09FA145 TT_3 0.69 MIA06FA008 
TT_3 0.871 NYC02FA060 TT_3 0.689 MIA08FA163 
TT_3 0.822 SEA07FA262 TT_3 0.687 NYC07FA041 
TT_3 0.801 ERA09FA514 TT_3 0.687 MIA05LA083 
TT_3 0.792 WPR11FA147 TT_3 0.685 LAX98FA188 
TT_3 0.784 NYC98FA095 TT_3 0.684 LAX01LA110 
TT_3 0.775 MIA03FA071 TT_3 0.678 WPR16FA054 
TT_3 0.773 ERA15FA099 TT_3 0.674 DEN04LA055 
TT_3 0.761 MIA03FA025 TT_3 0.673 ERA15FA144 
TT_3 0.751 CHI01LA322 TT_3 0.673 MIA99FA172 
TT_3 0.749 MIA99FA034 TT_3 0.669 ERA09FA083 
TT_3 0.744 WPR11FA073 TT_3 0.668 ERA14FA192 
TT_3 0.739 NYC02FA044 TT_3 0.667 ERA17FA135 
TT_3 0.736 LAX06FA066 TT_3 0.665 WPR16FA041 
TT_3 0.725 ERA14FA232 TT_3 0.663 ERA09FA376 
TT_3 0.719 SEA02GA053 TT_3 0.662 WPR14FA349 
TT_3 0.717 ATL04FA093 TT_3 0.658 MIA03LA012 
TT_3 0.715 IAD01FA070 TT_3 0.656 LAX01FA004 
TT_3 0.713 CEN11FA557 TT_3 0.655 LAX03FA072 
TT_3 0.712 ERA14LA117 TT_3 0.655 MIA01FA152 
TT_3 0.712 LAX05FA032 TT_3 0.653 WPR11FA170 
TT_3 0.708 MIA04FA100 TT_3 0.650 CEN11FA302 
TT_3 0.708 ERA18FA114 TT_3 0.641 DEN06FA114 
Note. The topic label is IMC Flight. The topic terms include +controller, +radar, +advise, +acknowledge, 
+tower. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_4 0.557 CHI00FA180 TT_4 0.388 SEA98FA170 
TT_4 0.520 CHI99FA341 TT_4 0.388 ATL04FA061 
TT_4 0.504 CHI01FA100 TT_4 0.384 ATL02FA074 
TT_4 0.502 CHI00FA234 TT_4 0.384 ATL02FA074 
TT_4 0.501 CHI99FA167 TT_4 0.379 SEA98FA179 
TT_4 0.495 CHI98FA287 TT_4 0.378 MIA99LA091 
TT_4 0.493 CHI02FA006 TT_4 0.378 CEN11FA195 
TT_4 0.488 DEN03FA113 TT_4 0.374 DEN03FA137 
TT_4 0.481 DEN01FA033 TT_4 0.370 ANC00FA052 
TT_4 0.454 CHI01FA247 TT_4 0.369 DEN02FA050 
TT_4 0.454 DEN03FA025 TT_4 0.368 ERA14FA077 
TT_4 0.454 DEN03FA074 TT_4 0.366 MIA99FA126 
TT_4 0.446 DEN04FA057 TT_4 0.366 CEN10FA493 
TT_4 0.443 ATL04FA079 TT_4 0.365 FTW03LA209 
TT_4 0.435 SEA00FA033 TT_4 0.365 FTW03FA225 
TT_4 0.432 DFW05FA065 TT_4 0.363 SEA99FA150 
TT_4 0.421 ATL04FA130 TT_4 0.363 CHI01FA220 
TT_4 0.420 ATL04FA099 TT_4 0.363 DEN05FA124 
TT_4 0.415 CEN10FA324 TT_4 0.362 FTW02FA211 
TT_4 0.409 DEN06FA028 TT_4 0.362 ERA11LA150 
TT_4 0.405 ATL05FA082 TT_4 0.361 ANC12FA009 
TT_4 0.399 SEA98FA042 TT_4 0.360 ATL02FA076 
TT_4 0.398 CHI99FA003 TT_4 0.360 ATL02FA076 
TT_4 0.395 DEN03FA114 TT_4 0.358 ERA10FA259 
TT_4 0.391 DEN06FA018 TT_4 0.358 FTW03FA027 
Note. The topic label is LOC-Stalls. The topic terms include +propeller, +nose, aft, +blade, 
+approximately. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_5 0.858 NYC07FA196 TT_5 0.583 ATL02LA014 
TT_5 0.713 ATL00LA045 TT_5 0.570 WPR09LA040 
TT_5 0.680 ATL05CA134 TT_5 0.566 ATL99LA110 
TT_5 0.669 FTW03LA157 TT_5 0.566 IAD00LA022 
TT_5 0.660 DEN04FA002 TT_5 0.565 NYC04LA169 
TT_5 0.637 CEN13LA342 TT_5 0.562 ATL06CA068 
TT_5 0.633 FTW00LA260 TT_5 0.562 ERA17LA267 
TT_5 0.620 IAD98LA041 TT_5 0.56 CHI08LA273 
TT_5 0.610 ATL06CA025 TT_5 0.558 ERA09LA189 
TT_5 0.609 CHI01LA280 TT_5 0.554 SEA03LA053 
TT_5 0.609 LAX05CA017 TT_5 0.553 CEN10CA328 
TT_5 0.609 ATL05CA015 TT_5 0.551 ERA12FA540 
TT_5 0.607 NYC02LA016 TT_5 0.550 NYC05CA112 
TT_5 0.606 FTW04CA163 TT_5 0.548 ATL04CA133 
TT_5 0.602 NYC02FA173 TT_5 0.547 SEA04LA002 
TT_5 0.600 NYC00LA235 TT_5 0.547 ERA19LA078 
TT_5 0.598 CHI07CA192 TT_5 0.546 ERA10CA392 
TT_5 0.598 NYC00LA224 TT_5 0.546 ATL06CA046 
TT_5 0.597 GAA17CA337 TT_5 0.545 NYC03LA014 
TT_5 0.593 LAX06LA032 TT_5 0.544 ERA18LA034 
TT_5 0.591 ATL07CA095 TT_5 0.542 NYC04FA171 
TT_5 0.589 ERA13LA347 TT_5 0.538 NYC99LA168 
TT_5 0.588 NYC99LA196 TT_5 0.538 IAC02LA067 
TT_5 0.587 ATL01LA089 TT_5 0.538 WPR11LA067 
TT_5 0.583 FTW04LA138 TT_5 0.536 ATL98LA044 
Note. The topic label is Student Pilots. The topic terms include +student, +student pilot, solo, +solo flight, 
instructional. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_6 0.483 FTW03LA026 TT_6 0.388 ERA11LA395 
TT_6 0.458 CEN11FA274 TT_6 0.387 CEN15LA038 
TT_6 0.454 ERA16LA040 TT_6 0.383 ERA14LA281 
TT_6 0.452 CEN09LA024 TT_6 0.383 NYC03LA075 
TT_6 0.446 CEN18LA229 TT_6 0.382 CEN15LA297 
TT_6 0.442 CEN15LA243 TT_6 0.381 CHI02LA091 
TT_6 0.428 CEN18LA363 TT_6 0.379 CEN16LA082 
TT_6 0.424 FTW01LA212 TT_6 0.379 DFW07LA009 
TT_6 0.417 CEN15LA392 TT_6 0.377 WPR11LA284 
TT_6 0.416 DFW06LA199 TT_6 0.376 WPR10LA284 
TT_6 0.414 DFW07LA017 TT_6 0.376 FTW01LA207 
TT_6 0.408 CHI07LA307 TT_6 0.375 CEN17LA065 
TT_6 0.406 FTW02LA191 TT_6 0.375 FTW98LA305 
TT_6 0.401 ERA17FA210 TT_6 0.375 WPR13LA078 
TT_6 0.400 ERA13LA214 TT_6 0.374 CEN11FA433 
TT_6 0.400 ERA16LA268 TT_6 0.374 NYC03LA155 
TT_6 0.398 MIA03LA186 TT_6 0.373 FTW04LA119 
TT_6 0.395 ANC03LA039 TT_6 0.373 CEN16LA078 
TT_6 0.394 ERA12LA034 TT_6 0.372 ERA14LA388 
TT_6 0.393 FTW98LA366 TT_6 0.371 ERA12LA312 
TT_6 0.393 CEN14LA234 TT_6 0.371 FTW04LA059 
TT_6 0.393 FTW99FA199 TT_6 0.371 CHI98LA160 
TT_6 0.392 ERA15LA071 TT_6 0.370 CEN11FA228 
TT_6 0.390 ERA14LA085 TT_6 0.370 CEN17LA263 
TT_6 0.388 MIA01LA109 TT_6 0.369 CEN12FA520 
Note. The topic label is Forced Landings. The topic terms include +engine, +power, forced, +forced 
landing, +loss. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_7 0.729 LAX07LA215 TT_7 0.579 ERA10LA478 
TT_7 0.721 MIA03LA009 TT_7 0.569 LAX05LA168 
TT_7 0.717 ATL04IA054 TT_7 0.564 CHI03LA032 
TT_7 0.682 ERA11LA231 TT_7 0.560 LAX06LA034 
TT_7 0.674 WPR12FA193 TT_7 0.555 ERA18LA215 
TT_7 0.652 WPR18LA057 TT_7 0.554 FTW04IA078 
TT_7 0.652 WPR17LA210 TT_7 0.554 LAX07LA158 
TT_7 0.642 CHI03LA039 TT_7 0.553 MIA06CA139 
TT_7 0.638 WPR16LA015 TT_7 0.55 LAX00LA112 
TT_7 0.636 ERA16LA042 TT_7 0.55 CHI06LA080 
TT_7 0.632 LAX06LA114 TT_7 0.549 ERA16LA135 
TT_7 0.631 DEN08LA021 TT_7 0.546 MIA03LA033 
TT_7 0.625 CEN16LA374 TT_7 0.544 ERA13LA398 
TT_7 0.619 WPR10LA347 TT_7 0.541 LAX02LA027 
TT_7 0.618 WPR16LA058 TT_7 0.539 CHI00LA161 
TT_7 0.615 CEN12LA387 TT_7 0.535 WPR18LA022 
TT_7 0.614 MIA98LA248 TT_7 0.532 CEN16LA190 
TT_7 0.609 WPR10LA140 TT_7 0.532 GAA16CA074 
TT_7 0.607 MIA06LA055 TT_7 0.531 LAX99LA278 
TT_7 0.604 CEN11LA494 TT_7 0.527 GAA17CA126 
TT_7 0.598 ERA16LA190 TT_7 0.527 CEN17LA148 
TT_7 0.598 ERA17LA287 TT_7 0.522 ERA16LA271 
TT_7 0.592 NYC08LA162 TT_7 0.518 ANC18LA009 
TT_7 0.586 MIA04LA038 TT_7 0.516 LAX98LA229 
TT_7 0.581 ANC05LA029 TT_7 0.514 ERA15LA249 
Note. The topic label is Landing Gear. The topic terms include +gear, gear, +landing gear, +landing, 
+extend. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_8 0.602 FTW98FA100 TT_8 0.431 SEA99FA104 
TT_8 0.576 SEA00LA110 TT_8 0.427 SEA04LA110 
TT_8 0.535 DEN08IA130 TT_8 0.426 WPR16LA080 
TT_8 0.519 SEA03FA041 TT_8 0.420 SEA99LA058 
TT_8 0.499 SEA00FA023 TT_8 0.419 SEA04FA009 
TT_8 0.495 SEA03FA015 TT_8 0.418 LAX00FA148 
TT_8 0.489 SEA03FA173 TT_8 0.413 SEA00LA186 
TT_8 0.478 SEA99LA081 TT_8 0.412 SEA03LA007 
TT_8 0.478 SEA04LA014 TT_8 0.41 SEA04FA188 
TT_8 0.475 SEA02LA012 TT_8 0.408 SEA01LA120 
TT_8 0.474 FTW02FA112 TT_8 0.406 SEA00LA104 
TT_8 0.472 LAX99FA080 TT_8 0.403 SEA01LA102 
TT_8 0.470 SEA99FA116 TT_8 0.401 SEA02LA084 
TT_8 0.468 SEA99FA176 TT_8 0.400 DEN00FA086 
TT_8 0.467 SEA04FA143 TT_8 0.400 LAX99FA311 
TT_8 0.464 LAX98FA141 TT_8 0.399 SEA03FA121 
TT_8 0.460 CEN09LA440 TT_8 0.394 CHI99FA105 
TT_8 0.458 SEA02FA171 TT_8 0.394 LAX00FA209 
TT_8 0.445 SEA02FA005 TT_8 0.392 CHI00LA085 
TT_8 0.445 FTW04LA072 TT_8 0.389 SEA04CA105 
TT_8 0.443 MIA99LA057 TT_8 0.387 SEA98FA047 
TT_8 0.441 MIA01LA228 TT_8 0.383 SEA98FA040 
TT_8 0.440 SEA99FA105 TT_8 0.383 SEA04FA060 
TT_8 0.432 LAX98LA279 TT_8 0.382 SEA05LA188 
TT_8 0.431 DEN99FA120 TT_8 0.380 SEA05CA150 
Note. The topic label is Flight Envelope Exceedance. The topic terms include aircraft, +approximately, 
+refer, +find, accident aircraft. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_9 0.597 ANC99FAMS1 TT_9 0.497 ANC02FA025 
TT_9 0.592 ERA15FA220 TT_9 0.497 LAX08LA253 
TT_9 0.590 SEA06FA036 TT_9 0.497 ERA14FA093 
TT_9 0.587 ANC98GA036 TT_9 0.494 WPR11FA256 
TT_9 0.579 FTW03FA016 TT_9 0.493 SEA04LA095 
TT_9 0.578 LAX99FA020 TT_9 0.492 CEN14FA019 
TT_9 0.558 CEN11FA347 TT_9 0.491 ERA11FA074 
TT_9 0.555 LAX02FA179 TT_9 0.488 DEN06FA065 
TT_9 0.549 LAX01FA208 TT_9 0.484 WPR12FA305 
TT_9 0.544 WPR15FA166 TT_9 0.483 MIA08FA001 
TT_9 0.543 LAX05FA076 TT_9 0.481 FTW98FA121 
TT_9 0.540 FTW01LA032 TT_9 0.481 CEN15FA092 
TT_9 0.537 ANC98FA043 TT_9 0.480 ERA14LA006 
TT_9 0.532 SEA01FA070 TT_9 0.479 ANC99FA108 
TT_9 0.532 CHI04FA043 TT_9 0.479 LAX04LA324 
TT_9 0.531 LAX05FA167 TT_9 0.474 WPR12FA136 
TT_9 0.526 ANC03LA029 TT_9 0.470 SEA99FA152 
TT_9 0.524 NYC00FA245 TT_9 0.469 FTW00FA144 
TT_9 0.522 CEN15FA174 TT_9 0.467 DEN07FA054 
TT_9 0.519 FTW01FA101 TT_9 0.466 WPR09FA192 
TT_9 0.510 DFW08FA204 TT_9 0.466 IAD03FA069 
TT_9 0.508 NYC00FA257 TT_9 0.465 CEN09FA340 
TT_9 0.507 CEN10LA055 TT_9 0.465 MIA02FA173 
TT_9 0.505 NYC04FA157 TT_9 0.464 SEA05FA092 
TT_9 0.500 CHI00FA123 TT_9 0.462 ERA09LA392 
Note. The topic label is Weather Factors. The topic terms include aircraft, +foot, +cloud, +mile, +visibility, 
+ceiling. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_10 0.543 ERA11FA354 TT_10 0.407 ATL98FA060 
TT_10 0.506 CHI01FA044 TT_10 0.407 ATL98FA060 
TT_10 0.496 CHI06FA077 TT_10 0.407 CEN09FA518 
TT_10 0.495 LAX05LA215 TT_10 0.406 CHI00FA039 
TT_10 0.493 ERA11FA391 TT_10 0.406 LAX08FA122 
TT_10 0.490 ANC07FA006 TT_10 0.404 CEN11FA431 
TT_10 0.490 LAX02FA214 TT_10 0.401 DEN05FA045 
TT_10 0.479 FTW02FA004 TT_10 0.400 CEN13FA352 
TT_10 0.460 CHI05FA260 TT_10 0.398 CHI02FA177 
TT_10 0.458 SEA05FA105 TT_10 0.395 CHI06FA010 
TT_10 0.456 CEN16FA158 TT_10 0.395 CHI06FA010 
TT_10 0.447 CEN14FA057 TT_10 0.394 LAX05FA184 
TT_10 0.441 CEN10LA427 TT_10 0.391 LAX00GA158 
TT_10 0.439 CHI02FA284 TT_10 0.391 FTW98FA186 
TT_10 0.435 CEN09FA070 TT_10 0.391 CEN17FA005 
TT_10 0.434 DEN03FA068 TT_10 0.388 DFW07FA044 
TT_10 0.431 CEN16FA224 TT_10 0.388 WPR09FA398 
TT_10 0.429 LAX04FA057 TT_10 0.387 CEN14FA522 
TT_10 0.429 CHI05FA189 TT_10 0.384 NYC07FA065 
TT_10 0.429 ERA14FA144 TT_10 0.384 DEN99FA075 
TT_10 0.417 WPR13FA115 TT_10 0.382 CHI03FA080 
TT_10 0.416 CHI06FA232 TT_10 0.382 CHI08FA027 
TT_10 0.416 FTW03FA229 TT_10 0.382 CEN13FA338 
TT_10 0.411 ERA09FA345 TT_10 0.381 MIA04FA049 
TT_10 0.410 CEN11LA669 TT_10 0.381 CEN13FA141 
Note. The topic label is Flight Hours. The topic terms include aircraft, +hour, total, +time, +engine, 
+logbook. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_11 0.782 SEA03FA038 TT_11 0.573 LAX98LA131 
TT_11 0.762 CEN10IA059 TT_11 0.570 CEN12LA326 
TT_11 0.719 LAX07LA236 TT_11 0.569 NYC01LA013 
TT_11 0.698 CHI07LA121 TT_11 0.564 WPR15LA157 
TT_11 0.682 ERA13LA382 TT_11 0.562 MIA99LA032 
TT_11 0.670 WPR15LA032 TT_11 0.558 NYC01LA194 
TT_11 0.669 CEN16LA391 TT_11 0.554 DEN05LA070 
TT_11 0.659 WPR15LA175 TT_11 0.554 ERA17LA109 
TT_11 0.649 ERA10FA074 TT_11 0.552 CEN16LA107 
TT_11 0.639 WPR13LA015 TT_11 0.546 ERA15LA189 
TT_11 0.631 WPR09LA362 TT_11 0.545 ERA16FA329 
TT_11 0.627 FTW01LA143 TT_11 0.535 LAX05LA273 
TT_11 0.626 SEA03LA082 TT_11 0.535 ERA12LA394 
TT_11 0.625 LAX08LA008 TT_11 0.532 WPR11LA038 
TT_11 0.613 IAD99FA025 TT_11 0.531 ERA16LA114 
TT_11 0.610 DEN01LA103 TT_11 0.530 WPR13FA169 
TT_11 0.604 WPR09LA458 TT_11 0.526 NYC00LA125 
TT_11 0.602 CEN18LA031 TT_11 0.524 CHI03LA095 
TT_11 0.601 MIA04LA013 TT_11 0.522 WPR17LA038 
TT_11 0.597 WPR12LA108 TT_11 0.519 LAX07LA058 
TT_11 0.591 ERA16LA022 TT_11 0.518 MIA01LA168 
TT_11 0.584 CEN17LA058 TT_11 0.518 ERA10LA335 
TT_11 0.578 ERA17LA185 TT_11 0.517 WPR12LA161 
TT_11 0.578 CEN14LA204 TT_11 0.516 LAX05LA172 
TT_11 0.574 ANC17LA006 TT_11 0.516 CEN12FA025 
Note. The topic label is Engine Oil Loss. The topic terms include aircraft, +oil, +rod, +connect, +cylinder, 
+number. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_12 0.317 WPR13CA327 TT_12 0.277 GAA18CA569 
TT_12 0.299 GAA18CA285 TT_12 0.276 GAA17CA550 
TT_12 0.297 GAA17CA449 TT_12 0.276 GAA18CA055 
TT_12 0.296 GAA17CA339 TT_12 0.276 GAA18CA395 
TT_12 0.294 GAA18CA448 TT_12 0.276 GAA17CA054 
TT_12 0.291 GAA18CA219 TT_12 0.275 GAA18CA225 
TT_12 0.291 GAA17CA363 TT_12 0.275 GAA18CA018 
TT_12 0.291 GAA17CA281 TT_12 0.275 GAA17CA441 
TT_12 0.289 GAA18CA303 TT_12 0.275 GAA17CA469 
TT_12 0.288 GAA17CA499 TT_12 0.275 GAA17CA209 
TT_12 0.287 GAA17CA518 TT_12 0.275 GAA18CA056 
TT_12 0.287 GAA19CA072 TT_12 0.275 GAA18CA279 
TT_12 0.286 GAA18CA527 TT_12 0.274 GAA17CA091 
TT_12 0.285 GAA17CA486 TT_12 0.274 GAA17CA270 
TT_12 0.284 GAA18CA176 TT_12 0.274 GAA18CA201 
TT_12 0.283 GAA18CA298 TT_12 0.274 GAA18CA556 
TT_12 0.283 GAA18CA196 TT_12 0.274 GAA17CA059 
TT_12 0.283 GAA17CA062 TT_12 0.274 GAA17CA396 
TT_12 0.282 GAA18CA130 TT_12 0.273 GAA18CA339 
TT_12 0.282 GAA19CA081 TT_12 0.273 GAA17CA364 
TT_12 0.281 GAA17CA377 TT_12 0.272 GAA18CA317 
TT_12 0.278 GAA18CA481 TT_12 0.272 GAA18CA328 
TT_12 0.278 GAA18CA523 TT_12 0.272 GAA18CA372 
TT_12 0.278 GAA17CA011 TT_12 0.271 GAA17CA290 
TT_12 0.277 GAA17CA280 TT_12 0.271 GAA19CA023 
Note. The topic label is Directional LOC. The topic terms include aircraft, +normal operation, +preclude, 
+malfunction, +failure, +operation. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_13 0.738 NYC08LA273 TT_13 0.555 ERA19LA055 
TT_13 0.731 ERA16LA113 TT_13 0.544 CEN12CA567 
TT_13 0.699 WPR17LA141 TT_13 0.534 DFW06LA038 
TT_13 0.687 WPR17LA192 TT_13 0.531 WPR15LA253 
TT_13 0.670 ERA14LA022 TT_13 0.531 WPR15LA253 
TT_13 0.665 ERA16LA213 TT_13 0.529 SEA99LA131 
TT_13 0.644 CEN16LA274 TT_13 0.525 WPR17LA114 
TT_13 0.636 WPR12LA207 TT_13 0.523 IAD99LA049 
TT_13 0.613 LAX05LA109 TT_13 0.519 WPR15LA218 
TT_13 0.612 ANC17LA005 TT_13 0.515 DEN01LA160 
TT_13 0.611 CEN19LA046 TT_13 0.515 CEN12LA023 
TT_13 0.608 CHI07LA135 TT_13 0.511 WPR13FA430 
TT_13 0.604 WPR18LA089 TT_13 0.510 ERA15LA186 
TT_13 0.594 MIA05LA143 TT_13 0.510 ERA19LA030 
TT_13 0.590 ERA13IA192 TT_13 0.504 NYC01LA216 
TT_13 0.584 WPR18LA216 TT_13 0.504 CEN15LA057 
TT_13 0.584 ERA17LA290 TT_13 0.503 ATL07CA047 
TT_13 0.583 ANC07LA059 TT_13 0.496 ERA17LA262 
TT_13 0.579 ERA15LA322 TT_13 0.496 MIA06LA052 
TT_13 0.575 SEA98LA178 TT_13 0.494 WPR12LA135 
TT_13 0.575 ATL07CA058 TT_13 0.493 ERA12LA016 
TT_13 0.571 CHI01LA126 TT_13 0.493 GAA16CA042 
TT_13 0.570 WPR09LA307 TT_13 0.492 CHI08CA032 
TT_13 0.565 ERA18LA023 TT_13 0.489 LAX98LA081 
TT_13 0.563 GAA18CA432 TT_13 0.485 CEN12LA516 
Note. The topic label is Braking Issues. The topic terms include aircraft, +brake, +brake, +apply, +rudder, 
+wheel. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_14 0.349 CHI07LA013 TT_14 0.250 ANC98LA127 
TT_14 0.329 CHI99LA307 TT_14 0.249 ANC00LA134 
TT_14 0.323 ANC04LA012 TT_14 0.249 ANC98LA088 
TT_14 0.321 ANC01LA040 TT_14 0.249 ANC00LA111 
TT_14 0.312 ANC05FA098 TT_14 0.249 ANC98LA107 
TT_14 0.296 ANC08LA075 TT_14 0.248 CEN17LA283 
TT_14 0.294 ANC02FA106 TT_14 0.245 ANC09LA103 
TT_14 0.290 ANC05LA133 TT_14 0.241 ANC08LA047 
TT_14 0.288 ANC05LA009 TT_14 0.241 ANC09TA005 
TT_14 0.279 ANC98TA128 TT_14 0.240 ANC01LA067 
TT_14 0.275 ANC01LA113 TT_14 0.239 ANC03LA021 
TT_14 0.270 ANC08FA079 TT_14 0.238 ANC00LA079 
TT_14 0.268 ANC03LA064 TT_14 0.237 ANC05CA122 
TT_14 0.267 ANC00LA116 TT_14 0.236 ANC00LA016 
TT_14 0.266 ANC05LA073 TT_14 0.236 ANC98LA147 
TT_14 0.265 ANC02LA126 TT_14 0.236 ANC01LA142 
TT_14 0.263 ANC98LA080 TT_14 0.235 ANC03LA112 
TT_14 0.262 ANC99LA088 TT_14 0.234 ANC05CA151 
TT_14 0.262 FTW98LA105 TT_14 0.234 ANC02LA088 
TT_14 0.261 ANC99LA078 TT_14 0.233 ANC99FA070 
TT_14 0.260 ANC00LA019 TT_14 0.233 ERA16LA181 
TT_14 0.259 ANC05TA106 TT_14 0.232 ANC07LA092 
TT_14 0.258 ANC00LA050 TT_14 0.232 WPR12FA385 
TT_14 0.258 ANC06FA136 TT_14 0.232 ANC00LA043 
TT_14 0.256 ANC04CA089 TT_14 0.232 ANC03LA116 
Note. The topic label is Water – Remote Airstrips. The topic terms include +airstrip, +passenger, +water, 
+lake, +seat. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_15 0.659 ERA10LA377 TT_15 0.422 NYC01LA012 
TT_15 0.519 ERA16FA257 TT_15 0.420 NYC00LA166 
TT_15 0.513 DEN99LA156 TT_15 0.418 ANC16LA054 
TT_15 0.490 LAX05LA160 TT_15 0.418 FTW98FA365 
TT_15 0.485 CHI01FA312 TT_15 0.417 LAX04LA328 
TT_15 0.481 ATL07LA111 TT_15 0.415 ERA13LA370 
TT_15 0.479 ERA10LA267 TT_15 0.414 ERA16LA224 
TT_15 0.478 ERA13LA037 TT_15 0.411 CHI98LA191 
TT_15 0.472 LAX07FA258 TT_15 0.410 LAX07CA254 
TT_15 0.462 WPR16FA095 TT_15 0.409 ERA17LA024 
TT_15 0.461 CHI05LA257 TT_15 0.406 SEA98LA066 
TT_15 0.460 WPR10FA449 TT_15 0.404 ERA10LA055 
TT_15 0.454 NYC08LA271 TT_15 0.403 NYC00FA001 
TT_15 0.451 ERA13LA264 TT_15 0.403 ERA09LA530 
TT_15 0.450 CHI03LA158 TT_15 0.401 WPR17FA166 
TT_15 0.448 ERA15LA282 TT_15 0.394 NYC00LA120 
TT_15 0.445 NYC00FA226 TT_15 0.394 NYC06LA197 
TT_15 0.443 GAA17CA347 TT_15 0.391 CEN13LA539 
TT_15 0.440 WPR12FA339 TT_15 0.385 NYC04IA054 
TT_15 0.437 DEN05LA088 TT_15 0.384 NYC02FA166 
TT_15 0.429 SEA02LA152 TT_15 0.383 WPR18LA179 
TT_15 0.427 CEN18TA374 TT_15 0.380 CHI04CA266 
TT_15 0.427 CHI99FA174 TT_15 0.379 LAX01LA177 
TT_15 0.425 DEN99LA101 TT_15 0.379 ERA11LA451 
TT_15 0.423 LAX08LA179 TT_15 0.378 ERA15LA238 
Note. The topic label is Excess Weight. The topic terms include +takeoff, +weight, +foot, +pound, +end. 
The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_16 0.639 LAX08FA109 TT_16 0.448 ERA18LA258 
TT_16 0.571 ERA16FA170 TT_16 0.447 FTW98LA150 
TT_16 0.559 LAX98LA164 TT_16 0.445 ANC01LA025 
TT_16 0.559 LAX98LA164 TT_16 0.445 ANC01LA025 
TT_16 0.558 ERA10LA302 TT_16 0.442 IAD04LA005 
TT_16 0.552 ERA10LA446 TT_16 0.441 ANC06LA105 
TT_16 0.548 CHI05CA219 TT_16 0.441 ATL05LA140 
TT_16 0.538 GAA17CA337 TT_16 0.440 CHI00LA216 
TT_16 0.523 LAX98LA196 TT_16 0.437 FTW99LA272 
TT_16 0.508 IAD05LA038 TT_16 0.434 GAA18CA358 
TT_16 0.508 SEA05FA125 TT_16 0.433 IAD03LA002 
TT_16 0.507 NYC00FA240 TT_16 0.433 ATL05CA030 
TT_16 0.495 FTW02FA004 TT_16 0.432 ERA09LA435 
TT_16 0.486 CHI08LA273 TT_16 0.429 FTW00LA036 
TT_16 0.482 WPR15FA021 TT_16 0.428 WPR17FA063 
TT_16 0.477 CEN15LA280 TT_16 0.428 FTW99FA153 
TT_16 0.471 NYC99FA216 TT_16 0.428 FTW99FA153 
TT_16 0.467 WPR14LA153 TT_16 0.428 FTW99FA223 
TT_16 0.459 SEA04LA183 TT_16 0.425 DFW06LA209 
TT_16 0.455 LAX05LA283 TT_16 0.425 CHI03LA122 
TT_16 0.452 ANC00LA014 TT_16 0.423 IAD05LA039 
TT_16 0.450 CEN13LA342 TT_16 0.419 GAA18CA234 
TT_16 0.449 FTW99LA084 TT_16 0.418 NYC98LA169 
TT_16 0.449 ERA17FA115 TT_16 0.417 SEA01LA087 
TT_16 0.449 FTW02LA073 TT_16 0.414 ANC01LA082 
Note. The topic label is Instructional. The topic terms include +instructor, +instruction, +instructional 
flight, instructional, +student. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_17 0.443 LAX06LA056 TT_17 0.346 ERA09FA116 
TT_17 0.443 LAX06LA056 TT_17 0.345 NYC04FA033 
TT_17 0.441 NYC05LA002 TT_17 0.345 NYC04FA033 
TT_17 0.441 NYC05LA002 TT_17 0.341 DEN99FA077 
TT_17 0.416 CEN16FA333 TT_17 0.341 DEN99FA077 
TT_17 0.404 SEA04LA048 TT_17 0.341 NYC08FA056 
TT_17 0.401 SEA01TA050 TT_17 0.338 FTW03LA022 
TT_17 0.388 IAD05LA099 TT_17 0.337 NYC00LA243 
TT_17 0.382 CEN11FA008 TT_17 0.336 WPR16LA061 
TT_17 0.372 SEA08FA116 TT_17 0.335 NYC98FA060 
TT_17 0.372 SEA08FA116 TT_17 0.335 IAD02LA025 
TT_17 0.369 ERA14LA181 TT_17 0.333 NYC08FA046 
TT_17 0.369 ERA14LA181 TT_17 0.333 ERA14TA435 
TT_17 0.367 CHI01LA050 TT_17 0.332 CEN11FA417 
TT_17 0.364 NYC05FA021 TT_17 0.332 SEA08LA057 
TT_17 0.362 WPR13FA296 TT_17 0.332 SEA08LA057 
TT_17 0.362 WPR13FA296 TT_17 0.331 IAD00LA027 
TT_17 0.357 ERA15LA084 TT_17 0.331 IAD00LA027 
TT_17 0.357 ERA15LA084 TT_17 0.330 ERA15LA257 
TT_17 0.356 IAD00FA082 TT_17 0.330 NYC05LA106 
TT_17 0.355 IAD01LA068 TT_17 0.329 CEN12LA629 
TT_17 0.355 WPR16LA093 TT_17 0.329 CEN12LA629 
TT_17 0.353 CHI00MA066 TT_17 0.327 DEN00LA036 
TT_17 0.353 NYC04FA100 TT_17 0.326 NYC06MA192 
TT_17 0.351 NYC02LA167 TT_17 0.325 FTW01FA033 
Note. The topic label is Unstable Approach. The topic terms include +approach, +runway, final, +airport, 
+end. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_18 0.737 ERA12LA575 TT_18 0.502 CEN17LA295 
TT_18 0.685 ERA17LA341 TT_18 0.498 NYC98LA078 
TT_18 0.662 ERA13LA269 TT_18 0.495 WPR14LA232 
TT_18 0.661 ERA16LA270 TT_18 0.490 ANC16CA056 
TT_18 0.621 ERA16LA281 TT_18 0.490 CEN15LA292 
TT_18 0.609 CEN14LA134 TT_18 0.486 WPR11LA359 
TT_18 0.599 FTW00LA175 TT_18 0.480 IAD02LA034 
TT_18 0.596 CEN13LA398 TT_18 0.475 ANC13CA056 
TT_18 0.592 CEN12LA175 TT_18 0.475 ANC04LA031 
TT_18 0.585 CEN14LA161 TT_18 0.473 CEN12LA477 
TT_18 0.565 CEN18LA151 TT_18 0.471 DEN00LA054 
TT_18 0.544 GAA16CA393 TT_18 0.463 CEN14LA244 
TT_18 0.539 CEN19LA015 TT_18 0.462 ANC09LA036 
TT_18 0.530 WPR13CA252 TT_18 0.461 NYC01LA060 
TT_18 0.527 CHI07CA169 TT_18 0.459 NYC06LA167 
TT_18 0.526 ANC01LA029 TT_18 0.458 NYC07LA085 
TT_18 0.524 CEN16LA349 TT_18 0.452 ERA15LA063 
TT_18 0.524 ANC04LA045 TT_18 0.451 LAX98LA107 
TT_18 0.522 ERA12LA432 TT_18 0.449 ATL07CA075 
TT_18 0.520 ANC04LA003 TT_18 0.448 WPR14LA147 
TT_18 0.518 CEN17FA332 TT_18 0.446 CEN18LA013 
TT_18 0.513 NYC06LA193 TT_18 0.444 ERA18TA255 
TT_18 0.512 MIA03LA035 TT_18 0.444 IAD05LA101 
TT_18 0.504 CHI01LA328 TT_18 0.442 ERA18LA162 
TT_18 0.503 NYC03LA055 TT_18 0.441 LAX05LA163 
Note. The topic label is Carburetor Icing. The topic terms include +carburetor, +heat, icing, carburetor heat, 
ice. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_19 0.544 LAX06LA183 TT_19 0.439 NYC01FA193 
TT_19 0.519 NYC03FA153 TT_19 0.435 ERA15FA361 
TT_19 0.505 ERA10LA162 TT_19 0.432 LAX06LA214 
TT_19 0.501 WPR13LA147 TT_19 0.428 LAX00FA151 
TT_19 0.500 ERA15LA030 TT_19 0.426 ATL06LA028 
TT_19 0.496 CEN16LA296 TT_19 0.424 WPR16LA048 
TT_19 0.490 ERA17FA327 TT_19 0.420 LAX05LA173 
TT_19 0.478 ERA10LA222 TT_19 0.418 SEA08LA073 
TT_19 0.476 ATL06LA114 TT_19 0.417 LAX01FA027 
TT_19 0.476 WPR09LA324 TT_19 0.417 ERA17FA139 
TT_19 0.468 ERA17FA107 TT_19 0.416 MIA08LA142 
TT_19 0.461 WPR15LA131 TT_19 0.414 ERA12LA442 
TT_19 0.457 ERA14LA389 TT_19 0.414 ERA15FA191 
TT_19 0.455 WPR18FA150 TT_19 0.412 WPR09LA364 
TT_19 0.453 WPR14LA199 TT_19 0.410 WPR11LA374 
TT_19 0.452 FTW03FA067 TT_19 0.410 NYC05LA086 
TT_19 0.451 LAX06LA153 TT_19 0.408 WPR12LA394 
TT_19 0.449 ATL07LA067 TT_19 0.407 WPR10LA053 
TT_19 0.447 ERA10LA151 TT_19 0.407 MIA99FA246 
TT_19 0.446 MIA05FA085 TT_19 0.406 WPR18LA002 
TT_19 0.445 CEN18LA285 TT_19 0.405 WPR16LA005 
TT_19 0.443 ERA16LA152 TT_19 0.404 FTW02LA023 
TT_19 0.443 ERA14FA074 TT_19 0.403 CEN14FA219 
TT_19 0.440 ERA17FA112 TT_19 0.403 MIA02LA057 
TT_19 0.440 LAX00LA247 TT_19 0.402 LAX03LA012 
Note. The topic label is Loss of Power. The topic terms include +pump, +magneto, +valve, +cylinder, 
+spark. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_20 0.450 IAD04FA017 TT_20 0.329 CEN14FA163 
TT_20 0.449 WPR13LA050 TT_20 0.328 DFW05FA055 
TT_20 0.448 IAD03FA035 TT_20 0.326 CEN16FA172 
TT_20 0.423 WPR12FA326 TT_20 0.324 CEN13FA044 
TT_20 0.414 NYC02FA089 TT_20 0.322 IAD00LA047 
TT_20 0.411 SEA08FA013 TT_20 0.321 LAX04FA226 
TT_20 0.403 IAD03FA039 TT_20 0.321 DEN00FA175 
TT_20 0.399 SEA03FA106 TT_20 0.320 SEA05LA098 
TT_20 0.393 CEN09FA518 TT_20 0.317 FTW98FA127 
TT_20 0.382 SEA98FA083 TT_20 0.316 CHI02FA120 
TT_20 0.378 FTW03FA174 TT_20 0.314 MIA06FA120 
TT_20 0.378 CHI98FA187 TT_20 0.309 NYC01FA223 
TT_20 0.376 FTW04FA204 TT_20 0.309 FTW99FA199 
TT_20 0.376 LAX08FA286 TT_20 0.306 ATL07CA061 
TT_20 0.366 SEA04FA009 TT_20 0.306 DFW06FA140 
TT_20 0.361 LAX00FA213 TT_20 0.305 CHI02FA262 
TT_20 0.357 CHI06FA067 TT_20 0.305 DEN99FA113 
TT_20 0.355 LAX02LA010 TT_20 0.303 IAD02FA018 
TT_20 0.353 CHI99FA052 TT_20 0.303 CEN15LA059 
TT_20 0.346 CHI99MA269 TT_20 0.303 FTW04FA144 
TT_20 0.345 SEA00LA186 TT_20 0.301 IAD00FA003 
TT_20 0.340 CHI98FA123 TT_20 0.301 CHI98LA270 
TT_20 0.339 DEN05FA047 TT_20 0.301 NYC00LA184 
TT_20 0.335 CHI07LA013 TT_20 0.300 ERA11FA222 
TT_20 0.333 NYC02LA129 TT_20 0.300 WPR11FA166 
Note. The topic label is Slow Flight - Stalls. The topic terms include +witness, left, +hear, +state, +turn. 
The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_21 0.582 ERA13FA256 TT_21 0.491 ERA11FA210 
TT_21 0.577 MIA02FA148 TT_21 0.484 ANC15FA050 
TT_21 0.573 WPR18FA116 TT_21 0.483 MIA08FA027 
TT_21 0.567 ATL05FA048 TT_21 0.480 CEN13FA476 
TT_21 0.566 CEN13FA219 TT_21 0.479 IAD01FA013 
TT_21 0.555 ERA19FA010 TT_21 0.475 ATL99FA081 
TT_21 0.551 ATL07FA038 TT_21 0.475 CEN15FA378 
TT_21 0.546 CEN14FA467 TT_21 0.474 WPR10FA162 
TT_21 0.545 ERA16FA032 TT_21 0.474 ATL02FA008 
TT_21 0.538 ERA16FA169 TT_21 0.473 ERA13FA348 
TT_21 0.532 CEN17FA028 TT_21 0.470 CEN13FA172 
TT_21 0.531 NYC02FA126 TT_21 0.469 LAX06FA289 
TT_21 0.531 ERA15FA330 TT_21 0.469 ERA14LA330 
TT_21 0.527 CEN18FA147 TT_21 0.465 NYC05FA117 
TT_21 0.526 ERA13FA349 TT_21 0.465 NYC05FA117 
TT_21 0.518 ATL05FA041 TT_21 0.464 CEN18FA003 
TT_21 0.510 ATL99FA074 TT_21 0.464 DEN06FA013 
TT_21 0.510 ERA12FA093 TT_21 0.462 ATL06FA038 
TT_21 0.510 CEN16FA361 TT_21 0.460 ATL04FA016 
TT_21 0.508 ATL03FA049 TT_21 0.460 CEN10FA322 
TT_21 0.504 ATL05FA128 TT_21 0.458 CHI01FA291 
TT_21 0.500 ATL04FA130 TT_21 0.457 ERA11FA431 
TT_21 0.496 ERA11FA462 TT_21 0.456 ERA12FA484 
TT_21 0.492 ATL04FA099 TT_21 0.456 ATL0FFA082 
TT_21 0.491 ATL00FA016 TT_21 0.455 ATL04FA056 
Note. The topic label is Flight Control. The topic terms include +attach, +aileron, +control, +cable, 
+remain. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_22 0.592 CHI06FA206 TT_22 0.354 GAA19CA079 
TT_22 0.592 CHI06FA206 TT_22 0.351 LAX02LA274 
TT_22 0.493 WPR09LA024 TT_22 0.349 MIA04LA074 
TT_22 0.493 WPR09LA024 TT_22 0.348 NYC08LA004 
TT_22 0.470 ERA11LA361 TT_22 0.347 WPR15LA154 
TT_22 0.470 ERA11LA361 TT_22 0.347 WPR15LA154 
TT_22 0.435 CEN09LA182 TT_22 0.339 WPR11CA171 
TT_22 0.435 CEN09LA182 TT_22 0.336 ANC09LA069 
TT_22 0.419 CHI01IA248 TT_22 0.334 CHI03LA280 
TT_22 0.419 CHI01IA248 TT_22 0.333 NYC98LA189 
TT_22 0.411 FTW98LA317 TT_22 0.328 LAX00LA011 
TT_22 0.411 FTW98LA317 TT_22 0.327 WPR18LA118 
TT_22 0.410 DEN08CA115 TT_22 0.325 CEN15FA386 
TT_22 0.398 ERA16LA225 TT_22 0.325 SEA07LA081 
TT_22 0.386 MIA00FA103 TT_22 0.325 SEA07LA081 
TT_22 0.383 FTW99LA245 TT_22 0.3232 LAX08LA235 
TT_22 0.383 FTW99LA245 TT_22 0.322 NYC02LA006 
TT_22 0.367 LAX99LA025 TT_22 0.322 NYC02LA006 
TT_22 0.367 LAX99LA025 TT_22 0.319 ANC03CA006 
TT_22 0.366 IAD05LA043 TT_22 0.317 MIA98LA111 
TT_22 0.366 IAD05LA043 TT_22 0.317 SEA99LA009 
TT_22 0.358 SEA98LA187 TT_22 0.316 FTW02LA047 
TT_22 0.357 WPR09IA128 TT_22 0.316 FTW02LA047 
TT_22 0.355 MIA01LA012 TT_22 0.315 LAX07CA157 
TT_22 0.355 MIA01LA012 TT_22 0.308 FTW99LA232 
Note. The topic label is Surface Accidents. The topic terms include +taxiway, +taxi, +runway, +park, +fire. 
The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_23 0.582 WPR17LA038 TT_23 0.395 DEN08IA044 
TT_23 0.544 LAX99LA111 TT_23 0.386 WPR15LA101 
TT_23 0.521 WPR15LA220 TT_23 0.386 CEN17LA292 
TT_23 0.500 CEN13LA233 TT_23 0.386 CEN10LA123 
TT_23 0.496 CEN10IA059 TT_23 0.383 NYC00LA187 
TT_23 0.495 MIA02LA107 TT_23 0.382 SEA03LA113 
TT_23 0.478 NYC01LA013 TT_23 0.381 CEN13LA103 
TT_23 0.468 CEN16LA218 TT_23 0.378 ERA15LA225 
TT_23 0.463 ATL06LA050 TT_23 0.378 WPR14LA079 
TT_23 0.463 WPR10LA248 TT_23 0.378 MIA01LA168 
TT_23 0.458 DEN07IA066 TT_23 0.377 CEN16LA107 
TT_23 0.455 SEA01LA067 TT_23 0.375 WPR10LA130 
TT_23 0.453 CHI07IA017 TT_23 0.369 CEN10LA037 
TT_23 0.437 LAX08LA168 TT_23 0.368 CHI04LA144 
TT_23 0.435 LAX99LA201 TT_23 0.367 CEN17LA333 
TT_23 0.433 NYC06LA089 TT_23 0.366 WPR16LA047 
TT_23 0.430 WPR11LA102 TT_23 0.364 MIA99LA166 
TT_23 0.426 ERA13LA382 TT_23 0.362 ERA09LA050 
TT_23 0.413 MIA04LA127 TT_23 0.358 DEN00IA093 
TT_23 0.408 NYC01IA211 TT_23 0.357 ERA13LA112 
TT_23 0.406 CHI02LA100 TT_23 0.355 CHI02LA179 
TT_23 0.404 NYC98LA074 TT_23 0.349 WPR15LA175 
TT_23 0.404 SEA98TA152 TT_23 0.348 CHI04LA187 
TT_23 0.401 CEN12LA326 TT_23 0.346 ERA17LA194 
TT_23 0.396 LAX02LA204 TT_23 0.346 ERA12LA274 
Note. The topic label is Engine Component Failure. The topic terms include +fracture, +bolt, +rod, fatigue, 
+surface. The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_24 0.418 CEN11FA479 TT_24 0.300 CEN10LA470 
TT_24 0.380 CEN12LA203 TT_24 0.300 CHI01FA204 
TT_24 0.369 CEN15LA026 TT_24 0.300 LAX08FA122 
TT_24 0.362 CEN09FA043 TT_24 0.300 MIA07LA009 
TT_24 0.362 WPR15FA016 TT_24 0.300 WPR10LA297 
TT_24 0.361 DFW08LA157 TT_24 0.299 CHI00LA282 
TT_24 0.350 WPR11FA268 TT_24 0.296 WPR09LA308 
TT_24 0.347 CEN13LA046 TT_24 0.294 WPR12FA062 
TT_24 0.336 SEA08LA145 TT_24 0.294 LAX08LA231 
TT_24 0.332 WPR11LA223 TT_24 0.293 WPR10FA399 
TT_24 0.327 CHI01LA294 TT_24 0.293 WPR14LA230 
TT_24 0.325 SEA04LA168 TT_24 0.292 ERA09LA230 
TT_24 0.325 CEN09LA311 TT_24 0.292 CEN14LA485 
TT_24 0.321 CHI99LA137 TT_24 0.291 NYC07LA098 
TT_24 0.320 CEN09LA263 TT_24 0.290 WPR14FA355 
TT_24 0.318 SEA08LA158 TT_24 0.290 CEN15FA291 
TT_24 0.316 CEN16FA346 TT_24 0.289 WPR11FA333 
TT_24 0.315 ERA15FA139 TT_24 0.289 WPR13LA002 
TT_24 0.313 CEN09LA061 TT_24 0.286 ERA16LA201 
TT_24 0.307 WPR09LA026 TT_24 0.286 CEN09LA385 
TT_24 0.305 LAX00FA170 TT_24 0.284 LAX04LA110 
TT_24 0.305 WPR13FA269 TT_24 0.284 WPR12FA044 
TT_24 0.303 ERA12FA271 TT_24 0.283 LAX06LA170 
TT_24 0.303 ATL05LA121 TT_24 0.282 CEN11LA090 
TT_24 0.301 ERA10LA280 TT_24 0.280 LAX04FA223 
Note. The topic label is Medical. The topic terms include +detect, +witness, medical, +test, +brake. The 
plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Text Topic Weight Report ID Text Topic Weight Report ID 
TT_25 0.237 LAX03FA116 TT_25 0.175 DEN04FA104 
TT_25 0.221 SEA02FA109 TT_25 0.173 CHI07FA052 
TT_25 0.219 CHI98FA187 TT_25 0.173 MIA07CA099 
TT_25 0.215 FTW03LA017 TT_25 0.172 SEA05LA162 
TT_25 0.207 CHI04FA205 TT_25 0.171 FTW00LA185 
TT_25 0.204 CHI99FA140 TT_25 0.171 MIA00FA126 
TT_25 0.203 DEN03FA137 TT_25 0.171 ANC06LA058 
TT_25 0.202 NYC06FA162 TT_25 0.170 DFW05LA081 
TT_25 0.201 WPR09FA316 TT_25 0.170 ATL05CA123 
TT_25 0.195 DEN05FA003 TT_25 0.170 ERA14LA149 
TT_25 0.194 NYC06FA029 TT_25 0.169 IAD05FA125 
TT_25 0.190 NYC02FA082 TT_25 0.169 ATL03FA136 
TT_25 0.188 IAD02FA075 TT_25 0.168 CEN14FA051 
TT_25 0.188 MIA98LA204 TT_25 0.168 WPR12LA047 
TT_25 0.187 DEN01FA110 TT_25 0.166 SEA07FA189 
TT_25 0.187 WPR10LA171 TT_25 0.165 LAX03FA135 
TT_25 0.185 NYC99FA213 TT_25 0.164 CEN12FA188 
TT_25 0.183 DFW06FA187 TT_25 0.164 NYC07FA056 
TT_25 0.180 CHI99FA223 TT_25 0.164 ATL99FA132 
TT_25 0.179 CHI01FA024 TT_25 0.164 LAX99FA270 
TT_25 0.178 LAX04FA019 TT_25 0.163 ANC99LA078 
TT_25 0.178 MIA08FA070 TT_25 0.162 ANC02FA038 
TT_25 0.177 IAD03FA050 TT_25 0.162 ERA12LA287 
TT_25 0.176 CHI00FA237 TT_25 0.162 CHI00LA038 
TT_25 0.176 FTW04LA191 TT_25 0.160 DFW05FA058 
Note. The topic label is Obstructions. The topic terms include +tree, +runway, main, +landing gear, +tank. 
The plus (+) indicates a parent term. 
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Figures    
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Figure B1 
Accident Aircraft Engine Types 
 
 
Note. Reciprocating engines are piston engines that use a propeller for thrust. A 
representative aircraft from the accident database using a reciprocating engine is a Cessna 
172. A turboprop engine integrates a turbine to drive a propeller (El-Sayed, 2017). A 
representative aircraft from the accident database is a DeHavilland DHC-3. Very simply, 
a turbofan engine has a ducted fan as an internal propeller. It operates with two air 
sources, one through the structure like a turbojet engine, the other through the fan (El-
Sayed, 2017). A representative aircraft from the accident database is a Gulfstream G-V. 
A turbojet engine creates thrust from the turbine exhaust gas (El-Sayed, 2017). A 
representative aircraft from the accident database is the Aero Vodochody L-39. The sole 
electric engine in the accident database powered a Yuneec E430 airplane. 
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Figure B2 
Accident Aircraft Engine Numbers  
 
 
 
Note. The number of single-engine aircraft = 23,501; multi-engine aircraft = 2,553. There 
were 333 reports that did not specify engine numbers. 
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Figure B3 
Accident Aircraft Landing Gear Types  
 
 
 
Note. The number of aircraft with tricycle landing gear = 17,553; tailwheel gear = 7,779; 
other gear types = 539. There were 513 reports that did not specify landing gear type. 
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Figure B4 
Accident Aircraft Manufacture Types  
 
 
Note. The number of homebuilt aircraft = 3,967; factory built = 22,413. There were seven 
reports that did not specify a manufacture type. 
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Figure B5 
Accident Pilot Total Flight Hours  
 
 
Note. The bars represent 500-hr increments. The blue bar contains the median = 1,000 
total flight hours. 
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Figure B6 
Accident Pilot Total Flight Hours in Aircraft Make  
 
Note. The bars represent 500-hr increments. The blue bar contains the median = 122 total 
flight hours in the accident aircraft make. 
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Figure B7 
Accident Pilot Total Flight Hours in Single-engine Aircraft  
 
 
Note. The bars represent 500-hr increments. The blue bar contains the median = 728 total 
flight hours in single-engine aircraft. 
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Figure B8 
Accident Pilot Total Pilot-in-Command Flight Hours  
 
Note. The bars represent 500-hr increments. The blue bar contains the median = 848 total 
flight as pilot-in-command. 
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Figure B9 
Accident Pilot Total Hours at Night  
 
Note. The bars represent 500-hr increments. The blue bar contains the median = 57 total 
flight hours as pilot-in-command. 
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Figure B10 
Accident Pilot Total Hours—Last 90-days  
 
Note. The bars represent 10-hr increments. The blue bar contains the median = 26 total 
flight hours in the previous 90-days. 
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Figure B11 
Accident Pilot Total Hours—Last 30-days 
 
Note. The bars represent 5-hr increments. The blue bar contains the median = 11 total 
flight hours in the previous 30-days. 
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Appendix C 
Variable Dictionary  
C1 Variable Dictionary 
C2 As-built Modeling Variables 
252 
 
Table C1 
 
Variable Dictionary 
 
Variable Name Variable Description Variable Type Measure 
Age Age of the pilot Interval Years 
Air-medical flight The aircraft was an air medical 
flight 
Categorical Y / N 
Aircraft damage Damage categories: destroyed, 
substantial, minor, or none 
Categorical Damage Type 
Aircraft year Aircraft year of manufacture Interval Year 
Airplane rating Mishap pilot rating in more than 
one aircraft 
Categorical Y / N 
Airport location to crash Accident location in reference to 
the airport: OFAP, ONAP, ONAS 
Categorical Location Code 
Airspace Type of airspace where the mishap 
took place 
Categorical Airspace Code 
Atmospheric lighting Records the prevailing light 
condition 
Categorical Light Code 
Basic weather conditions Basic conditions at the accident 
site 
Categorical VMC / IMC 
Biennial flight review A biennial flight review was 
accomplished 
Categorical Y / N 
Cause narrative Probable cause narrative Text Unstructured 
Causes Combined cause descriptions Text Unstructured 
Crew position code Pilot category (pilot, copilot, 
student, check pilot) 
Categorical Type 
Defining events Investigator assigned defining 
event 
Categorical Event code 
Engine type Accident aircraft engine type Categorical Type Code 
Event state State where the accident took 
place 
Categorical State ID 
Event time Time the accident took place Interval HH:MM 
Factors Combined factors descriptions Text Unstructured 
Factual narrative Factual narrative Text Unstructured 
Fixed-retractable gear Fixed or retractable gear Categorical F / R 
Flight plan activated Flight plan activated with ATC Categorical Y / N 
Flight plan type Type of flight plan filed Categorical Plan Type 
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Variable Name Variable Description Variable Type Measure 
Flight purpose Reason for the flight Categorical Reason Code 
Ground collision Accident involved a ground 
collision 
Categorical Y / N 
Highest certificate Highest pilot certificate Categorical Cert type 
Homebuilt Amateur built or manufactured Categorical Y / N 
Hours last 24-hours Hours last 24-hrs, all a/c Interval Hours 
Hours last 30-days Hours last 30-days, all a/c Interval Hours 
Hours last 90-days Hours last 90-days, all a/c Interval Hours 
IFR equipped The aircraft was IFR avionics 
equipped 
Categorical Y / N 
Incident narrative FAA Incident Narr (8020-5) Text Unstructured 
Instructional Instructional flight Categorical Y / N 
Instructor Mishap pilot holds an instructor 
rating 
Categorical Y / N 
Med certificate validity Medical certificate validity Categorical Med Val Code 
Medical certificate Medical certificate held by the 
pilot 
Categorical Med Cert Code 
Mid-air Accident involved a midair 
collision 
Categorical Y / N 
Multi-engine aircraft Multi-engine a/c Categorical Y / N 
Multi-platform instructor Mishap pilot holds an instrument 
rating 
Categorical Y / N 
Occurrence_combined Combined occurrence descriptions Text Unstructured 
Professional pilot Employed professionally as a pilot Categorical Y / N 
Report narrative Narrative summary released at 
completion of accident 
Text Unstructured 
Runway condition Condition of the runway Categorical Runway Code 
Seat occupied by pilot Seat where the pilot was sitting / 
controlling the aircraft from 
Categorical Seat Code 
Second pilot on board A second pilot was on the aircraft Categorical Y / N 
Sex Sex of the pilot Categorical M / F 
Sightseeing flight The aircraft was a site-seeing 
flight 
Categorical Y / N 
Solo student pilot Student on a solo flight Categorical Y / N 
TARGET Accident Injury level Categorical F / NF 
Total flight hours Total flight hours, all a/c Interval Hours 
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Variable Name Variable Description Variable Type Measure 
Total hours make Total hours in a/c make Interval Hours 
Total hours multi-engine Total multi-engine hours Interval Hours 
Total hours night Total night hours Interval Hours 
Total hours single-engine Total single-engine hours Interval Hours 
Total PIC hours PIC hours, all a/c Interval Hours 
VFR approach Type of VFR approach being 
flown 
Categorical Approach Code 
Visibility Prevailing visibility in statute 
miles 
Continuous Statute Miles 
Weather factors Mishap had a weather component 
cited 
Categorical Y / N 
Wind gust speed Gust wind speed in nautical miles 
per hour 
Continuous Nautical Miles 
Wind gusts indicated Indicates whether gusts were 
present 
Categorical Y / N 
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Table C2 
As-built Modeling Variables 
Variable Description Status 
Age Pilot age Included 
Airport location to crash Proximity to airport Included 
Airspace Airspace Included 
Atmospheric lighting Lighting condition Included 
Basic weather conditions Basic weather condition Included 
Crew position code Pilot category Included 
Engine type Engine type Included 
Flight plan type Type of flight plan filed Included 
Flight purpose Flight purpose Included 
Gear Gear type Included (new) 
Ground-collision On ground collision Included 
Highest certificate Highest pilot certificate Included 
Highest instructor certificate Highest instructor rating Included (new) 
Homebuilt Homebuilt aircraft Included 
Hours last 30-days Hours last 30-days, all a/c Included 
Hours last 90-days Hours last 90-days, all a/c Included 
Instructor Pilot possessed instructor rating Included (new) 
Loss of control Loss of control (air or ground) Included (new) 
Med Certificate validity Medical certificate validity Included 
Mid-air Mid air collision Included 
Multi-engine aircraft Multi-engine a/c Included 
Multi-platform instructor Instructor rated in multiple a/c Included (new) 
Number of engines Number of engines Included (new) 
Professional pilot Professional pilot Included 
Report narrative Accident summary/report Included 
Runway condition Runway condition Included (new) 
Seat occupied by pilot Seat position of accident pilot Included (new) 
Second pilot on board Second pilot on board Included 
Solo student pilot Solo student pilot Included (new) 
Systems failure System failure cited Included (new) 
TARGET Accident Injury level Included 
Total flight hours Total flight hours, all a/c Included 
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Variable Description Status 
Total hours make Total hours in a/c make Included 
Total hours night Total night hours Included 
Total hours single-engine Total single-engine hours Included 
Total PIC hours PIC hours, all a/c Included 
Weather not a factor Weather not a factor Included (new) 
Wind gust indicated Gusts indicated Included 
Air-medical flight Air medical flight Rejected on review 
Cause narrative Probable cause narrative Rejected on review 
Causes Combined cause descriptions Rejected on review 
Defining events Defining event Rejected on import 
Factors Combined factors descriptions Rejected on review 
Factual narrative Factual narrative Rejected on review 
Fixed-retractable gear Gear type Rejected on import 
Hours last 24-hours Hours last 24-hrs, all a/c Rejected on import 
Incident narrative FAA Incident Narrative (8020-5) Rejected on review 
Occurrences Combined occurrence descriptions Rejected on import 
Sex Pilot sex Rejected on review 
Sightseeing flight Sightseeing flight Rejected on review 
Total hours multi-engine Total multi-engine hours Rejected on review 
Wind factors (TT 1) +knot, +wind, +degree, +runway, +gust Included 
Fuel issues (TT 2) +fuel, +tank, +gallon, +fuel tank, 
+selector 
Included 
IMC Flight (TT 3) +controller, +radar, +advise, 
+acknowledge, +tower 
Included 
LOC-stalls (TT 4) +propeller, +nose, aft, +blade, 
+approximately 
Included 
Student pilots (TT 5) +student,  +student pilot, solo, +solo 
flight, instructional 
Included 
Forced landings (TT 6) +engine, +power, forced, +forced 
landing, +loss 
Included 
Landing gear (TT 7) +gear, gear, +landing gear, +landing, 
+extend 
Included 
Flight envelope exceedance (TT 
8) 
aircraft, +approximately, +refer, +find, 
accident aircraft 
Included 
Weather factors (TT 9) +foot, +cloud, +mile, +visibility, 
+ceiling 
Included 
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Variable Description Status 
Flight hours (TT 10) +hour, total, +time, +engine, +logbook Included 
Engine oil loss (TT 11) +oil, +rod, +connect, +cylinder, 
+number 
Included 
Directional LOC (TT 12) +normal operation, +preclude, 
+malfunction, +failure, +operation 
Included 
Braking issues (TT 13) +brake, +brake, +apply, +rudder, +wheel Included 
Water-remote airstrips  
(TT 14) 
+airstrip, +passenger, +water, +lake, 
+seat 
Included 
Excess Weight (TT 15) +takeoff, +weight, +foot, +pound, +end Included 
Instructional (TT 16) +instructor, +instruction, +instructional 
flight, instructional, +student 
Included 
Unstable approach (TT 17) +approach, +runway, final, +airport, 
+end 
Included 
Carburetor icing (TT 18) +carburetor, +heat, icing, carburetor 
heat, ice 
Included 
Loss of power (TT 19) +pump, +magneto, +valve, +cylinder, 
+spark 
Included 
Slow flight-stalls (TT 20) +witness, left, +hear, +state, +turn Included 
Flight control (TT 21) +attach, +aileron, +control, +cable, 
+remain 
Included 
Surface accidents (TT 22) +taxiway, +taxi, +runway, +park, +fire Included 
Engine component failure (TT 
23) 
+fracture, +bolt, +rod, fatigue, +surface Included 
Medical (TT 24) +detect, +witness, medical, +test, +brake Included 
Obstructions (TT 25) +tree, +runway, main, +landing gear, 
+tank 
Included 
TextCluster_1 +landing  +report  +runway  +gear  left  
+land  +condition  visual  +damage  
+plan  +student  +nose  +prevail  +state  
+time 
Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_2 +power  +engine  +fuel  +tank  +hour  
+position  +reveal  medical  last  +record  
+issue  +hold  +wing  +damage  
+instrument 
Not used in modeling 
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Variable Description Status 
TextCluster_3 +record  weather  last  medical  +locate  
+hold  +issue  +instrument  +mile  +hour  
+impact  +knot  +turn  +instructor  
+wind 
Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_4 +report  +runway  left  +landing  
+condition  visual  +plan  +land  
+damage  +state  +prevail  +sustain  
+time  +nose  +operate 
Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD1 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD2 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD3 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD4 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD5 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD6 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD7 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD8 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD9 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD10 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD11 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD12 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD13 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD14 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD15 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD16 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD17 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD18 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD19 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD20 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD21 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD22 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD23 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
TextCluster_SVD24 Text Cluster SVD variable Not used in modeling 
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NTSB Most Wanted List Areas 
Year Issue Area 
2019-2000 Eliminate Distractions 
2019-2000 End Alcohol and Other Drug Impairment 
2019-2000 Improve the Safety of Part 135 Aircraft Flight Operations 
2019-2000 Reduce Fatigue-Related Accidents 
2019-2000 Strengthen Occupant Protection 
2017-2018 Eliminate Distractions 
2017-2018 End Alcohol and Other Drug Impairment 
2017-2018 Ensure the Safety Shipment of Hazardous Materials 
2017-2018 Expand Recorder Use to Enhance Safety 
2017-2018 Prevent Loss of Control in Flight in General Aviation 
2017-2018 Reduce Fatigue-Related Accidents 
2017-2018 Require Medical Fitness 
2017-2018 Strengthen Occupant Protection 
2016 Disconnect from Deadly Distractions 
2016 End Substance Impairment in Transportation 
2016 Expand the Use of Recorders to Enhance Transportation Safety 
2016 Prevent Loss of Control in Flight in General Aviation 
2016 Reduce Fatigue-Related Accidents 
2016 Require Medical Fitness for Duty 
2016 Strengthen Occupant Protection 
2015 Disconnect from Deadly Distractions 
2015 End Substance Impairment in Transportation 
2015 Enhance Public Helicopter Safety 
2015 Prevent Loss of Control in Flight in General Aviation 
2015 Require Medical Fitness for Duty 
2015 Strengthen Procedural Compliance 
2014 Address Unique Characteristics of Helicopter Operations 
2014 Eliminate Distraction in Transportation 
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Year Issue Area 
2014 General Aviation: Identify and Communicate Hazardous Weather 
2014 Improve Fire Safety in Transportation 
2014 Strengthen Occupant Protection in Transportation 
2013 Eliminate Distraction in Transportation 
2013 Improve Fire Safety in Transportation 
2013 Improve General Aviation Safety 
2013 Improve Safety of Airport Surface Operations 
2013 Preserve the Integrity of Transportation Infrastructure 
2011-2012 Addressing Human Fatigue 
2011-2012 General Aviation Safety 
2011-2012 Pilot & Air Traffic Controller Professionalism 
2011-2012 Recorders 
2011-2012 Runway Safety 
2011-2012 Safety Management Systems 
Note. Adapted from NTSB (2020a) and NTSB (n.d.b).
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FAA GA Safety Enhancement Topic Fact Sheets 
The following list of fact sheets was compiled from the FAA Safety Briefing site (FAA, 
2020a):  
Topic Area Title 
Aerodynamics Angle of Attack Awareness 
 Best Glide Speed and Distance 
  
Aeromedical Flight After Use of Medication with Sedating 
Effects 
 Pilots and Medication 
 Spatial Disorientation 
  
Aeronautical Decision Making Aeronautical Decision Making 
 Compliance Philosophy 
 Flight Data Monitoring 
 Flight Risk Assessment Tools (FRAT) 
 Introduction to Safety Risk Management 
 Managing Distractions 
 Managing Unexpected Events 
 Personal Minimums 
 Single-pilot Crew Resource Management 
 Startle Response 
  
Controlled Flight Into Terrain CFIT/Automation Overreliance 
 Controlled Flight Into Terrain 
  
Expanding Your Horizons General Aviation Survival 
 Mountain Flying 
 Pilot Proficiency Training 
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Topic Area Title 
Flight Training and Proficiency Avoiding Pilot Deviations 
 Emergency Procedures Training 
 Enhanced Vision Systems 
 Experimental/Amateur-Built Flight Testing 
 Flight Training after Period of Inactivity 
 Fly the Aircraft First 
 Maneuvering Flight 
 Runway Safety 
 Transition Training 
 VMC Scenario Training 
  
Mechanical, Maintenance, and Systems Advanced Preflight After Maintenance 
 Approval for Return to Service 
 Engine Maintenance and Performance 
Monitoring 
 Fuel Monitoring 
 Ignition Systems/FADEC 
 Maintenance Placards 
 Regulatory Roadblock Reduction 
 Smart Cockpit Technology 
  
Takeoff and Landing Aircraft Performance and Calculations 
 Aircraft Performance and Monitoring 
 Stabilized Approach and Landing 
  
Weather Personal Minimums and Weather Cameras 
 Personal Minimums for Wind 
 Use of Weather Information. 
 Weather Technology 
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Dissertation TM Checklist 
using SAS® Enterprise Miner™ 
1. Text Pre-Processing 
Determine Data Sources Complete 
Download Data Complete 
Clean Data Complete 
Determine Variables Complete 
Text Import Complete 
 
2. Text Parsing   
Text Parsing Node 
Setup Node Complete 
Run Node Complete 
Review Results Complete 
Make Adjustments As req. 
Detect Properties 
Different Parts of Speech Yes 
Noun Groups On 
Multi-word Terms As req. 
Find Entities None 
Custom Entities -- 
Ignore Properties 
Ignore Parts of Speech As req. 
Ignore Types of Entities -- 
Ignore Types of Attributes As req. 
Synonyms Properties 
Stem Terms Yes 
Synonyms As req. 
Filter Properties 
Start List As req. 
Stop List As req. 
Select Languages As req. 
Text Parsing Node Report Properties 
Number of Terms to Display 20,000 
 
3. Transformation 
Text Filter Node 
Setup Node Complete 
Run Node Complete 
Review Results Complete 
Make Adjustments As Required 
Spelling Properties 
Check Spelling No 
Weightings Properties 
Frequency Weighting None 
Term Weight Inverse Doc Freq 
Term Filters Properties 
Min Number of Documents  
Max Number of Terms  
Import Synonyms As req. 
Document Filters Properties 
Search Expression  
Subset Documents  
Results Properties 
Filter Viewer  
Spell-Checking Results  
Exported Synonyms  
Text Filter Node Report Properties 
Terms to View  
Number of Terms to Display  
 
4. Document Analysis 
Text Cluster Node 
Setup Node Complete 
Run Node Complete 
Review Results Complete 
Make Adjustments As req. 
General Train Properties 
Variables As req. 
Transform Properties 
SVD Resolution Low 
Max SVD Resolution 100 
Cluster Properties 
Exact or Max # Default 
# of Clusters 40 
Cluster Algorithm Hierarchical 
Descriptive Terms Default 
Results Properties 
Topic Viewer 15 
 
Text Topic Node 
Setup Node Complete 
Run Node Complete 
Review Results Complete 
Make Adjustments As Required 
General Train Properties 
Variables Edit as required 
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User Topics Edit as required 
Term Topic Properties 
# of Single-term Topics Default 
Learned Topics Properties 
# of Multi-term Topics Default 
Correlated Topics Default 
Results Properties 
Topic Viewer Edit as required 
 
Text Profile Node 
Setup Node Complete 
Run Node Complete 
Review Results Complete 
Make Adjustments As Req. 
Train Properties 
Variables Default 
Max # of Terms Default 
Date Binning Interval Default 
 
Text Rule Builder Node 
Setup Node Complete 
Run Node Complete 
Review Results Complete 
Make Adjustments As Req. 
Train Properties 
Variables Default 
Generalization Error Medium 
Purity of Rules Medium 
Exhaustiveness Medium 
Score Properties 
Content Cat. Code  
Change Target Values  
Dissertation DM Checklist 
using SAS® Enterprise Miner™ 
1. Data Pre-Processing 
Determine Data Sources Complete 
Download Data Complete 
Clean Data Complete 
Determine Variables Complete 
Data Import Complete 
 
2. Sample 
Data Partition Node 
Setup Node Complete 
Run Node Complete 
Review Results Complete 
Make Adjustments As Req. 
Train Properties 
Variables As Req. 
Output Type Data 
Partitioning Method Default 
Random Seed 12345 
Data Set Allocation 
Training 60 
Validation 20 
Test 20 
Report Properties 
Interval Targets Yes 
Class Targets Yes 
 
3. Explore 
StatExplore Node 
Setup Node Complete 
Run Node Complete 
Review Results Complete 
Make Adjustments As Req. 
Train Properties 
Variables As Req. 
Number of Observations 100000 
Validation No 
Test No 
Interval Distributions Yes 
Class Distributions Yes 
Level Summary Yes 
Use Segment Variables No 
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Cross-Tabulation As Req. 
Hide Rejected Variables Yes 
# of Selected Variables 1000 
Chi-square Yes 
Interval Variables No 
Number of Bins 5 
Correlations Yes 
Pearson Correlations Yes 
Spearman Correlations No 
 
4. Modify 
Impute Node 
Setup Node Complete 
Run Node Complete 
Review Results Complete 
Make Adjustments As Required 
Train Properties 
Variables  
Non-Missing Variables  
Missing Cutoff  
Class Variables 
Default Input Method  
Default Target Method  
Normalize Values  
Interval Properties 
Default Input Method  
Default Target Method  
Default Constant Value 
Default Character Value  
Default Number Value  
Method Options 
Random Seed  
Tuning Parameters  
Tree Imputation  
Score Properties 
Hide Original Variables  
 
 
 
Indicator Variables 
Type  
Source  
Role  
Report Properties 
Validation and Test Data No 
Distribution of Missing  
 
Transform Variables Node 
Setup Node Complete 
Run Node Complete 
Review Results Complete 
Make Adjustments As Req. 
Train Properties 
Variables  
Formulas  
Interactions  
SAS Code  
Default Methods 
Interval Inputs  
Interval Targets  
Class Inputs  
Class Targets  
Treat Missing as Level  
Sample Properties 
Method  
Size  
Random Seed 12345 
 
Optimal Binning 
Number of Bins  
Missing Values  
Grouping Method 
Cutoff Value  
Group Missing No 
Number of Bins  
Add Min. Value to Offset Value  
Offset Value  
Score Properties 
Use Meta Transformation  
Hide  
Reject  
Report Properties 
Summary Statistics Yes 
 
5. Model 
AutoNeural Node 
Setup Node Complete 
Run Node Complete 
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Review Results Complete 
Make Adjustments As Required 
Train Properties 
Variables As Req. 
Model Options 
Architecture Single Layer 
Termination Overfitting 
Train Action Search 
Target Layer Error Function Default 
Maximum Iterations 8 
Number of Hidden Units 2 
Tolerance Medium 
Total Time One Hour 
Increment and Search 
Adjust Iterations Yes 
Freeze Connections No 
Total # of Hidden Units 30 
Final Training Yes 
Final Iterations 5 
Activation Functions 
Direct Yes 
Exponential No 
Identity No 
Logistic No 
Normal Yes 
Reciprocal No 
Sine Yes 
Softmax No 
Square No 
Tanh Yes 
Score Properties 
Hidden Units No 
Residuals Yes 
Standardization No 
 
Neural Network Node 
Setup Node Complete 
Run Node Complete 
Review Results Complete 
Make Adjustments As Req. 
Decision Tree Node 
Setup Node Complete 
Run Node Complete 
Review Results Complete 
Make Adjustments As Req. 
Train Properties 
Variables As Req. 
Interactive As Req. 
Import Tree Model No 
Tree Model Data Set -- 
Use Frozen Tree No 
Use Multiple Targets No 
Splitting Rule 
Interval Target Criterion ProbF 
Nominal Target Criterion ProbChisq 
Ordinal Target Criterion Entropy 
Significance Level 0.2 
Missing Values Most corr. Branch 
Use Input Once No 
Maximum Branch 2 
Maximum Depth 6 
Minimum Categorical Size 5 
 
Node 
Leaf Size 5 
Number of Rules 5 
Number of Surrogate Rules 0 
Split Size . 
Split Search 
Use Decision No 
Use Priors No 
Exhaustive 5000 
Node Sample 20000 
Subtree 
Method Assessment 
Number of Leaves 1 
Assess. Measure Misclassification 
Assessment Fraction .25 
Cross Validation 
Perform Cross Validation NO 
Number of Subsets 10 
Number of Repeats 1 
Seed 12345 
Observation-Base importance 
Obs.-based Importance No 
Number single Var Importance 5 
P-Value Adjustments 
Bonferroni Adjustment Yes 
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Time of Bonferroni Adjust. Before 
Inputs  
Number of Inputs 1 
Depth Adjustment Yes 
Output Variables 
Leaf Variable Yes 
Interactive Sample 
Create Sample Default 
Sample Method Random 
Sample Size 10000 
Sample Seed 12345 
Performance Disk 
Score Properties 
Variable Selection Yes 
Leaf Role Segment 
Report Properties 
Precision 4 
Tree Precision 4 
Class Target Node Color %  … Class. 
Interval Target Node Color AVE 
Node Text  
 
Gradient Boosting Node 
Setup Node Complete 
Run Node Complete 
Review Results Complete 
Make Adjustments As Required 
Train Properties 
Variables As Required 
Series Options 
N Iterations 50 
Seed 12345 
 
Shrinkage 0.1 
Train Proportion 60 
Splitting Rule 
Huber M-Regression No 
Maximum Branch 2 
Maximum Depth 2 
Minimum Categorical Size 5 
Re-use Variable 1 
Categorical Bins 30 
Interval Bins 100 
Missing Values Use in search 
Performance Disk 
Node 
Leaf Fraction 0.001 
Number of Surrogate Rules 0 
Split Size . 
Split Search 
Exhaustive 5000 
Node Sample 20000 
Subtree 
Asses. Measure Misclassification 
Score Properties 
Subseries Best Assess. Value 
Number of Iterations 1 
Create H Statistic No 
Variable Selection Yes 
Report Properties 
Observation Based Importance No 
Number Single Var Importance 5 
 
Regression Node 
Setup Node Complete 
Run Node Complete 
Review Results Complete 
Make Adjustments As Required 
Train Properties 
Variables As Required 
Equations 
Main Effects Yes 
Two-Factor Interactions No 
Polynomial Terms No 
Polynomial Degree 2 
User Terms No 
Term Editor -- 
Class Targets 
Regression Type Log. Regression 
Link Function Logit 
Model Options 
Suppress Intercept No 
Input Coding Deviation 
Model Selection 
Selection Model Stepwise 
Selection Criteria None 
Use Selection Defaults Yes 
Selection Option -- 
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Optimization Options 
Technique Default 
Default Optimization Yes 
Max Iterations 0 
Max Function Cells 0 
Maximum Time 1 hour 
Convergence Criteria 
Uses Defaults Yes 
Options -- 
Output Options 
Confidence Limits No 
Save Covariance No 
Covariance No 
Correlation Yes 
Statistics No 
Suppress Output No 
Details Yes 
Design Matrix No 
Score Properties 
Excluded Variables Reject 
 
HP Forest Node 
Setup Node Complete 
Run Node Complete 
Review Results Complete 
Make Adjustments As Required 
Train Properties 
Variables As Req. 
Tree Options 
Maximum Number of Trees 100 
Seed 12345 
Type of Sample Proportion 
Prop. of Obs in Each Sample .6 
Number of Obs in Each Sample -- 
Splitting Rule Options 
Maximum Depth 20 
Missing Values Use in Search 
Minimum Use in Search 1 
# of vars to consider  
Significance Level 0.05 
Max Categories in Split Search 30 
Minimum Category Size 5 
Exhaustive 5000 
Node Options 
Method for Leaf Size Default 
Smallest % of Obs in Node .00001 
Smallest # of Obs in Node 1 
Split Size  
Use as Modeling Node Yes 
Score Properties 
Variable Selection  
Variable Importance Method  
Number of Variables to Consider  
Cutoff Fraction  
 
6. Assess 
Model Comparison Node 
Setup Node Complete 
Run Node Complete 
Review Results Complete 
Make Adjustments As Required 
 
 
